CSS 843
**MILITARY INTELLIGENCE: STRATEGIC PLANNING AND
OPERATIONAL TACTICS/DESIGN**

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NATIONAL OPEN UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA

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INTRODUCTION

Welcome to CSS 843**: Military Intelligence: Strategic Planning and Operational Tactics/Design**

CSS 843 is a 3 credit unit course that provides students with the various topics on the issues in Military Intelligence: Strategic Planning and Operational Tactics Design. It is prepared for students of Criminology and Security Studies in the National Open University of Nigeria (NOUN).

The concept of military intelligence is a broad one that yields to no generally accepted definition, although its understanding and use are a necessity in effectively managing an army and executing a war. Theorists, states and armies have somewhat different approaches to military intelligence. Development in military intelligence grows with the generations and era with great influence by the state of technological advancement at the time. Military intelligence applies through the three levels of warfare, namely: strategy, tactics and operation. This study guide provides you with simple understanding of military intelligence, strategic planning and operational tactics/design.

To do well in this course, and the various units, you need to be ready to think critically. You need to develop a constructive mind and use situational analysis, case studies and other research oriented approaches carefully to buttress arguments in the study of military intelligence.

To provide guidance, the aims and objectives are explained below. Also, this course guide provides some useful advice on the reading system, the rule in using the course material, the structure of the course material and guidance for the assessment.

AIMS

i.   To demonstrate an understanding of the application of military intelligence to strategic planning and operational tactics/design.
ii.   To apply the main theories and concepts of military intelligence in strategic planning and operational tactics/design.
iii.   To outline and critically analyse contemporary issues related to military intelligence and its application to strategic planning and operational tactics/design.
iv.   To examine the role of military intelligence in equipping the forces to get them poised to effectively combat terrorism, insurgency and banditry as well as make Nigeria safe for everyone.

v.   To critically evaluate and demonstrate the ability to communicate students' programme through a combination of written papers and oral presentations.

OBJECTIVES
By the end of this course, you will be able to:

i.   explain the concept of military intelligence, strategic planning and operational tactics/design.
ii.   specify the impact of technology and geopolitics on military intelligence and the associated consequences.
iii. identify reasons why states use force, to evaluate international criminal law as a restraint on state capacity to use force and put in perspective the future of use of force.
iv.   show that you are acquainted   with the background to and principles of military strategy and tactics, including the strategies of war, the dichotomies between intelligence and tactics, and the dimensions of tactics generally.
v.   explain the theoretical underpinnings of operational design and its relationship with operational art, operational approach and the impact of environment on operational design and planning.
vi.   discuss special military operations like special operations forces and other elite team, and to do a holistic review of guerrilla warfare.

WORKING THROUGH THIS COURSE

To complete this Course, you are advised to check the study units, read the recommended books as well as other course materials provided by the NOUN. Each unit contains Self-Assessment Exercise (SAE) and Tutor Marked Assignments (TMAs) for assessment purposes. There will be a written examination at the end of the Course. The Course should take you about 14 weeks to complete. You will find all the components of the course listed below. You need to allocate time to each unit to finish the Course successfully.

COURSE MATERIALS

For this Course, you will require the following materials:

1)   The course guide;
2)   Study units which are twenty-four (24) in all;
3)   Textbooks, journal articles and other materials recommended at the end of the units;
4)   Assignment file where all the unit assignments are kept;
5)   Presentation schedule.

STUDY UNITS

There are twenty-four (24) study units in this course broken into 6 modules of 4 units each. They are as follows:

Module 1

Unit 1	Meaning of Military Intelligence
Unit 2	The Stages of War and the Use of Military Intelligence
Unit 3	Impact of Technology and Geopolitics on Military Intelligence
Unit 4	Intelligence Failure and the Problems with using the "Best" Intelligence

Module 2

Unit 1	Status of Use of Force and the Pursuit of National Intelligence
Unit 2	Why and How States Use Force
Unit 3	International Criminal Law as Restraint on the Use of Force
Unit 4	The Future of Use of Force in an Era of Technological Advancement

Module 3

Unit 1	Background to Strategy
Unit 2	The Strategies/Principles of War
Unit 3	Dichotomies between Strategy and Tactics
Unit 4	Dimensions of Tactics

Module 4

Unit 1	Theoretical Underpinnings of Operational Design and the Relationship between Operational Art and Operational Design
Unit 2	Depicting the Operational Environment and Understanding the Operational Environment and the Problems
Unit 3	The Operational Approach and the Interaction of Operational Design and Planning
Unit 4	Organising for Operational Design and Planning, and Operational Design and Planning during Execution

Module 5

Unit 1   Meaning and Evolution of Special Operations Forces (SOP)
Unit 2   Incorporation of Special Operations Forces into National Security Strategy and Policy
Unit 3   Special Operations Forces and other Elite Units
Unit 4   Gender Integration in Special   Operations Forces

Module 6

Unit 1   Meaning, Theorists and Strategic Models of Guerrilla Warfare
Unit 2   Tactics and Organisation of Guerrilla Warfare
Unit 3   Other Aspects of Guerrilla Warfare
Unit 4   Counter-Guerrilla Warfare

Each unit contains some exercises on the topic covered, and you will be required to attempt the exercises. This will enable you evaluate your progress as well as reinforce what you have learned so far. The exercises, together with the tutor- marked assignments will help you in achieving the stated learning objectives of the individual units and the course.

TEXT BOOKS AND REFERENCES

You may wish to consult the references and other books suggested at the end of each unit to enhance your knowledge and understanding of the material.

ASSESSMENT

Assessment for this course is in two parts such as the Tutor-Marked Assignments, and a written examination. You will be required to apply the information and knowledge gained from this course in completing your assignments. You must submit your assignments to your tutor in line with submission deadlines stated in the assignment file. The work that you submit as your Tutor-marked Assignment for assessment will count for 30% of your total score.

TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENTS (TMAS)

In this course, you will be required to study twenty-four (24) units, and complete tutor marked assignment provided at the end of each unit. The assignments carry 10 marks each. The best four of your assignments will constitute 30% of your final mark. At the end of the course, you will be

required to write a final examination, which counts for 70% of your final mark.

The assignments for each unit in this course are contained in your assignment file. You may wish to consult other related materials apart from your course material to complete your assignments. When you complete each assignment, you are required to send it together with a tutor- marked assignment (TMA) form to your tutor. Ensure that each assignment reaches your tutor on or before the deadline stipulated in the assignment file. If, for any reason you are unable to complete your assignment in time, contact your tutor before the due date to discuss the possibility of an extension. **Note** that extensions will not be granted after the due date for submission unless under exceptional circumstances.

FINAL EXAMINATION AND GRADING

The final examination for this course will be for three hours, and counts for 70% of your total mark. The examination will consist of questions, which reflect the information in your course material, exercise, and Tutor -Marked Assignments. All aspects of the course will be examined. Use the time between the completion of the last unit and examination date to revise the entire course. You may also find it useful to review your Tutor- Marked Assignments before the examination.

COURSE MARKING SCHEME

ASSESSMENT MARKS

ASSESSMENT	MARKS
Assignments	Four assignments, best three marks of four count as 30% of the course
Final Examination	70% of total course mark
Total	**100% of course marks**

ASSIGNMENT FILE
The Assignment file consists of all the details of the assignments you are required to submit to your tutor for marking. The marks obtained for these assignments will count towards the final mark you obtain for this course. More information on the assignments can be found in the assignment file.

COURSE OVERVIEW AND PRESENTATION SCHEDULE

Module 1	Title of Work	Weeks Activity	Assessment (End of Unit)
Unit 1	The Meaning of Military Intelligence	Week 1	
Unit 2	The three Stages of War and the Use of Military Intelligence	Week 2	
Unit 3	Impact of Technology and Geopolitics on Military Intelligence	Week 3	
Unit 4	Intelligence Failure and Problems with using "Best" Intelligence	Week 4	Assignment 1
Module 2			
Unit 1	Status of Use of Force and the Pursuit of National Interest	Week 5	
Unit 2	Why and how States use Force	Week 6	
Unit 3	International Criminal Law as Restraint on Use of Force	Week 7	
Unit 4	The Future of Use of Force in an era of Technological Advancement	Week 8	Assignment 2
Module 3			
Unit 1	Background to Strategy	Week 9	
Unit 2	The Strategies/Principles of War	Week 10	
Unit 3	Dichotomies between Strategy and Tactics	Week 11	
Unit 4	Dimensions of Tactics	Week 12	Assignment 3
Module 4			
Units 1	Theoretical Underpinnings of Operational Design and the Relationship between Operational Art and Operational Design	Week 13	

Unit 2	Depicting the Operational Environment and Understanding the Operational Environment and the Problems	Week 14	
Unit 3	The Operational Approach and Interaction of Operational Design and Planning	Week 15	
Unit 4	Organising for Operational Design and Planning, and Operational Design and Planning during Execution	Week 16	Assignment 4
Module 5			
Unit 1	Meaning and Evolution of Special Operations Forces	Week 17	
Unit 2	Incorporation of Special Operations Forces into National Security Strategy and Policy	Week 18	
Unit 3	Special Operations Forces and other Elite Units	Week 19	
Unit 4	Gender Integration in Special Operations Forces	Week 20	Assignment 5
Module 6			
Unit 1	Meaning, Theorists and Strategic Models of Guerrilla Warfare	Week 21	
Unit 2	Tactics and Organisation of Guerrilla Warfare	Week 22	
Unit 3	Other Aspects of Guerrilla Warfare	Week 23	
Unit 4	Counter-Guerrilla Warfare	Week 24	Assignment 6
	Revision	Week 25	
	Examinations	Week 26	
	Total	26 Weeks	

HOW TO GET THE MOST FROM THIS COURSE

In distance learning, your course material replaces the lecturer. The course material has been designed in such a way that you can study on your own with little or no assistance at all. This allows you to work, and study at your pace, and at a time and place that best suits you. Think of reading your course material in the same way as listening to the lecturer. The study units give you information on what to read, and these form your text materials. You are provided exercises to do at appropriate points, just as a lecturer might give you an in-class exercise.

Each of the study units follows a common format. The first item is an introduction to the unit, and how a particular unit is integrated with the other units and the course as a whole. Next to this, is a set of learning objectives that guide you on what you are required to know by the time you have completed the unit. Hence, the learning objectives are meant to provide direction for your study. The moment a unit is finished, you must go back and check whether you have achieved the objectives. If you make this a habit, it will improve your chances of passing the course significantly.

The main body of the unit guides you through the required reading from other sources. This will usually be either from the reference books or from a reading section. The following is a practical strategy for working through the course. If you run into difficulties, telephone your tutor. Remember that your tutor's job is to help you when you need assistance, do not hesitate to call and ask your tutor for help or visit the study centre.

Reading this Course Guide thoroughly is your first assignment

1) Organise a study schedule, design a "Course Overview" to guide you through the course. Note the time you are expected to spend on each unit and how the assignments relate to this unit. You need to gather all the information into one place, such as your diary or a wall calendar. Whatever method you choose to use, you should decide and write in your own dates and schedule of work for each unit.
2) Once you have created your own study schedule, do everything to be faithful to it. The major reason students fail is that they get behind with their course work. If you get into difficulties with your schedule, please, let your tutor know before it is too late for help.
3) Turn to Unit 1, and read the introduction and the objectives for the unit.

4) Assemble the study materials. You will need the reference books in the unit you are studying at any point in time.

5) Work through the unit. As you work through the unit, you will know what sources to consult for further information.

6) Before the relevant due dates (about 4 weeks before due dates), access the assignment file. Keep in mind that you will learn a lot by doing the assignment carefully, they have been designed to help you meet the objectives of the Course and pass the examination. Submit all assignments not later than the due date.

7) Review the objectives for each study unit to confirm that you have achieved them. If you feel unsure about any of the objectives, review the study materials or consult your tutor.

8) When you are confident that you have achieved a unit's objectives, you can start on the next unit. Proceed unit by unit through the course and try to pace your study so that you keep yourself on schedule.

9) When you have submitted an assignment to your tutor for marking, do not wait for marking before starting on the next unit. Keep to your schedule. When the assignment is returned, pay particular attention to your tutor's comments, both on the tutor-marked assignment form and also the written comments on the assignment paper you submitted.

10) After completing the last unit, review the course and prepare yourself for the final examination. Check that you have achieved the unit objectives (listed at the beginning of each unit) and the course objectives (listed in the Course Guide).

TUTORS AND TUTORIALS

There are eight hours of tutorials provided to support this course. Tutorials are for problem solving and they are optional. You need to get in touch with your tutor to arrange date and time for tutorials if needed. Your tutor will mark and comment on your assignments, keep a close watch on your progress and on any difficulties you might encounter and provide assistance to you during the course. You must submit your tutor-marked assignments to your tutor well before the due date (at least two working days are required). They will be marked by your tutor and returned to you as soon as possible.

Do not hesitate to contact your tutor by telephone, e-mail, or discussion board. The following might be circumstances in which you will find it necessary to contact your tutor. If:

- You do not understand any part of the study units or the designed readings.
- You have difficulties with the exercises.

- You have a question or problem with an assignment, with your tutor's comments
  on an assignment or with the grading of an assignment.

To gain maximum benefits from this course tutorials, prepare a question list before attending them. You will learn quite a lot from participating in the discussions.

SUMMARY

The course guide has introduced you to what to expect in military intelligence. It examines strategic planning and operational tactics/design. It covers the military intelligence across the three levels of warfare, namely tactics, planning and operation. It covers the impact of geopolitics and technology on military intelligence. It covers the use of force by states, how international criminal law acts as a restraint on state use of force and the future of use of force. The course gives a background to strategy, discusses the strategies/principles of war, the dichotomies between strategy and tactics and the dimensions of tactics. It covers operational planning and design, depicting operational environments and the challenges it poses, the interaction between operational design and planning, as well as design and planning during execution. Also, the Course covers special operations forces and guerrilla warfare.

We wish you success with the course and hope you will find it both engaging and practical.

REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

Clausewitz, C. von, (1976). *On War*, translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton University Press.

Davis, P. & Kahan, J. (2007). "Technical Report, Theory and Methods for Supporting High Level Military Decision making".

Eccles, H. (1965). *Military Concepts and Philosophy*, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Courtesy of Milan Vego's Joint Forces Quarterly issue 62 article, On Military Theory, 3rd quarter 2011.

Guillot, M. (2004). "Critical Thinking for the Military Professional," *Air and Space Power Journal*, 17 June.

Halpern, D. (2003). *Thought & Knowledge: An Introduction to Critical Thinking* (4th ed). Mahway, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,

**MAIN
COURSE**

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Unit 1   Meaning of Military Intelligence
Unit 2   The Three Stages of War and the Use of Military
                Intelligence
Unit 3   Impact of Technology and Geopolitics on Military
                Intelligence
Unit 4   Intelligence Failure and Problems with using the
                "Best" Intelligence

UNIT 1   MEANING OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

CONTENTS

1.0   Introduction
2.0   Objectives
3.0   Main Content
        3.1 Military Intelligence

4.0   Conclusion
5.0   Summary
6.0   Tutor-Marked Assignment
7.0   References/Further Reading

1.0   INTRODUCTION

Military intelligence is the central theme connecting all the units of this study. The concept of military intelligence is a broad one that yields to no generally accepted definition, although its understanding and use are a necessity in effectively managing an army and executing a war. Theorists, states and armies have somewhat different approaches to military intelligence. Development in military intelligence grows with the generations and era and is greatly influenced by the state of technological advancement and the geopolitics of the times.

2.0   OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
- explain what military intelligence means
- identify of a variety of sheds of military intelligence
- explain how military intelligence applies in all the three stages of war

- state how technology and geopolitics impact on military intelligence
- show how the use of "best" intelligence can result in intelligence failure.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT
3.1 Military Intelligence

Military intelligence is an amorphous concept that addresses the way and manner an army gathers and uses critical information for the safety of society and the eventual success of war. It covers key aspects of intelligence such as warning and surprise; denial and deception; covert action; oversight and civil liberties; role of policymakers; and intelligence reform. Military intelligence addresses theory, practice, and processes as they relate to the most important national security topics of the day; it debates and explores how ideas and interests work together or in opposition to shape national security policies and priorities. It also looks at some of the key intelligence missions, such as strategic warning, counterterrorism, counter proliferation and counterinsurgency. Also within the province of military intelligence is the history of ciphers, cryptanalysis, computer security system design, investigation of security system breaches, user access issues and associated policies.

Military intelligence supports policy making. It examines the principal roles of intelligence in a terror-vulnerable environment and in national policy formulation, in the provision of strategic and tactical warning, in providing support for military operations, and in covert action. There are, of course, problems inherent in conducting intelligence in a democracy and on the ethical considerations associated with providing high quality intelligence analysis. Military intelligence guides national security policy formulation, the factors that influence and constrain policy choices, and the role of intelligence in this process. The changing nature of intelligence vis-a-vis policy formulation, with illustrations from the global war on terror also falls within the purview of military intelligence. As cyber-attacks take the centre stage and is considered to be an act of war, it also became an issue for military intelligence.

It is military intelligence that guides strategic thought and leadership, as it explores how strategic leaders at the executive level of organisations think and influence actions amid volatility and adversity. Military intelligence guides special operation forces and other elite groups. Military intelligence is however subject to legal and ethical constraints, which includes the wide spectrum of topics involving the need for surveillance to ensure a state's continuing security as well as the necessity of providing constitutional protection for individual freedoms.

The intelligence profession is filled with moral and ethical dilemmas that require "doing the right thing" on a daily basis. This notwithstanding, military intelligence is of utmost importance to success in international armed conflicts, internal security and law enforcement. It provides details on how the intelligence enterprise supports a state's internal security and law enforcement programmes. Generally, military intelligence covers issues relating to cyber-security, constitutionalism, emerging technologies in internal security and the overall well-being of the society.

SELF- ASSESSMENT EXERCISE
In what ways is military intelligence constrained by legal and ethical issues and how can these constraints be overcome?

4.0   CONCLUSION

This unit addressed the varying views of theorists and states on the meaning and applicability of military intelligence. It explored the wide range of issues and activities covered by military intelligence, even as there is no generally accepted definition of military intelligence.

5.0   SUMMARY

Military intelligence was explained here as a variety of means of gathering and analysing critical information to achieve national security. It showed how military intelligence supports policy making, special operations, cyber-security, counter-insurgency, strategic thought and leadership and internal security and law enforcement. The unit observed some legal and ethical constraints on military intelligence and how these can be harmonised.

6.0   TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1.   Explain what you understand by military intelligence.
2.   As the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, explain how you will utilise military intelligence to achieve internal security and law enforcement.

7.0   REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

Harriet, F. & Scott, W. F. (1982). *The Soviet Art of War: Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics.* Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

United States Army Foreign Science and Technology Center, *Soviet General Doctrine for War, 1985–2005*, vol. 1

Baxter, W. P. (1986). *Soviet Air and Land Battle Tactics.* Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press

Hensley, J. (1982). *Soviet Troop Control: The Role of Command Technology in the Soviet Military System.* New York: Brassey's Publishers Ltd.

UNIT 2 THE THREE STAGES OF WAR AND THE USE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

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1.0   Introduction
2.0   Objectives
3.0   Main Content
        3.1   The Strategic Level
        3.2   The Operational Level
        3.3   The Tactical Level
4.0   Conclusion
5.0   Summary
6.0   Tutor-Marked Assignment
7.0   References/Further Reading

1.0   INTRODUCTION

In the last unit, we learnt that military intelligence is a guiding principle based on information and situational analysis of information adopted to the overall success of a war. War is divided into three levels, namely: strategic, operational and tactical levels. Military intelligence is useful at all these three levels of war.

2.0   OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- identify the three levels of war
- explain how the three levels of war interrelate to ensure the eventual success of war
- explain how and why military intelligence is useful in all the three levels of war.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

Modern military theory divides war into strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Although this division has its basis in the Napoleonic Wars and the American Civil War, modern theory regarding these three levels was formulated by the Prussians following the Franco-Prussian War. It has been most thoroughly developed by the Soviets. In American military circles, the division of war into three levels has been gaining prominence since its 1982 introduction in Army Field Manual (FM)

100-5, Operations. The three levels allow causes and effects of all forms of war and conflict to be better understood—despite their growing complexity. To understand modern theories of war and conflict and to prosecute them successfully, the military professional must thoroughly understand the three levels, especially the operational level, and how they are interrelated. The boundaries of the levels of war and conflict tend to blur and do not necessarily correspond to levels of command. Nevertheless the strategic level is usually the concern of the highest military commanders, the operational level is usually the concern of theatre commands, and the tactical level is usually the focus of sub-theatre commands.

Each level is concerned with planning (making strategy), which involves analysing the situation, estimating friendly and enemy capabilities and limitations, and devising possible courses of action. This is the application of military intelligence to all the levels of war. Corresponding to the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war and conflict is national (grand) strategy with its national military strategy subcomponent, operational strategy and battlefield strategy (tactics).

Each level is also concerned with implementing strategy, which must be reevaluated constantly (and usually on the basis of incomplete information) because warfare is dynamic. Therefore, a key to success in war and other conflicts is the ability to adapt rapidly to the changing situation and to exploit transient opportunities rather than strictly adhering to a predetermined course of action. The ability to adapt and exploit requires extraordinary judgment, a "feel" for the situation and knowing what to do and how to do it. Exercise of this judgment is the art of war at each level. Below, the three levels of war are briefly explained.

3.1   The Strategic Level

The strategic level focuses on defining and supporting national policy and relates directly to the outcome of a war or other conflict as a whole. Usually, modern wars and conflicts are won or lost at this level rather than at the operational or tactical levels. The strategic level applies to all forms of war and conflict from military activities short of war through insurgent, conventional and nuclear warfare. This level involves a strategic concept, plans for preparing all national instruments of power for war or conflict, practical guidance for preparing the armed forces and leadership of the armed forces to achieve strategic objectives.

3.2   The Operational Level

The operational level is concerned with employing military forces in a theater of war or operations to obtain an advantage over the enemy and thereby attain strategic goals through the design, organisation and conduct of campaigns and major operations. In war, a campaign involves employment of military forces in a series of related military operations to accomplish a common objective within a given time and space. In activities short of war, a campaign consists of a series of related military, economic, and political operations to accomplish a common objective relative to a given time and space. Commanders should design, orchestrate and coordinate operations and exploit tactical events to support overall campaign objectives. Where and when to conduct a campaign is based on objectives, the threat, and limitations imposed by geographical, economic and cultural environments, as well as the numbers and types of military resources available.

3.3 The Tactical Level

In the traditional sense, the various operations that make up a campaign are themselves made up of maneuvers, engagements and battles. From this perspective, the tactical level translates potential combat power into success in battles and engagements through decisions and actions that create advantages when in contact with or in proximity to the enemy. Tactics deal with the details of prosecuting engagements and are extremely sensitive to the changing environment of the battlefield. Thus, in nuclear and conventional warfare, the focus of the tactical level is generally on military objectives and combat. However, combat is not an end in itself; it is the means to achieve goals set at the operational level.

SELF- ASSESSMENT EXERCISE
Describe the three levels of warfare.

4.0 CONCLUSION

This unit classified war into three levels, namely: the strategic, operational and tactical levels in line with modern military theory. The unit explained these three levels and distinguished the various activities that constitute each level of war, while recognising the fact that these levels are not like a water-tight compartment, as activities in one level may spill over to the other.

5.0 SUMMARY

Here, you have been equipped with the knowledge of the three levels of war and the constituting activities. You also learnt here, how and why it

is important for military intelligence to apply in all three levels for the overall success of a war campaign.

6.0   TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1. Differentiate the various levels of war, showing their interrelatedness.
2. As the commander of an army, demonstrate how you will apply military intelligence to the levels of war to ensure eventual success of war.

7.0   REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

Bellamy, C. (1985). Trends in Land Warfare: The Operational Art of the European Theater, *Defence Yearbook.* London: Brassey's Defence Publishers.

Clayton. R. N., (1988). The Levels of War. *Army*, June

Clayton, R. (1986). Modern Warfare: Balancing the Ends, Ways and Means, *Army*, August.

Franz, W. P. (1983). Maneuver: The Dynamic Element of Combat, *Military Review*, May.

UNIT 3 IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY AND GEOPOLITICS ON MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

CONTENTS

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2.0 Objectives
3.0 Main Content
    3.1 Impact of Technology on Military Intelligence
    3.2 Impact of Geopolitics on Military Intelligence
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
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7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Military intelligence is not static. It changes with or constantly adjusts to the developments in technology and geopolitics. This unit examines the impact that technology and geopolitics have on military intelligence and warfare in general. The technology with which World War I was fought differed from that with which World War II was fought and will definitely differ from that with which World War III (even though we do not pray for this) will be fought. Hence, technology has significant effect on the way wars are fought as well as military intelligence. As technology influences military intelligence so does geopolitics. The three traditional levels of war as at the World War II, namely: tactics, strategy and operation, appear to have been compressed with the present ability of sensor-to-shooter war technology, whereby the military practitioner can station in the Northern Hemisphere, press a button and an unmanned drone will proceed to hit a target in the Southern Hemisphere. Similarly, the three traditional loci of war as at the World War II, namely: land, sea and air have changed today to include the electromagnetic sphere and space.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
- explain the obvious and subtle ways in which technology and geopolitics have affected military intelligence and war in general
- describe what ought to be done in the circumstances to restore the place of geography as the primary locus of war.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Impact of Technology on Military Intelligence

In 1901 the strategic world was two dimensional—land and sea were the only two environments. A century later, in 2001, the strategic world had become five dimensional, with land and sea now joined by air, space and the electromagnetic spectrum. During the 1990s, the expansion of the media of strategy led to a debate in Western strategic circles over the alleged growing irrelevance of geography and, by implication, of continental strategy and of the primacy of land forces in war (Evans 2004, p. 102).

The main agents in expanding the media of strategy are the ongoing information revolution and the process of globalisation. In the age of satellites, cell phones, 24-hour television, digital photography and the Internet, war is now global (Keohane and Nye 1998, pp. 81-94). In combination, the rise of information technology and the growth of the global political economy are seen by a number of social theorists and strategic thinkers as creating a system of global networking that links national, regional and international politics. These linkages tend to erase classic geographical formations. In the words of Robert Leonhard, in globalised political conditions, the battlespace becomes a singularity both geographically and with regard to the elements of geopolitical power: economics, information, diplomacy and military power (Leonhard 1999 p. 34). As one major geographical study notes, the rapid expansion of information technologies over the last decade has led some commentators to identify an "end to geography" paralleling the "end of history" that Francis Fukuyama associated with the triumph of liberal democracy in the late 1980s' (Taylor, Watts and Johnston 2002 p. 449).

Advocates of the eradication of geography believe that the spatial logic of modern society is being reconfigured by global telecommunications (Evans 2004 p. 103). Phrases such as "instant wars", the "death of distance", "the end of geography", the coming of "byte city" and "the empire of speed" have been invoked by some scholars to suggest dramatic change in the world of international politics. Many of the "end of geography" advocates believe that technological innovation in transportation, communications and military weaponry has the potential to overcome the constraints of physical terrain and territorial power, and to change the relationship between distance, space and force (Castell 1996 pp 484-490; Cairncross 1997; Geeig 2002 pp. 225-243; Vlahos 1997 pp. 41-72; Diebert 1999 pp. 273-290).

From a military perspective, since the mid-1990s, the "end of geography" debate has been embraced by several advocates of information warfare. These advocates believe that the rise of a trinity of sensors, low-observable platforms (or stealth technologies) and precision-guided missiles have begun to alter the entire calculus of conventional conflict. As Mackinder saw the rise of the railway as signaling the key to unlocking the potential of the Heartland at the expense of maritime nations, so the information warfare advocates see the rise of networks and information technology as a portent of the decline of geopolitics and continental strategy (Mackinder 1989). In many respects, the "end of geography" theme promoted by information warfare advocates is not a new idea. Rather it represents an intellectual extension of Alexander de Seversky's assertion of the early 1950s that the development of strategic bombing had created a new "geopolitics of air power" that had abolished traditional geographical constraints on strategy (Severesky 1950).

Over the past decade, information warfare advocates associated with the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) school—such as Admiral William Owens, Martin Libicki, Richard Szafranski, Walter B. Wriston and Christopher Fettweis—have argued that the information revolution and the rise of global networks have altered the whole nature of time, space and distance in modern warfare (Libicki 1994). Admiral Owens has visualised information technology as producing a transparent battlespace the size of Iraq or North Korea in which there is "unprecedented fidelity, comprehension and timeliness; by night or day, in any kind of weather, all the time" (Owen 2000 p. 14). Owens' idea of an immaculate battlespace impervious to geographical obstacles recalls the May 1997 neo-Severskian belief of the US Air Force Chief of Staff, General Ronald Fogelman, that "in the first quarter of the 21st century you will be able to find, fix or track, and target—in near real time—anything of consequence that moves upon or is located on the face of the Earth" (in Michael O'Hanlon, 2000 p. 13).

For Martin Libicki, precision-guided munitions will separate information from force, while "cyberspace will tend to eliminate geopolitics through its influence on military security, rather than (or at least in addition to) its influence on international politics" (Libicki, 1996 p. 262). He goes on to suggest that the geopolitical landscape will change because a form of strategic information warfare will be projected globally without recourse to physical geography. Information, through "sensing, redirecting, cuing, filtering, pinpointing, classifying, and creating target determinations" will gradually erode environmentally specific warfare. American and Western information technology will make war less of a force-on-force experience and more of a hide-and-

seek activity, while information flow will become central to developing concepts such as network-centric warfare (Libicki, 1996 p. 264).

Wriston and Fettweis have expressed similar views to those held by Owens and Libicki. For Wriston, "information technology has demolished time and distance", while Fettweis notes that, because American armed might can be projected around the world from almost any position, "the geographical location of bases (and indeed geography itself) is becoming increasingly irrelevant". Moreover, geopolitics—in the tradition of Mahan, Mackinder, Nicholas Spykman, Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski—has become obsolete (Wriston, 1997 p. 172).

Yet the proposition that information dominance will eliminate the importance of geography and geopolitics is clearly exaggerated. While it is true that time–space relations are being reconfigured by information networks, the role of territory as an organising principle continues to define human social relations (Evans, 2004 p. 107). As David Lonsdale has warned, the "fifth dimension", or the "infosphere", does not have its own environment and cannot apply unilateral force. Rather, information acts as a medium for more efficient and faster physical expressions of strategic power (Longsdale quoted in Gray and Sloan 1999).

As Evans puts it, the information revolution has not rendered physical geography and physically based military forms of power irrelevant, but acts as an enabler to both (Evans, 2004 p. 107). Improved technology may ameliorate, but will not end, the timeless challenge of mastering tactical topography and of "battling the elements". It remains a truism that "physical geography has a continuous, powerful, and profound effect on the nature and course of combat" (Winters *et al.*, 1998 p. 4). An age of global information networks does not instantly liberate the art of warfare from the geographical and logistical realities of the physical world. What one scholar has called "the unbearable heaviness of being" remains to challenge practitioners of modern armed conflict (Kane, 2001 p. 152.)

Not surprisingly, military analysts such as John M. Collins, Colin S. Gray, David Hansen and John Mearsheimer have argued that the realities of geography and geopolitics in conditioning strategy remain inescapable. Collectively, they have refuted the suggestion that knowledge drawn from superior information networks will become more important than knowledge of terrain, spatial relationships and demography (Collins 1998; Gray 1999 pp. 161-177; Hansen 1997 pp. 55-56; Mearssheimer 2001). As Gray puts it, "the idea that technology has cancelled geography contains just about enough merit to be called a

plausible fallacy while "*all politics is geopolitics* and . . . *all strategy is geostrategy*" (Gray 1999 p. 251). Gray's statement echoes the 1985 prediction of David Wilkinson that "the idea that techno-politics will abolish geopolitics by annihilating the significance of space remains seductive and plausible: a fruitful error and a productive vision as well as a dangerous illusion" (Wilkinson, quoted in Evans 107).

The continuing importance of traditional geopolitics has also been strongly reasserted by the prominent American political scientist, John Mearsheimer. He argues that, in terms of international political competition, it is not information power, but traditional land power that matters most (Mearsheimer, 2001 p. 135). For Mearsheimer, statecraft and strategy remained defined by organised land power because a state's land power is largely embedded in its army and the air and naval forces that support those ground forces. Simply put, the most powerful states possess the most formidable armies, and this eternal truth is ignored at great peril (Evans, 2004 p. 109).

Both Gray and Mearsheimer point out that the possible emergence of China as a 21st-century hegemon cannot be understood without recourse to rigorous geopolitical analysis (Gray, p. 258; Mearsheimer, 2001 pp. 373-377, 397-402). China is a potential continental–maritime giant and represents the Eastern rimland of Mackinder's historical Eurasian Heartland with a long sea coast flanking the principal sea lines of communication of the maritime power of Japan. China has weight and position but, unlike Russia, it is not a predominantly landlocked power. For all the traditional reasons that have defined strategic analysis since the time of Mackinder—size, population, access to the sea, geography and economic growth—China is a growing world force whose ambitions and potential cannot be understood solely in terms of cyberspace analysis and information technology (Evans, 2004 pp. 109-110).

Yet, although the "end of geography" school clearly exaggerates the extent of change, its work serves as a useful reminder that geography represents the grammar of strategy—as opposed to its logic, which is always supplied by policy. The logic of strategy is always political, with geography nearly always playing a conditional role. While overcoming the complexities of the physical world remains fundamental to the conduct of war and statecraft, in strategic calculation one must always be careful to view geography as a conditioning, rather than as a determining factor. Geography may be a constant, but creative policy can also make it a variable factor in strategic calculation. A misplaced sense of environmental determinism should never be allowed to dictate a narrow and rigid view of strategy and statecraft. As Colin Gray notes,

when it comes to the formulation of strategy, geography's proper role is that of a "team player" (Sloan and Gray, pp. 2-3).

Significantly, most modern geographers tend to reject geographical determinism in favour of "environmental possibilism"—that is, the notion that there is an essential interaction between geographical milieu, policy and strategy. Seen from the perspective of environmental possibilism, geography represents a source of both limitation and opportunity for statecraft and strategy (Harold and Sprout, 1969 pp. 41-56). The relationship between geographical environment and the decision-making process is essentially an interactive one and embraces change in both technology and international politics. Geopolitics represents dynamism, not stasis, because "the meaning of geography changes as rapidly as ideas and technologies change" (East, 1956 p. 434).

It is always important to understand that new technology or political innovation may affect the influence that geography exerts over a particular state's strategic thinking. Technology helps to counteract physical barriers, while the formation of alliances serves as a mechanism by which isolated states overcome geographical constraints and extend their ability for military interaction (Starr and Siverson, 1990 pp. 232-248). Indeed, Mackinder's own theory of the Heartland was based on a long-range view of changing technology in relation to geographical conditions since "the value of a natural fortress alters . . . as the range of weapons grow" (Evans, 2004 p. 112). Thus, while a state's geographical position or the extent of its landmass may suggest a fortress strategy based on isolation, politics and statecraft may dictate a different course. In the case of the strategic histories of Britain, the United States, Germany and Russia, the interaction of technology with an alliance or series of alliances allowed geographical constraints to be overcome and a more forward strategy to be adopted (Starr and Siverson, 1990 pp. 232-248).

For Britain and the United States, seaborne trade, mastery of the technology of naval warfare and the use of alliances permitted both powers to pursue maritime and continental strategies in the 20th century (Howard, 1984 pp. 189-207). In the late 19th century, Wilhelmine Germany sought *Weltmacht* through building an imperial navy based on modern battleships that would allow German strategy to extend beyond its enclosed geographical position in the centre of continental Europe. Similarly, during the Cold War, the development by the Soviet Union of a blue-water nuclear-powered fleet was a clear attempt by the Kremlin

to develop a maritime mode of strategy to complement Russia's immense advantages in continental land power (Kennedy, 2000).

Perhaps the central characteristic of the continental school of strategy has been its codification of war into three differentiated levels of tactics, operations and strategy. Until the industrial revolution of the 19th century, the dualism of tactics and strategy dominated the intellectual study of land warfare. As seen in the 19th century, the industrialisation of warfare created a crisis in military theory that was not resolved until after World War I through the development of an intermediate operational level of war connecting tactical means to strategic ends.

By the late 20th century, the theory and practice of the operational art became part of the curricula of many of the world's leading armies and symbolised the acme of war fighting skill. The levels of war in general, and the key role of the operational art in particular, came to serve as a mental map for waging modern military conflict. Yet even at the operational level, war was successfully imported from the continental military tradition of Germany and the Soviet Union into Anglo-American military culture. The codification of war into three composite levels came under challenge from the emergence of new information technologies.

3.2   Impact of Geopolitics on Military Intelligence

Geopolitics is the integration of land power with all of the instruments of state power—diplomatic, military, financial and economic. The aim is to serve goals set by policy (Evans, 2004 p. 86). As Paul Kennedy points out, the critical issue that determines how such instruments will be employed is that of "the geographical factor" of strategic location (Kennedy, 1989 pp. 111-112). It is the geographical configuration of a state's land frontiers or its island location that helps to shape strategy into continental or maritime frameworks. Using the conflict between the various European powers from the 17th to the 19th centuries, Kennedy illustrates the timeless geopolitical questions that all statesmen must consider when contemplating the use of force:

> Was a particular (European) nation able to concentrate its energies upon one front, or did it have to fight on several? Did it share common borders with weak states, or powerful ones? Was it chiefly a land power, or a sea power, or a hybrid and what advantages and disadvantages did that bring? Could it easily pull out of a great war in central Europe if it wished to? Could it secure additional resources from overseas? (Kennedy, 1989 p. 111-112)

The answers to such questions mean that armies become pieces on the chessboard of geopolitics. On this chessboard, the facts of geography, the ambitions of strategy and the realities of politics and technology all interact (Evans, 2004 p. 86). As Svechin pointed out in the 1920s, the geopolitical dimension of modern war requires a dialogue between soldiers and statesmen. For success to be achieved there must be a common understanding of the complex relationship between war, economy and politics (Evans, 2004 p. 87).

A similar call has been made more recently by both American and Chinese military theorists. The American military theorist, Robert Leonhard, has called for future commanders to master not simply tactics and operations, but also the intricacies of grand strategy because, in 21st-century conditions, they will have to operate, simultaneously, in both worlds (Leonhard p. 35). Some Chinese analysts maintain that warfare should be conceived in terms of a grand strategy of "supra-domain" combinations of politics, economics, culture and religion. The formulation of higher strategy requires diverse elements because, in the age of globalisation, "warfare is in the process of transcending the domains of soldiers, military units, and military affairs, and is increasingly becoming a matter for politicians, scientists, and even bankers" (Qiao Liang and Hang Xiangsui, 1999 pp. 221, 189).

Although the parameters between war and other socio-political elements are open to debate, the trend is unmistakably towards a greater convergence. In the 21st century, military commanders will almost certainly require better knowledge of the connections between purely military strategy and the world of grand strategy or national security policy. They must therefore pay closer attention to the study of the extrinsic dimension of the continental school of strategy, that is, to the geopolitical role of land power. In the glare of a global electronic media and in an era of instant communications, no commander will be able to take refuge in the old adage of "simple soldiering" (Evans, 2004 p. 87).

SELF- ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

I In what ways do you think that modern technology and geopolitics have impacted on military intelligence and war-fighting generally today?

4.0   CONCLUSION

In this unit, we traced the developments in technology and saw how they necessarily impacted on military intelligence and war-making generally.

We also saw the meaning of geopolitics, how attendant innovations to geopolitics gave rise to grand strategy and impacted on military intelligence and war-fighting.

5.0   SUMMARY

We learnt in this unit that military intelligence is not static. It changes with or constantly adjusts to developments in technology and geopolitics. This unit examined the impact that technology and geopolitics have on military intelligence and warfare in general. It found that the technology with which the World War I was fought differed from that with which the World War II was fought and the latter will definitely differ from that with which World War III (if that very undesirable war comes to pass) will be fought. All of these do have effect on military intelligence. As technology influences military intelligence so does geopolitics. The three traditional levels of war as at the time of the World War II, namely: tactics, strategy and operation appears to have been compressed with the present ability of sensor-to-shooter war technology and computer surveillance, whereby the military practitioner can station in the Northern Hemisphere, press a button and an unmanned drone will proceed to hit a pre-determined target in the Southern Hemisphere without an infantry support on the ground. Similarly, the three traditional loci of war as at the World War II, namely: land, sea and air have changed today to include the electromagnetic sphere and space.

6.0   TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

You know already that there are three traditional loci of war, namely land, sea and air. You know also that there are three traditional stages or levels of war, namely: tactics, strategy and operation. Now consider this in full, citing relevant authorities. The US military sent an unmanned drone from the high sea in January 2020, which proceeded to Iraq, located a pre-identified enemy, Iranian General Quassim Suleimani and hit him. Suleimani died. In this mission, identify the arts of tactics, strategy and operation. Analyse the effect or the interplay of land, sea and air in the mission. What other factors, apart from the traditional levels and loci of war came to bear to make this mission possible?

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UNIT 4   INTELLIGENCE FAILURE AND PROBLEMS WITH USING THE "BEST" INTELLIGENCE

CONTENTS

1.0   INTRODUCTION

The timely and effective use of intelligence is the hallmark of a secure society, just like the failure to obtain or failure to use good intelligence can be a harbinger of insecurity. Failure of intelligence makes surprise attack a success. Intelligence does not fail under mysterious circumstances. It changes for known or knowable reasons, which may include bureaucracy and an attitude of feeling over-confident with a state's capabilities. It may also be as a result of a state being unable or unwilling to effectively utilise "best" intelligence at its disposal.

2.0   OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
- explain how good intelligence is obtained and utilised
- provide reasons why obtaining and utilising good intelligence is necessary for the security of a state
- show why and how failure of intelligence endangers the security of a state.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Intelligence Failure

The discussion in this unit is adapted from class notes composed by Dr. Tom O'Connor for his class on Homeland Security at North Carolina Wesleyan College, entitled "The History and Lessons of Intelligence Failure". It has been said that "The result of shielding men from the effects of folly is to fill the world with fools" (Herbert Spencer). In other words, it pays to learn about the effect of intelligence failure to avoid more of such failures in the future. An intelligence failure can be defined as any misunderstanding of a situation that leads a government or its military forces to take actions that are inappropriate and counterproductive to its own interests (Schulsky and Schmitt 2002 p. 63). It is a mistake to think that any human endeavour, including intelligence, will be error-free. Enemies may be underestimated or overestimated, and events that should be predictable go unforeseen. Because intelligence work is the product of team effort, there are certain peculiarities common to the bureaucratic environment that help explain failure.

 Arguably, the worst kind of intelligence failure is surprise attack. Surprise attack can be defined as a bureaucratic neglect of responsibility, or responsibility so poorly defined or delegated that action gets lost (Schelling 1962). Surprise attack subsumes intelligence failure. Here are some examples of the worst surprise attacks in history.

Operation Barbarossa—a 1941 deep penetration mission that took Russian intelligence by surprise. In 1941, Hitler staged an operation invading Russia with three million German troops who poured in from the Arctic Circle to the Black Sea. The Russians had plenty of information about troop movements eastward by the Germans, and could not help but notice the increased number of aerial surveillance flights Hitler was sending over Russia. Besides, the US intelligence had already told Russian intelligence of Hitler's plans to invade Russia back in 1940. Russia was convinced that similar intelligence leaked to them by the British was really counterintelligence. Hitler played two deception schemes. He first explained the buildup of his troops on the Russian border as being there for training purposes, to prepare for the invasion of England (Operation Sea Lion). Next, he explained the troops as being contingency forces against possible hostile Soviet action. Stalin bought all this because his own intelligence led him to believe that Hitler would not dare try to fight a war on two fronts.

Pearl Harbour—in 1941, a task force of 33 Japanese ships stationed themselves 200 miles north of Oahu and launched two successive waves of air attack (350 planes). By the time the attack was over, the US had lost 18 warships, 200 airplanes, and over 2,000 personnel. The case of Pearl Harbour is regarded as the worst case of intelligence failure in

history. No intelligence agency had prepared a report for the possibility of an attack there, although everyone talked about it. Naval intelligence did not even have a minimal amount of strategic or tactical intelligence. They thought Japan would attack Thailand about that time of the year. The problem was that America lacked Human Intelligence (HUMINT) on Japan. The US had a few geisha girls on the payroll, but no agents in the Japanese elite. The US had broken the Japanese code, but what they were intercepting was just diplomatic and espionage information (movement of spies), nothing of the nature of military plans, and anyway, they changed their codes a day before the attack. Japanese radio transmissions deceived the Americans into thinking the task force was assembling for training maneuvers.

September 11 "Twin Towers"—From 1998-2001, Osama Bin Laden's terrorist network, al-Qaida, slipped new operatives into the US from Hamburg and Bangkok while the CIA was watching and disrupting other sleeper cells, and although intelligence officials had long speculated on the use of airliners as weapons and knew that Osama Bin Laden was a potent adversary from the 1998 attacks on African embassies and a 2000 attack on the USS Cole, the infiltrators managed to avoid attention getting six different kinds of fake IDs. Some even attending pilot training, a fact the FBI picked up as early as 1998 and something British intelligence tipped the US about in 1999, which led to a 1999 US intelligence brief which political officials claimed they never heard of or was vague. In late 2000, the US conducted a "Dark Winter" drill in which fictional terrorists flew fictional planes into buildings. In early 2001, a flight school alerted the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) about a suspicious student, and the summer of 2001, several suspected terrorists were seen drinking and partying in Las Vegas. Also, in late summer 2001, a Phoenix FBI agent sent a warning memo to his supervisors, and Russian, Jordanian, British, and Israeli intelligence all tried to warn the US. In August of 2001, a senior FBI counterterrorist official quit, the Minnesota FBI began working with the CIA on detained suspect Moussaoui, and the CIA issued another intelligence brief to the President. On September 10, 2001, a group of top Pentagon officials suddenly canceled commercial flight plans, financial centers reported a surge in money transfers from banks in the World Trade Center, and suspected terrorists were again seen in bars, getting drunk and hurling insults at "infidels."

On the day of the 9/11 Attack, 19 terrorists got past airport security with box cutters, and four planes were hijacked — two out of Boston, and two others out of Washington DC and Newark. The two planes out of Boston crashed into the World Trade Center towers within 20 minutes of one another. The one out of DC crashed into the Pentagon about a half

hour later, and a half hour from that, a fourth plane crashes into a field in Pennsylvania, due to passengers storming the cockpit. The FAA notified the North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD) Command about the first flight, but nothing could be done in the six minute timeframe. With the second flight, two F-15s gave chase, but even at 500 mph could not catch the airliner in time. The third flight, headed for the Pentagon, was off radar because it was flying so low. The fourth flight had a thirty minute window of opportunity, but by then, passengers had received cell phone calls about the first tower collapsing and heroically rushed the cockpit.

There are many theories about who is to blame for the 9/11 attack, and unless more evidence is made available, each of the three (3) main "conspiracy" theories remain little more than speculation.   The conspiracy theories include: (1) the CIA did it; (2) Israeli intelligence did it; and (3) the Arabs did it, and the CIA let it happen. This is not the place to go into these conspiracy theories; suffice it to say that belief depends heavily on viewpoint (Harris Poll on Who is to Blame for 9/11). There are those (e.g. Hart 2003) who spread the blame widely on a kind of a post-Cold War fatigue, "peace dividend" mindset, or general "lassitude" that all Americans were caught up in at the time. What is evident and clear is that catastrophic weaknesses were exposed in the world's passport and visa system (background checks were not done), the FBI operated in "dumb" pencil-and-paper mode, the CIA did not have enough linguists and translators, airport security did not know how to do a Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS) screening, there was too much distrust of sharing secrets, and civilian agencies (like the FAA) did not know how to handle military threats while military agencies (like NORAD) did not know how to handle law enforcement threats.   The 2004 Executive Summary of the 9-11 Commission Final Report stated that all the following were specific intelligence failures which occurred:

- not watchlisting future hijackers Hazmi and Mihdhar and not trailing them after they traveled to Bangkok,
- not sharing information linking individuals in the Cole attack to Mihdhar,
- not taking adequate steps in time to find Mihdhar or Hazmi in the United States,
- not linking the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui, described as interested in flight training for the purpose of using an airplane in a terrorist act, to the heightened indications of attack,
- not discovering false statements on visa applications by the Hamburg cell,

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- not recognising passports manipulated in a fraudulent manner by the Hamburg cell,
- not expanding no-fly lists to include names from terrorist watchlists,
- not searching airline passengers identified by the computer-based CAPPS screening system, and
- not hardening aircraft cockpit doors or taking other measures to prepare for the possibility of suicide hijackings.

Anonymous (2004), aka ex-CIA Osama expert, Michael Scheuer, who has also authored *Imperial Hubris* and *Through Our Enemies' Eyes* has disagreed with the official 9/11 Commission Report, saying it was erroneously based on a portrayal of the problem as the result of budgetary, structural, and organisational issues. In a letter to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, he laid out the "Ten Steps How Not to Catch a Terrorist," which are condensed as follows:

1. In late 1996, a report about al-Qaeda and their seeking to acquire nuclear weapons was suppressed (within the CIA), reduced in length, and only after three members of the Bin Laden unit protested was the full report made.
2. From 1996-1998, the CIA and another intelligence community agency refused to share half the information that was exploited via a communications conduit used by Bin Laden and al-Qaeda.
3. From 1996-1999, the CIA received only two special operations officers from the military when they requested many more, and then had to wait 18 months to get the two they got.
4. From 1996-1998, verbatim transcripts (which are much more operationally useful than summaries) were never provided to the CIA by NSA.
5. In 1997, when the CIA had one officer (on loan from another intelligence community (IC) component) who knew the issue told about an upcoming al-Qaeda attack in a foreign city, that officer (an extraordinarily able analyst) was ordered back to her headquarters.
6. In 1998, the CIA's Bin Laden unit was ordered disbanded, then the Director Central Intelligence (DCI) found out about it and preserved the unit.
7. From 1998-1999, CIA forces had at least ten chances to capture or kill Bin Laden, and in all instances, the assertion was that the "intelligence was not good enough" and joint military plans were also scrapped because senior officials from CIA, the Executive Branch, and other intelligence community components decided to accept assurances from an Islamic country that it could acquire Bin Laden from the Taliban.

8.   In 1998, following the embassy bombings in Africa, the CIA's Bin Laden unit briefly started receiving verbatim transcripts, but after receiving about a dozen of them, the flow stopped.

9.   In 1999, Scheuer wrote a memo to senior CIA officials describing the problems of insufficient support, personnel, and at best mediocre performance of Western European intelligence allies but received no response.

10.   For a long time, there has been no systematic effort to groom al-Qaeda expertise.

Below, we take a look at the general reasons for intelligence failure. Although details are important in ascribing causation to historical events (Carr 1961), perhaps more important is to take the time to reflect over the problem of intelligence failure in general. Numerous sources exist which have analyzed the general reasons (Laqueur 1985; Lowenthal 2003; BBC 2004), and have attributed the main causes to certain tendencies which are inherent in most bureaucracies. The following is a list of those causes:

Overestimation — this is perhaps the most common reason for failure, and one which, if uncorrected, can lead to the continuation of error for a long time. Examples include the long Cold War period in which the US consistently overestimated the "missile gap" between the US and Soviet Union. Critics of the Iraq War say this was the main kind of error that happened in estimating Saddam Hussein's nuclear weapon capabilities.

Underestimation — this occurs when intelligence or political leadership seems unwilling to be receptive to warnings, or completely misread the enemy's intentions. A classic example is Stalin in 1941, who did not want to hear about the possibility of Hitler invading Russia, even though the British and Americans tried to tip him off. It is a primary cause of not trusting what foreign intelligence services are saying, and may also be a reason why lower-ranking employees are not listened to.

Subordination of Intelligence to Policy — this happens when judgments are made to produce results that superiors want to hear instead of what the evidence indicates. It is the most widely discussed and analyzed type of intelligence failure, although some discussions talk about a related error, bias. With 9/11, there is the possibility that a "hands-off" policy toward Saudi Arabia interfered with intelligence over the hijackers, many of whom were from Saudi Arabia.

Lack of communication — the lack of a centralised "fusion" office often creates this problem, but it more typically results from when you have

different officials from different agencies with different rules, different security clearances, and different procedures on who and how they communicate. It also occurs when there are too few analysts who only work on-the-fly for different agencies and do not have full-time intelligence responsibilities.

Unavailability of Information — regulations and bureaucratic jealousies are sometimes the cause of this, but the most common problem involves restrictions on the circulation of sensitive information. When there is virtually no intelligence at all, this is called something else, ignorance.

Received Opinion — this is also called "conventional wisdom" and consists of assertions and opinions that are generally regarded in a favorable light, but have never been sufficiently investigated. Sometimes the people in a bureaucracy are forced to make "best guesses" on the basis of limited information.

Mirror-Imaging — this is technically defined as "the judging of unfamiliar situations on the basis of familiar ones," but most often involves assessing a threat by analogy to what you (your government or a similar government) would do in a similar position. It is also the problem of having too many area specialists, like Kremlinologists or Sovietologists.

Over-confidence — this occurs when one side is so confident of its ability that it projects its reasoning onto the other side and believes that since it would not do something itself, neither will the other side. The classic case is the Yom Kippur war of October 1973, although the whole Cold War was characterised by this.

Complacency — this happens when you know the enemy might do something, though you are not sure what or when, and yet you do nothing anyway. The classic example is the British who did nothing in the weeks leading up to the Falkland War of 1982. A modern example is the way the international community sat on the sidelines during the Rwanda massacre. There is a tendency in some circles to just let things run their course. The Syrian crisis that started in 2011 till date is also an example.

Failure to connect the dots — this occurs when the connections between bits of intelligence are not put together to make a coherent whole. It is most easily observed in hindsight, and is perhaps the main cause behind how the 9/11 attacks caught American officials by surprise.

3.2   Problems with Using the "Best" Intelligence

Good collection and good judgment are the key ingredients to producing good warning intelligence. The most accurate of warnings are going to come from a minority of individuals, so it is probably good to "beef up" the number of analysts in various agencies. A large workforce of intelligence analysts should at least statistically increase the chances against surprise attack. However, there are deeper issues at work with regard to safeguarding against intelligence failure. Let us take a look at some of the reasons why the "best" intelligence cannot be used for warning purposes. A partial list is as follows:

- Highly accurate information may be provided by a foreign government or entity, which if used, would publicly disclose the fact that they are assisting a foreign state, and this is not in their best interests.
- Highly accurate information may come from an unreliable source of disreputable character or questionable veracity, and standard operating procedures for "sourcing" or "vetting" and such characters may downplay the importance of their information.
- Highly accurate information may come from an interrogated source who has been tortured or mind controlled in some way, so using the information may risk exposing the government's involvement in such dirty business.
- Highly accurate information may involve a citizen who has more rights than a foreign national, and the slow process of implementing domestic surveillance or getting a material witness warrant must be "fused" with the relatively fast processes of technical foreign surveillance.
- Highly accurate information may only be obtainable by planting a human insider within the enemy organisation, and there may be a total shortage of such agents.
- Highly accurate information is obscured because the enemy is using sophisticated security and deception measures to conceal their real intentions.
- Highly accurate information may not be useable because there are leaks within one's own intelligence organisation, and/or there is media saturation, and/or there are Freedom of Information issues.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE
1)   List and discuss the causes of intelligence failure.
2)   Describe the failure of intelligence that led to the Nigerian Air Force bombing an internally displaced persons (IDP) camp in the North East in 2017.

4.0 CONCLUSION

We have seen the usefulness of intelligence in the security apparatus of a state and how intelligence failure can lead to security hazards. In particular, we used examples like Operation Barbarossa which happened in 1941, the Pearl Harbour incidence of 1941, and the September 11 2001 attack on the Twin Towers to illustrate how intelligence failure makes surprise attack possible.

5.0 SUMMARY

This unit discusses the importance of intelligence in the security of a state. It gives classic cases of intelligence failure and provides detailed causes of intelligence failure. It emphasises bureaucracy as a major reason for intelligence failure. Finally it explains the problems that may be associated with inappropriately using or refusing to use what otherwise is a wonderful piece of intelligence.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Describe in detail the failure of intelligence that made the kidnap of the Chibok girls possible in 2014.

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MODULE 2

Unit 1   State Use of Force and the Pursuit of National Interest
Unit 2   Why and How States Use Force
Unit 3   International Criminal Law as Restraint on Use of Force
Unit 4   The Future of Use of Force in an Era of Technological
                Advancement

UNIT 1   STATE USE OF FORCE AND THE PURSUIT OF
               NATIONAL INTEREST

CONTENTS

1.0   Introduction
2.0   Objectives
3.0   Main Content
4.0   Conclusion
5.0   Summary
6.0   Tutor-marked Assignment
7.0   References/Further Reading

1.0   INTRODUCTION

This unit considers the concept of state use of force and national
interests. It examines the parameters of use of force. It also seeks to
determine the meaning of national interest, what it includes and what it
excludes.

2.0   OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
- explain the concept of state use of force and the pursuit of
  national interest
- determine the parameters of state use of force
- explain the meaning of national interest
- identify what national interest includes and what it excludes.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

Defining national interests is a challenge in and of itself. Such definition
"demands the willingness of a state to uphold its morals and national
values with the commitment of its blood, treasure, time, and energy to
achieve sometimes specific and sometimes in-specific ends" (Loitta,

2004 p. 144). Donald Neuchterlein developed a template that offers four versions of national interest that are based on relative intensity (Neuchterlein 1983, p. 38). He identified four basic interests at stake in any state, namely: defence of homeland, economic well-being, favourable world order, and promotion of values. Each of these basic interests is graded in intensity as survival, vital, major or peripheral.

The definition of a "survival" interest is pretty clear cut; a nation's physical existence is threatened by an attack. The use of military force is unquestionably advanced in support of survival interests. Next on the intensity scale are "vital" interests where serious harm to the nation occurs unless dealt with using strong measures, including force. States are unwilling to compromise these interests; the maintenance of territorial integrity is an example of a vital national interest. "Major" interests are next on the intensity scale. Similar to vital interests, a primary difference between the two is that use of force is not deemed necessary in the defense of major interests. States tend not to go to war over major interests; they will do so over vital interests, though. Finally, "peripheral" interests impact a state's overall interest but do not really pose a threat to the state as a whole (Sklenka, 2007 pp. 4-5).

Debate regarding the use of military force is not generally required when addressing survival and peripheral interests. The requirement or lack thereof is usually self-evident. However, the line differentiating vital from major interests is blurred more often than not, and it is in this region that identifying appropriate strategy, ends, and means proves to be the most challenging. Assessing a state's or region's importance to another state is a crucial step in determining what level of interest a particular issue represents. Equally critical is determining if a concomitant commitment of a state's forces is required to protect those interests. In all but survival interests, ends are governed greatly by the means available to accomplish them. This reality heightens the contention among those advocating that a particular interest be designated as either vital or major, since limited resources required in dedication of the pursuit of particular national objectives must be redirected from support to other issues (e.g., domestic social programmes). Ultimately, the public's willingness to commit force often depends on its interpretation of a given threat. Just as often, the effectiveness of the political leadership to convince their constituents one way or the other regarding the use of force can be the determining factor in moving a particular interest from a major to a vital interest or vice versa. Complicating matters, general agreement regarding the designation of a particular interest as "vital" does not necessarily result in a consensus regarding how to protect that interest (Handel, 2001 pp.311-312). Constant vigilance in the application of these definitions when determining strategy is essential if an ends-means match is to

occur, and an attendant strategy to tie those ends and means together is to be developed. If national political leadership confuses these definitions, a confused strategy with conflicting ends will inevitably result.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE
What do you understand by state use of force?

4.0   CONCLUSION

In this unit we set examined the meaning of state use of force. We also examined the parameters of national interest, what it includes and what it does not include.

5.0   SUMMARY

This unit examined the concept of state use of force. It also examined the concept of national interests, what it includes and what it excludes. We discussed the varying degrees of national interests and how they merit or do not merit state use of force to protect.

6.0   TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Discuss the ambits of the national interests of Nigeria which she can pursue with use of force.

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UNIT 2   WHY AND HOW STATES USE FORCE

CONTENTS

1.0   Introduction
2.0   Objectives
3.0   Main Content
         3.1 Why States Use Force
         3.2 How States Use Force
4.0   Conclusion
5.0   Summary
6.0   Tutor-Marked Assignment
7.0   References/Further Reading

1.0   INTRODUCTION

In our context, the use of force means the application of force of any kind by a state. It will ordinarily include use of economic force like economic sanctions and use of moral force, which are wider and more nebulous terms. However, for our purpose here, we confine use of force to the use of military force by a state. Use of military force by a state can be of two different dimensions, namely: internal use of force and external use of force. Use of force is internal if the state uses her military force to quell domestic hostilities. It is external if the state uses her military force abroad. Whether internal or external, a state's use of force can be in collaboration with another or other states. For instance, when hostilities broke out in Syria in 2011 following domestic protests and government's use of high-handed force to quell them, the government of Bashar Al'Assad invited Russia to use force in Syria to help quell the Syrian crisis. On her own and without the invitation of the Syrian government, the United States also brought its military force into Syria to help in quelling the hostilities, fighting of course on the side of rebel against Syrian government of Al'Assad.

2.0   OBJECTIVES
At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
- explain why states use force either internally or externally or in alliance or cooperation with other states or allied forces
- clearly state how states use force internally or externally.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

The pivotal reason for state use of force is to protect her national interests. National interest is an omnibus term that includes not just the

need to protect the lives and properties of her citizens at home and abroad and those of their allies, but also includes the policy of the state to keep peace (peace-keeping mission), humanitarian missions, counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency and to fight just war.

3.1 Why States Use Force

National interest is the basic reason a state uses force either at home or abroad. It is the police that have responsibility to maintain law and order in the state. Now, what will you do as the president and commander-in-chief of the armed forces of your state when there is a domestic uprising that surpasses an extent the police can handle? It is easy; you may have no choice but to order the deployment of your military to assist the police in restoring law and order. Such internal use of force may be justifiable like the case of Nigeria using force against the Boko Haram insurgency. First in 2002, when the insurgency began, the Nigerian government used police action against the insurgents, which led to the arrest and death of the insurgent leader, Mohammed Yusuf and the brief dispersal of the group. Later in 2009, when the insurgent regrouped under the new leadership of Abubakar Shekau, they lunched ferocious attacks that were obviously beyond what the police could handle and the military was deployed to fight the insurgents. The use of military force against the Niger Delta militants was also justified, considering the intensity of the militancy in that region and its huge adverse impact on the economic mainstay of Nigeria: oil production. However, some other internal use of force may be unjustified, such as the use of the military by the Obasanjo administration in Odi and Zakibiam, which resulted in avoidable casualties in a minor skirmish, and the use of force by the Buhari administration against unarmed Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) protesters.

When states use force internally or externally they always justify it on the ground of national interest, which includes the need to keep peace. The Nigeria military has been involved in peace keeping missions in places like Liberia and Mali. The goal was, either acting alone or in alliance with other states or as part of the African Union (AU) or Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) or as part of the United Nations (UN) peace keeping mission to maintain peace. Peace keeping missions, although composed of the military and at times in combination with police or para-military troops, is not an all-out mission for war and use of force; its mission is to maintain peace, and only when necessary or when attacked by local forces make use of force. In the Middle East, which has been torn by conflict for millennia, the US has sent troops in the past both to the Sinai and to Lebanon, just for such a peace keeping mission. But the US did not configure or equip those

forces for combat—they were armed only for their self-defense. Their mission required them to be—and to be recognised as—peacekeepers. The US knew that if conditions deteriorated they were in danger, or if because of the actions of the warring nations, their peace keeping mission could not be realised, then it would be necessary either to add sufficiently to the number and arms of its troops—in short to equip them for combat,—or to withdraw them. And so in Lebanon, when the US faced such a choice, because the warring nations did not enter into withdrawal or peace agreements, the US properly withdrew forces equipped only for peacekeeping. (Weinbeberger, 1984)

Similar to the need to maintain peace is also the need for humanitarian intervention. When there is crisis in a state, especially when the central government of a state is using state power to cause humanitarian atrocities on some region or population of the state, a foreign mission can go on humanitarian intervention. The Charter of the United Nations provided for respect for the territorial integrity of a sovereign state. That is, a state has no right to intervene in the internal affair of another state. Where it becomes necessary to intervene to avert humanitarian crisis, the Security Council of the UN has to approve of it by a resolution. It happens that the veto power politics of the five permanent members of the Security Council prevent prompt response in times of emergency, as was the case in the Syrian crisis where Russia and China vetoed Security Council resolution for intervention. In such cases, states have been known to take unilateral action to intervene all the same to avert humanitarian crisis, like the US and Russia did eventually in Syria. Where unilateral humanitarian intervention becomes necessary, it is coupled with the responsibility to rebuild the state in which the intervention took place. In 2003, the US, Britain, Australia and the friendly forces intervened in Iraq supposedly to avert humanitarian crisis, although it did appear eventually that the purpose of the intervention was to oust then President Saddam Hussein, who was wrongly accused of stockpiling weapons of mass destruction. After the intervention, the US made some effort at rebuilding the infrastructure damage in Iraq, such as restoring electricity and water supply.

Sometimes, the national interest of a state is clearly political. A case in point is the Russian use of force, what she called the little green men in Crimea, Ukraine in 2014. Ukraine, somewhat backed by the US support, had just elected a government that was not in alliance with Russia. Russia felt it could not work with the Ukrainian government and the involvement of the US in the affair may have adverse effect on Russia's interest in the Port of Sevastopol located in Crimea, which is of great interest to the Russian navy. The port eases Russia's access to the Sea. Russia quickly sent the little green men, who Russia claimed were not

even armed. The little green men moved into Crimea and annexed it to become part of Russia.

States also use force in counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency. Terrorists are increasingly becoming a global threat. Here in Nigeria, we have the Boko Haram terrorising the Northeastern part of the country. We also have the Fulani Herdsmen adding their own brand of terror. Nigeria has deployed military force to the Boko Haram stronghold to dislodge the terrorists. The US and Russia collaborated somewhat around 2018 and 2019 in Iraq and Syria to fight the then Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) operating in parts of Iraq and Syria. In the end, ISIS was defeated. Just late in 2019, the US sent a special operations team that went on a secret mission in the region and terminated the ISIS leader Abukakar Al'Bagdadi, signaling the end of that group. In the 1990s, the US had used force in the fight against the Al'Qaeda terrorist network. On 11 September 2001, Al'Qaeda hijacked four civilian planes in the US laced with bombs and crashed them into strategic locations in the US causing huge losses in human life and property. In 2011 the Obama administration eventually traced the leader of Al'Qaeda to his hideout in Pakistan and terminated him.

Of course, states also use force to defend their territory or their allies and to fight a just war. Nigeria is at the moment using force to defend her territory against the Boko Haram terrorists. In 1990 the US used force in the Gulf War to stop Iraq from invading Kuwait, an ally of the US. The Gulf War was a just war. When Japan bombed the Pearl Harbour in 1941, the US was justified to use force against Japan and to enter fully into the World War II leading to the unconditional surrender of Japan and Germany and the emergence of the US as a super power.

3.2 How States Use Force
We have seen *why* states use force. We now turn to the next question of this unit, *how* does state use force? A state can use only the force it has or it can garner from allies. You cannot give what you do not have. However, a state does not have to use all her force. The state has to measure the threat involved and apply force that is proportionate to take care of it. If a state decides it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, she should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning. If a state is unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary to achieve her objectives, she should not commit them at all. Of course, if the particular situation requires only limited force to win the objectives, then she should not hesitate to commit force sized accordingly. In other words, force should be appropriately sized. It should be neither an overkill nor an under-do. As Confucius put it: "To go too far is as bad as to fall short (Confucius 551-479 B.C.).

Again, if a state decides to commit forces to combat overseas, she should have clearly defined political and military objectives and she should know precisely how her forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives. She should also have and send the forces needed to do just that. As Clausewitz wrote, "no one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war, and how he intends to conduct it." (Clausewitz, *On War)*

SELF- ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Why do you think states use force?

4.0 CONCLUSION

In this unit, we considered the reasons why states use force either internally or externally or in alliance or cooperation with other states or allied forces, and how they do this. We found that the pivotal reason for state use of force is to protect her national interests. National interest is an omnibus term that includes not just the need to protect the lives and properties of citizens at home and abroad and those of allies, but also includes the policy of the state to keep peace (peace-keeping mission), humanitarian missions, counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency and to fight just war.

5.0 SUMMARY

At the beginning of this unit we set out to learn why and how a state uses force. We learnt the reasons why states use force either internally or externally or in alliance or cooperation with other states or allied forces, and how they do this. We found that the pivotal reason for state use of force is to protect her national interests. National interest is an omnibus term that includes not just the need to protect the lives and properties of citizens at home and abroad and those of allies, but also includes the policy of the state to keep peace (peace-keeping mission), humanitarian missions, counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency and to fight just war.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Using historic examples, explain why you think states use force and how such force ought to be used.

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UNIT 3   INTERNATIONAL   CRIMINAL   LAW   AS RESTRAINT ON USE OF FORCE

CONTENTS

1.0   INTRODUCTION

As we saw in the first two units of this module, a state may use force in pursuit of her national interest. Use of force is just a euphemism for war. Carl von Clausewitz has said that war is the continuation of politics by other means. Just as there are rules governing politics, there are also rules governing war. To say that war is politics by other means does not mean that war is a phenomenon not regulated by law. It has been difficult if not impossible for human beings to proscribe war as a crime. The closest we came to achieving this is the declaration that the International Criminal Court (ICC) shall from August 2018 have jurisdiction over aggression, another euphemism for war. Even at that, the ICC Statute is just a multilateral treaty binding only on the few states that signed the 2010 amendment of the ICC Statute making aggression an international crime. International criminal law has however proscribed act and omissions constituting war crimes punishable at the ICC. It is desirable though that effective system of law against war-making is in force to act as a restraint on state use of force.

2.0   OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
*   explain how international criminal law has made rules governing war-making
*   show how international criminal law acts as a restraint on state use of force.

3.0   MAIN CONTENTS

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (the ICC Statute) 1998 is the law that provides for war crimes. The ICC is situated in The Hague in the Netherland for the prosecution of persons who commit international crimes. There are four international crimes, namely: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression. Our interest in the matter of use of force here is on war crimes and aggression, which are crimes committed during war. Although genocide and crimes against humanity can be committed during war time, they are also committed during peace time. War crimes are acts or omissions done or made in violation of the law of war (or humanitarian law as it is also called). According to the ICC Statute Article 7 the ICC shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes (Article 7(1)). The ICC has criminal jurisdiction over individuals (Article 25) and does not try states, as against the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that has civil jurisdiction over states and does not try individuals. War crime can be committed in international and internal armed conflicts. The four classes of war crimes and the crime of aggression that can be committed under the ICC Statute are highlighted below.

3.1   Grave Breaches of the Four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949

Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention:

(i) Willful killing;
(ii) Torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;
(iii)   Willfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health;
(iv)   Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;

(v)   Compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile power;

(vi)   Willfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial;

(vii)   Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement;

(viii) Taking of hostages.

3.2 Other Serious Violations of the Laws and Customs Applicable in International Armed Conflict

Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts:

(i)   Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities;

(ii)   Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which are not military objectives;

(iii)   Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict;

(iv)   Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated;

(v)   Attacking or bombarding, by whatever means, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended and which are not military objectives;

(vi)   Killing or wounding a combatant who, having laid down his arms or having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at discretion;

(vii)   Making improper use of a flag of truce, of the flag or of the military insignia and uniform of the enemy or of the United Nations, as well as of the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions, resulting in death or serious personal injury;

(viii) The transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or outside this territory;

(ix)   Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives;

(x)   Subjecting persons who are in the power of an adverse party to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of any kind which are neither justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment of the person concerned nor carried out in his or her interest, and which cause death to or seriously endanger the health of such person or persons;

(xi)   Killing or wounding treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army;

(xii)   Declaring that no quarter will be given;

(xiii) Destroying or seizing the enemy's property unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war;

(xiv)   Declaring abolished, suspended or inadmissible in a court of law the rights and actions of the nationals of the hostile party;

(xv)   Compelling the nationals of the hostile party to take part in the operations of war directed against their own country, even if they were in the belligerent's service before the commencement of the war;

(xvi)   Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault;

(xvii) Employing poison or poisoned weapons;

(xviii) Employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices;

(xix)   Employing bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with a hard envelope which does not entirely cover the core or is pierced with incisions;

(xx)   Employing weapons, projectiles, material and methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering or which are inherently indiscriminate in violation of the international law of armed conflict, provided that such weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare are the subject of a comprehensive prohibition and are included in an annex to this Statute, by an amendment in accordance with the relevant provisions set forth in articles 121 and 123;

(xxi)   Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;

(xxii) Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as defined in article 7, paragraph 2 (f), enforced sterilisation, or any other form of sexual violence also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions;

(xxiii) Utilising the presence of a civilian or other protected person(s) to render certain points, areas or military forces immune from military operations;

(xxiv) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical units and transport, and personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions in conformity with international law;

(xxv) Intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to their survival, including willfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva Conventions;

(xxvi) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into the national armed forces or using them to participate actively in hostilities.

3.3 Serious Violations of Article 3 Common to the Four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949

In the case of an armed conflict not of an international character, serious violations of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts committed against persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat (those put out of action) by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause:

(i)   Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;

(ii)   Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;

(iii)   Taking of hostages;

(iv)   The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all judicial guarantees which are generally recognised as indispensable.

The war crimes in this sub-unit apply to armed conflicts not of an international character and thus do not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature.

3.4 Other Serious Violations of the Law and Customs Applicable in Armed Conflicts not of an International Character

Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts:

(i)   Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities;

(ii)   Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical units and transport, and personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions in conformity with international law;

(iii)   Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict;

(iv)   Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives;

(v)   Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault;

(vi)   Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as defined in article 7, paragraph 2 (f), enforced sterilisation, and any other form of sexual violence also constituting a serious violation of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions;

(vii)   Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities;

(viii) Ordering the displacement of the civilian population for reasons related to the conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand;

(ix)   Killing or wounding treacherously a combatant adversary;

(x)   Declaring that no quarter will be given;

(xi)   Subjecting persons who are in the power of another party to the conflict to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of any kind which are neither justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment of the person concerned nor carried out in his or her interest, and which cause death to or seriously endanger the health of such person or persons;

(xii)   Destroying or seizing the property of an adversary unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of the conflict;

(xiii) Employing poison or poisoned weapons;

(xiv) Employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices;

(xv) Employing bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with a hard envelope which does not entirely cover the core or is pierced with incisions.

The provisions of this sub-unit apply to armed conflicts not of an international character and thus does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature. It applies to armed conflicts that take place in the territory of a State when there is protracted armed conflict between governmental authorities and organised armed groups or between such groups. The provisions on war crimes in armed conflicts not of an international character shall not affect the responsibility of a Government to maintain or reestablish law and order in the State or to defend the unity and territorial integrity of the State, by all legitimate means.

3.5 The Crime of Aggression

For the purpose of this Statute, "crime of aggression" means the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.

For the purpose of paragraph 1, "act of aggression" means the use of armed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in accordance with the United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, qualify as an act of aggression:

(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a state of the territory of another state, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another state or part thereof;

(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a state against the territory of another state or the use of any weapons by a state against the territory of another state;

(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a state by the armed forces of another state;

(d)   An attack by the armed forces of a state on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another state;

(e)   The use of armed forces of one state which are within the territory of another state with the agreement of the receiving state, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement;

(f)   The action of a state in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another state, to be used by that other state for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third state;

(g)   The sending by or on behalf of a state of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another state of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.

SELF- ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Discuss the war crimes committed as Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949; and other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict within the established framework of international law. Show how the provisions of the ICC Statute proscribing these crimes constitute restraint on state use of force.

4.0   CONCLUSION

In this unit, we set out to examine the provision of international criminal law that act as restraint on the means, methods and targets of state use of force. We saw that a state use of force in violation of international criminal law can constitute the war crimes or the crime of aggression. We saw that war crimes can be committed during international armed conflicts as well as during armed conflicts not of an international character.

5.0   SUMMARY

This unit highlighted the restraints to state use of force placed by international criminal law. A state that uses force in violation of the ICC Statute commits war crime or the crime of aggression. War crimes can be committed in international armed conflict as well as armed conflicts not of an international character. The four specific types of war crimes are Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949; other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict within the established framework of international law; serious violations of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions

of 12 August 1949; and other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character within the established framework of international law. We also saw that a state's use of force in violation of international criminal law can amount to the crime of aggression under the ICC Statute Article 8*bis.*

6.0   TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Discuss the war crimes committed as serious violations of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949; and other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character within the established framework of international law. Show how the provisions of the ICC Statute proscribing these crimes constitute restraint on state use of force.

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**UNIT 4   THE FUTURE OF USE OF FORCE IN AN ERA OF
TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENT**

CONTENTS

1.0   INTRODUCTION

The present era has seen warfare within available technology. The future of warfare in the era of advanced technology seems bleaker than the present, in the sense of being more dangerous and tempting. War in the future will be much more than combat or how we fight. The stealth technology and precision guided missiles used to impose a "new world order" in the early 1990s now pale in significance in the face of new technology. Artificial Intelligence (AI) has taken the human face off warfare, leaving it only with the ruthless ambition to win a war at all cost. The potential for developing lethal autonomous weapons system grabs headlines ("killer robots!"), but the greatest impact of AI on conflict may be socially mediated. Algorithmically-driven social media connections funnel individuals into trans-national but culturally enclosed echo-chambers, radicalising their world-view. The trends in future warfare are examined in this unit.

2.0   OBJECTIVES
At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- describe how the latest trends in technology are poised to change the future of warfare

- specify   what needs to be done by stakeholders towards mitigating the impact of this future warfare on humanity.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

The following are the trends in future warfare necessitated by advancement in technology. They are culled from the World Economic Forum (WEF) 2016.

3.1   Waging War May Seem "Easier"

If increased reliance on machines for remote killing makes combat more abstract from our everyday experience, could that make it more tolerable for our societies, and therefore make war more likely? Those who operate lethal systems are ever more distant from the battlefield and insulated from physical danger, but this sense of advantage may prove illusory. Those on the receiving end of technological asymmetries have a stronger incentive to find other ways to strike back: when you cannot compete on a traditional battlefield, you look to where your adversary is vulnerable, such as through opportunistic attacks on civilians.

3.2   Speed Kills

"The speed at which machines can make decisions in the far future is likely to challenge our ability to cope, demanding a new relationship between man and machine." This was the assessment of US Major General William Hix at a conference on the future of the Army in October 2016. The speed of technological innovation also makes it hard to keep abreast of new military capabilities, easier to be misled on the actual balance of power, and to fall victim to a strategic miscalculation. The fact that some capabilities are deliberately hidden just makes it harder. Because offensive cyber capability relies so much on exploiting one-off vulnerabilities, it is difficult to simultaneously demonstrate and maintain a capability. Once a particular vulnerability has been exploited, the victim is alerted and will take steps to fix it. General Hix says again: "A conventional conflict in the near future will be extremely lethal and fast, and we will not own the stopwatch."

3.3   Fear and Uncertainty Increase Risk

The expectation that asymmetries could change quickly – as may be the case with new strategic capabilities in areas like artificial intelligence, space, deep sea and cyber – could incentivise risk-taking and aggressive behaviour. If you are confident that you have a lead in a strategically-significant but highly dynamic field of technology, but you are not

confident that the lead will last, you might be more tempted to use it before a rival catches up. Enhanced capacity to operate at speed puts security actors into a constant state of high alert, incentivises investment in resilience, and forces us to live with uncertainty. Under these conditions, war by mistake – either through over-confidence in your ability to win, or because of exaggerated threat perception – becomes more likely.

3.4   Deterrence and Pre-emption

When new capabilities cause a shift in the balance between offensive and defensive advantage – or even the perception of such a shift -, it could increase the incentives for aggression. For example, one of the pillars of nuclear deterrence is the "second strike" capability, which puts the following thought into the mind of an actor contemplating a nuclear attack: "even if I destroy my opponent's country totally, their submarines will still be around to take revenge". But suppose swarms of undersea drones were able to track and neutralise the submarines that launch nuclear missiles? Long-range aerial drones can already navigate freely across the oceans, and will be able to fly under the radar deep into enemy territory. Such capabilities make it possible in theory for an actor to escape the fear of second-strike retaliation, and feel safer in launching a pre-emptive strike against aircraft in their hangars, ships in port, and critical infrastructure, with practically no chance of early warning. Indeed, cyberattacks on banks, power stations and government institutions have demonstrated that it is no longer necessary to fly bombers around the world to reach a distant enemy's critical infrastructure without early warning. The idea of striking a `knockout blow` may come to seem feasible once more.

3.5   The New Arms Race is Harder to Control

One of the mechanisms for strategic stability is arms control agreements, which have served to limit the use of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. When it comes to the multiple combinations of technology we see as a hallmark of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, one of the obstacles to international agreement is caused by uncertainty about how strategic benefits will be distributed. For instance, the international community is currently debating both the ethics and practicality of a ban on the development of lethal autonomous weapons systems. One of the factors holding this debate back from a conclusion is a lack of consensus among experts about whether such systems would give an advantage to the defender or the attacker, and hence be more likely to deter or incentivise the escalation of conflict. Where you stand on the issue may

depend on whether you see yourself as a master of the technology, or a victim. Another obstacle to imposing control is the wider cast of players.

3.6 A Wider Cast of Players

As cutting-edge technology becomes cheaper, it spreads to a wider range of actors. Consider the development of nuclear bombs – the last breakthrough in weapons technology that re-wrote the rules of international security. Although the potential for a fission bomb was understood in terms of theoretical physics, putting it into practice involved thousands of scientists and billions of dollars – resources on a scale only a few nations could muster. Over 70 years later, the club of nuclear weapons states remains exclusively small, and no non-state actor has succeeded in acquiring nuclear capability. In contrast, there are more than 70 states operating earth-orbiting satellites today. Nano-satellites are launched by Universities and Corporations. A growing list of companies can launch and recover payloads on demand, meaning even small states can buy top-notch equipment "off the shelf". As Christopher Zember puts it, "Once the pinnacle of national achievement, space has become a trophy to be traded between two business owners". These days, even a committed enthusiast can now feasibly do genetic engineering in their basement. Other examples of dual-purpose technologies include encryption, surveillance, drones, AI and genomics. With commercial availability, proliferation of these technologies becomes wider and faster, creating more peer competitors on the state level and among non-state actors, and making it harder to broker agreements to stop them falling into the wrong hands.

3.7 The Grey Zone

The democratisation of weaponisable technology empowers non-state actors and individuals to create havoc on a massive scale. It also threatens stability by offering states more options in the form of "hybrid" warfare and the use of proxies to create plausible deniability and strategic ambiguity. When it is technically difficult to attribute an attack – already true with cyber, and becoming an issue with autonomous drones – conflicts can become more prone to escalation and unintended consequences.

3.8 Pushing the Moral Boundaries

Institutions governing legal and moral restraints on the conduct of war or controlling proliferation date from an era, when massively destructive technology was reserved to a small, distinct set of actors – mostly states or people acting under state sponsorship. The function of state-centric

institutions is impaired by the fact that states' militaries are no longer necessarily at the cutting edge of technology: most of the talent driving research and development in today's transformative dual-use technologies is privately employed, in part because the private sector simply has access to more money. For example, the private sector has invested more in AI research and development in five years than governments have since AI research first started. Diminishing state control of talent is epitomised by Uber`s recruitment of a team of robotics researchers from Carnegie Mellon University in 2015, which decimated the research effort they had been working on for the United States Department of Defence.

The fact that the trajectory of research – and much of the infrastructure critical to security – is in private hands need not be a problem if state actors were able to exercise oversight through traditional means such as norms development, regulation and law-making. However, the pace and intensity of innovation, and difficulty of predicting what new capabilities will be unleashed as new technologies intersect, makes it difficult for states to keep up. State-centric institutions for maintaining international security have failed to develop a systematic approach to address the possible long-term security implications of advances in areas as diverse as nanotechnology, synthetic biology, big data and machine learning. Yet industry-led measures have not been able to fill the gap.

3.9 Expanding Domains of Conflict

Domains of potential conflict such as outer space, the deep oceans, and the Arctic – all perceived as gateways to economic and strategic advantage – are expanding via new technologies and materials that can overcome inhospitable conditions. Like cyberspace, these are less well-governed than the familiar domains of land, sea and air: their lack of natural borders can make them difficult to reconcile with existing international legal frameworks, and technological development that is both rapid and private sector-driven, which makes it hard for governance institutions to keep up.

Those who secure "first mover" advantage may also seek to defend it against the establishment of regulation and governance in the common interest. Access to the technology needed to reach and exploit space, for example, allows belligerents to compromise the effectiveness of defensive measures that rely on satellites for communications, navigation, command and control technology. Even a very limited strike on a satellite would likely cause space debris, damaging systems used by the wider community. Despite a 1967 United Nations treaty calling for the peaceful use of Space, the United States Deputy Secretary of the Air

Force recently warned that "there is no agreed upon code of conduct" for space operations.

3.10   What is Physically Possible Becomes Likely

History suggests that any technology – even one that gives moral pause - will eventually be developed in order to be used as a weapon. As the political theorist Carl Schmitt explained, political conflict is the "realm of exception" in all sorts of ways that make the morally unthinkable not only possible, but more likely. Professor Ole Wæver and the Copenhagen School of International Relations developed the concept of "securitisation" to describe how a security actor invokes the principle of necessity as a way of getting around legal or moral restraints. Policy-makers can argue that because non-state actors, terrorist and criminal groups can access new technology, they are obliged to pursue weaponisation, in order to prepare an adequate defence. Public disquiet can also be bypassed by conducting research in secret; we now know from de-classified accounts of Cold War studies that soldiers were used as guinea pigs to research the effects of new weapons, and military experiments may well be underway today in areas such as human enhancement. The tendency for the logic of conflict to drive the development of technology beyond what is considered acceptable by society under normal conditions is one more reason to pay closer attention to trends in this field.

As you can see from the foregoing, the future of warfare is disastrous. Humanity will need to be able to think long-term, adapt rapidly to the implications of technological advances, and work in a spirit of partnership with a wide range of stakeholders.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE
In your view, how should humanity adjust to impending escalation in warfare made possible by nanotechnology, synthetic biology, big data and machine reading?

4.0   CONCLUSION

We have seen that modern technology on the production of military weaponry is heading towards more doom for humanity. This is coupled with artificial intelligence, which makes attacks more precision-driven and mans the weaponry with robots, which do not feel the impact of human casualties and indeed strikes from distance far away from the point of impact. Urgent action is needed to prune this technology to adjust humanity to safety.

5.0   SUMMARY

Military weaponry grows proportionately with the state of technology in an era. The future of warfare looks dangerous owing to advancement in modern military weaponry. There is a task ahead for stakeholders to seek ways to prune this development for the safety of mankind. Such is the speed, complexity and ubiquity of innovation today that we need a regulation process that looks ahead to how emerging technologies could conceivably be weaponised, without holding back the development of those technologies for beneficial ends.

6.0   TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

State-centric institutions for maintaining international security have failed to develop a systematic approach to address the possible long-term security implications of advances in areas as diverse as nanotechnology, synthetic biology, big data and machine learning. Do you agree?

7.0   REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

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MODULE 3

Unit 1   Background to Strategy
Unit 2   The Strategies/Principles of War
Unit 3   Dichotomies between Strategy and Tactics
Unit 4   Dimensions of Tactics

UNIT 1   BACKGROUND TO STRATEGY

CONTENTS

1.0   Introduction
2.0   Objectives
3.0   Main Content
4.0   Conclusion
5.0   Summary
6.0   Tutor-marked Assignment
7.0   References/Further Reading

1.0   INTRODUCTION

This unit explains strategy and gives a background to strategy as the life wire of effective war campaign. Strategy means the planning that goes into identifying the end of a war and developing appropriate and effective means to achieving that end. It shows how a war can be lost or won even at the stage of strategy. Effective strategy makes success in war easy. Absence of strategy or ineffective strategy makes war cumbersome and may result in avoidable consequences and casualties.

2.0   OBJECTIVES
At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
- provide the meaning of strategy
- explain the imperatives of strategy
- evaluate the place of effective and ineffective strategy in relation to warfare.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

Military strategy is a set of ideas implemented by military organisations to pursue desired strategic goals (Gartner, 1999 p. 163). Derived from the Greek word *strategos,* the term strategy, when it appeared in use during the 18th century (Carpenter, 2005 p. 25), was seen in its narrow sense as the "art of the general" (Matlof, 1996 p. 11), or "the art of arrangement" of troops (Wilden, 1987 p. 235). Military strategy deals

with the planning and conduct of campaigns, the movement and disposition of forces, and the deception of the enemy. The father of Western modern strategic studies, Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831), defined military strategy as "the employment of battles to gain the end of war." B. H. Liddell Hart's definition put less emphasis on battles, defining strategy as "the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy" (Liddell Hart, 1967 p. 321). Hence, both gave the pre-eminence to political aims over military goals.

Sun Tzu (544-496 BC) is often considered the father of Eastern military strategy with great influence on the Chinese, Japanese, Korean and Vietnamese historical and modern war tactics (Nojonen, 2009). *The Art of War* by Sun Tzu grew in popularity and saw practical use in Western society as well. It continues to influence many competitive endeavors in Asia, Europe, and America including culture, politics (Scott Wilson, 2013), and business (Garner, 2006) as well as modern warfare. The Eastern military strategy differs from the Western variant because of its focus on asymmetric warfare and deception (Nojonen, 2009).

Strategy or strategic planning is the art of identifying an end of war and employing appropriate and sufficient means to achieve this end. Good and effective strategy enhances success. Ineffective strategy inhibits success (Sklenka, 2007). Strategy is defined as a "complex decision-making process that connects the ends sought (objectives) with the ways and means of achieving those ends" (Drew & Snow, 2006 p 13). Strategy relates means to ends and encompasses the process by which the means, expressed as instruments of national power, are employed to accomplish stated ends that are expressed as the national interests. In other words, strategy represents the intellectual connection among "the things one wants to achieve, the means at hand, and the circumstances" (Codevilla & Seabury, 2006 p. 91). Strategy requires the assemblage and coordination of specified acts deliberately linked together in a manner designed to achieve a specific end or set of ends. Under this specification, concepts such as anticommunism, maritime superiority, the cultivation of alliances, and information dominance represent desires and goals, not, as they are often erroneously termed, strategies (Sklenka, 2007 p. 3). Tangible objectives are the target of legitimate strategies, posing a fundamental difference from ideas and dreams. The objectives, or ends, of strategy are represented by national interests, and it is here that much consternation and debate among political leadership occurs.

Clear, succinct, and obtainable ends must be articulated by national leadership prior to the commitment of force to ensure that force is actually representative of appropriate and corresponding means to achieve those ends. Moreover, only a unified strategic design can ensure

that the means are properly employed and that the ends remain focused—especially when the environment changes in such a way as to engender a necessary adjustment to those ends that require a commensurate adjustment in dedicated means as well. Accordingly, when a state commits its military forces in a war, success can only be achieved if clear ends are identified, appropriate means are leveraged against those stated ends, and a coherent strategy is developed to coordinate the ends and means.

Means must connect to end if strategy is to achieve national interest. "No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it" (Clausewitz, 1984 p. 579). This emphasises the need for strategic planning in warfare. Again, it has been said that "To know in war how to recognise an opportunity and seize it is better than anything else" (Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Art of War* p. 158). In the matter of strategy, if you do not know where you are going, then any road will lead you there (Sklenka, 2007 p. 1). To enable effective strategic planning a state or a party going to war or defending herself in a war should always ask this question and provide answer to it: What is the desired end in this war and by what means are we to effectively achieve it?

Strategy without an aiming point represented by a defined end state is doomed to drift aimlessly. Establishing a clearly defined set of political goals up front, though, enables the formulation of an executable strategy and the identification of requisite means designed to support that strategy. Success hinges on that critical first step—determination of the end state. Only after that determination is accomplished can a meaningful strategy and the allocation of appropriate resources to achieve that strategy occur. The process conceptually is rather simple—ends must first be determined, a strategy is then developed, and finally, appropriate means to conduct that strategy to achieve the desired ends are identified and allocated (Sklenka, 2007 p. 2).

Early strategies included the strategy of annihilation, exhaustion, attrition warfare, scorched earth action, blockade, guerrilla campaign, deception and feint. Ingenuity and adeptness were limited only by imagination, accord, and technology. Strategists continually exploited ever-advancing technology. Strategy has since progressed and modernised with the ages through the antiquity, middle ages, early modern era, the Napoleonic era, Waterloo, Clausewitz and Jomini, the Industrial age, World War I, Interwar, World War II, Cold War, post-Cold War and the Netwar. The technology of modern era has greatly improved strategy in line with modern reality.

John M. Collins has argued that, at the beginning of the 21st century, there are six identifiable schools of strategic thought. Three of these schools of thought are the traditional ones of the continental (or land power school dominated by the teachings of Carl von Clausewitz), the maritime (or command of the sea school whose devotees favour the teachings of Alfred Thayer Mahan), and the aeronautical (or air power school founded by the Italian theorist, Giulio Douhet). The other three schools are more recent and are the astronautical (the embryonic infosphere and space strategy school), the special operations (or clandestine warfare school), and the unifying ("beyond joint" or integrated military power school) (Collins 2002 pp. 61-62).

Collins identifies the continental school of strategy with modern land warfare in which the key influence is the 19th-century Prussian military philosopher, Carl von Clausewitz. In essence, a continental strategy refers to the waging of war in which the principal medium of conflict is the land as opposed to a maritime strategy, where the principal medium of conflict is the sea. In the continental school of strategy, the ultimate aim is the defeat of enemy armed forces by the use of armies supported by navies and air forces (Collins, 2002 pp. 61-62). Collins's view is representative of a scholarly consensus that sees the continental school of military strategy as being synonymous with the theory and practice of land warfare (Evens, 2004 pp. 10-11). This consensus is encapsulated in Roger W. Barnett's useful definition:

> The continental school of strategy argues that control over land is the organising principle of nation-states and politics. Man lives on the land, not in the sea or air and control of the land far supersedes in importance control over maritime areas or lines of communication. In historical perspective, conflict has taken place almost exclusively with control over territory as the stake in the contest. (Barnett, 1991 p. 313)

The design of strategy must connect the means to the end. Strategy enables success, only through a sound calculation and coordination of the end and the means (Liddell Hart, 1967 p. 322). Six desirable characteristics of a national strategy has been developed, which offer policymakers a beneficial tool in ensuring accountability and in achieving effective results when crafting strategy (The US Government Accountability Office, 2006 p. 12). These are in general terms:

1.   A clear purpose, scope, methodology.
2.   A detailed discussion of the problems, risks, and threats the strategy intends to address.

3.   The desired goals and objectives, and outcome-related performance measures.
4.   A description of the resources needed to implement the strategy.
5.   A clear delineation of government's roles, responsibilities, and mechanisms for coordination.
6.   A description of how the strategy is integrated internally among agencies and externally with allies.

Accordingly, a coherent strategy begins with the identification of a desired objective or end. Understanding purposes and objectives will not guarantee victory, but failure to understand them virtually guarantees defeat (Codevilla & Seabury, p. 251). Essentially, answering the question, "What do I really want out of this situation?" puts national leadership on the path toward establishing meaningful ends. When determining if military intervention is necessary, defining an end is a state's method of declaring that a particular objective is worth sacrificing its blood and treasure to achieve. Codevilla & Seabury offer a series of subsequent questions that assist policymakers in refining their ends, identifying requisite means to achieve those ends, and developing a suitable strategy that ties the ends and means together. The questions indicate that the process of ends-means matching and strategic development are not one-time events but rather require continual reassessment to ensure that the necessary symmetry among the three is maintained (Codevilla & Seabury). The questions are:

1.   Whom or what do I have to kill, destroy, besiege, intimidate, or constrain to get what I "want?" Once these things are accomplished, will I have achieved my desired ends? Will this obtain "victory?"
2.   What can my enemy do to keep from accomplishing those actions of killing, destroying, etc?
3.   What forces do I have to achieve my desired ends? Can I expand my forces and contrast my enemy's?
4.   Do I possess the requisite will to achieve my desired ends? Have I realistically calculated the anticipated costs associated with executing this war, and if so, am I willing to commit those resources toward my stated ends?
5.   What kind of peace do I want to achieve?
6.   What actions must I accomplish in order to remove any obstacles in the path toward the type of peace I desire?
7.   What must I do to avoid defeat?
8.   What must I do to defeat the enemy's will?

Consideration of these questions throughout a war enables policymakers to ensure that they are correctly focused on their own actions as well as

those of the enemy. Each can be linked to the overall stated ends, and equally as important, each also can be traced back to the issue of means and strategy necessary to accomplish those ends.

As a war proceeds and progresses, these questions also assist policymakers in framing the evaluations that are necessary to ensure the continued relevance of the initially stated ends. An important point to remember is that ends identified at the conception of any war are not necessarily cast in stone; policymakers are obligated to conduct periodic reviews regarding the continuing legitimacy and viability of ends regarding overall national policy. Clausewitz rightly observes that the supremacy of the political aim over all others does not necessarily mean that upon initiation of hostilities political objectives cannot be altered. Military actions on the ground may actually createsituations where adjustments to overarching political objectives must be considered (Codevilla & Seabury pp. 84-85). Supremacy of the political objective should in no way translate into political obstinacy.

Whenever, there is a mismatch between the means and the end, there will be failure of strategy. The US intervention in Somalia in 1993 was adjudged a "failed" mission because the Clinton administration adjusted the end without a corresponding adjustment in means. Had the shift in ends been accompanied by an attendant adjustment in means to accomplish those ends, many of the challenges that US forces faced in Somalia during the autumn of 1993 would have been avoided. As the ends changed, strategic planners at the national leadership level were obligated to conduct an analysis of the evolving situation to determine what shifts in means were necessary to accommodate the requirements of the newly stated ends and then act on their findings. The lack of any substantive action designed to match means with new ends predictably resulted in the ultimate failure of the mission (Sklenka, 2007 p. 10). The consequence of an ends-means mismatch and the attendant disjointed strategy combined to create a situation where manpower and resources were sacrificed in the pursuit of ill-defined policy objectives. Ultimately, this contributed to the operation being deemed a "failure" simply because of the manner in which the US withdrew from Somalia. The "failure" was not in the operation itself, as thousands of Somalis were saved due to US and UN interventional actions. Rather, the failure was more accurately due to the national leadership's inability to develop sound strategy that appreciated the necessity of an ends-means match.

The US mistake in Somalia repeated in the intervention in the Balkan. The failure to adequately address Serb forces in Bosnia merely delayed the inevitability that was realised a few years later in Kosovo (Sklenka, 2007 p. 13). As with the ends in Bosnia, cessation of Serb aggression represented the primary aim of the US. The means for achieving that end

consisted primarily of US-led North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) air strikes against Serbia. While the means employed in Kosovo were deemed appropriate for that particular conflict, once again a lack of an overarching strategy that related the end and means to a broader US vision for the world created unintended consequences. Russia and China were unsurprisingly quite irritated with US actions vis-à-vis Kosovo, particularly since they were dealing with their own set of disgruntled minorities in the form of the Chechens and Tibetans respectively (Gaddis, 2001 pp. 14-15). Interestingly, the ends identified regarding Kosovo did not necessarily fit the profile of "vital" national interest, yet US ends and accompanying strategies impacting Russia and China routinely fell into that category (Sklenka, 2007 p. 13).

Again, the US strategy in the intervention in Haiti failed because there was a means-end mismatch. The concept of nation-building was a legitimate and fundamental component of the overall means by which the US could achieve a critical stated end regarding Haiti—the creation of the conditions for stability necessary to foster an acceptable standard of living among the populace and thus reduce the burden on overall US immigration (Ernest Preeg, 1995 p. 11). Nation-building represents a long-term action by a nation that is designed to engender a long-term result. However, while the stated ends are long-term in focus, and the acknowledged means to achieve those ends are also long-term in focus, US policy regarding Haiti has habitually indicated a focus on short-term objectives. In other words, while the ends and means often appear to match but in actuality they do not, the strategy that binds them together is just as often inappropriate. Because the United States has refused to provide the necessary means to accomplish the ends regarding Haiti as stated in 1994, Haiti has continued to founder, teetering on the brink of collapse. The ends identified for "Operation Uphold Democracy" were indeed noble, but they demanded a long-term commitment that the US leadership was not willing to endure. Consequently, the ends-means mismatch has resulted in at best a strategic purgatory regarding Haiti, with many believing that a repeat of the situation of the mid-1990s is inevitable (Sklenka, 2007 p. 16).

Results were undeniably achieved in Haiti. The US-led reconstruction actions yielded positive results, and President Aristide was restored to power in an indication that democracy was restored to that island state. However, the restoration of democracy required a lengthy commitment that the Clinton administration did not appear willing to embrace. Accordingly, while some short-term objectives were achieved, long-term ends were neglected when U.S. forces were prematurely withdrawn. The lack of success within the long-term domain can be attributed to the ends-means mismatch applied by the US political

leadership. An enduring democracy is indeed a noble end; however, if desired in a state as fraught with developmental issues as Haiti is, that noble end must be accompanied by means reflective of that nobility (Dobbins et al., 2003, pp. 83-84). The cessation of human rights abuses, the reconstruction of critical infrastructure, and the restoration of democratic principles could not endure because the means to perpetuate them were not sustained. The lack of a coherent overarching strategy and the unwillingness to commit the requisite means to sustain the ambitious ends meant that success was fleeting in Haiti (Sklenka, 2007 p. 17).

Just like Haiti, the US war in Iraq was a demonstration of ends-means mismatch. The war began in March 2003 and the US effectively removed then President Saddam Hussien with ease and without finding the weapons of mass destruction allegedly stockpiled by Iraq. The initial reconstruction plans provided ample evidence of the impact of flawed assumptions. A key assumption of the early reconstruction plan was that Iraqi critical infrastructure, such as oil production capacity, electricity generation, and water treatment capabilities, would be rapidly restored to pre-war levels. However, the unstable security environment has not allowed any enduring, substantive repairs to be effected. Further compounding the difficulties of reconstruction, the anticipated dividends reaped from the Iraqi economy have never materialised as that nation is yet to realise significant export yields. Additionally, the permissive environment on which reconstruction actions depend has not fully materialise. The lack of a secure overall environment created second and third order effects that have stymied and stultified many infrastructure repair projects and sharply limited the growth and development of provincial and national governmental capacity. Those situations have in turn hampered the central government's ability to harness legitimacy and acceptance among the Iraqi constituents and have served to embolden the various insurgent and sectarian groups that persist in asserting their respective positions while simultaneously undermining that of the Iraqi central government. The vicious cycle continues as the lack of security prevents further restoration actions, fostering further disillusionment among the populace and exacerbating the legitimacy problems for the central government. The security situation and governance gap created by the US war in Iraq contributed to the emergence of the ISIS terrorist group in Iraq around 2014 and necessitated the US returning to the region in 2019 to eliminate the leader of ISIS, Abubakar Al'Baghdadi.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE
What do you think the US and UN forces could have done to consolidate on strategy after they changed the end in Somalia?

4.0   CONCLUSION

We defined strategy in this unit and gave a background to the vital role of strategy in warfare, emphasising the need for strategy to be clear in terms of the end having harmony with the means before a party goes into war. The consequences that can befall a war campaign if there is an end-means mismatch in war was also highlighted.

5.0   SUMMARY

This unit explained strategy and gave a background to military strategy. Through a review of the ends-means mismatch in the US strategy in Somalia, the Balkan, Haiti and Iraq, this unit demonstrates the importance of strategy to war fare.

6.0   TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1.   Establish and discuss the connection between the ends-means mismatch in the US strategy in the Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 and the emergence of ISIS in Iraq.
2.   Strategy has since progressed and modernised with the ages and the technology of modern era has greatly improved strategy to bring it to terms with modern reality. **Discuss.**

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UNIT 2   THE STRATEGIES/PRINCIPLES OF WAR

CONTENTS

1.0   INTRODUCTION

This unit studies the strategies or what you may call the principles of war. Strategy is a series of lines and arrows aimed at a goal: at getting you to a certain point in the world, at helping you to attack a problem in your path, at figuring out how to encircle and destroy your enemy (Greene, 2006 p. 1).

2.0   OBJECTIVES
At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- describe the strategies to apply in the different types of war that a party may be engaged in
- identify the various uses to which war strategies can be put under relevant circumstances.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT
Many military strategists have attempted to encapsulate successful strategies of war in a set of principles. Sun Tzu defined 13 principles in his *The Art of War* while Napoleon listed 115 maxims. American Civil War General Nathan Bedford Forrest had only one: to "[get] there first with the most men" (Bruce Catton 1971). However, this unit is going to present the strategies/principles of war as encapsulated by Robert Greene's *The 33 Strategies of War,* which are more or less a distillation of principles from extant strategists like Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, Napoleon, Clausewitz, Baltazar Gracian, etc.

3.1 Self-Directed Warfare

The strategy for self-directed war is, in summary, that before you direct your strategy at the enemy, first direct it at yourself. That is to say, your mind is the starting point of all war and all strategy. Directing the strategy at yourself helps to sharpen your mind and ensures that you will get your mark when you direct your strategy at the enemy. Directing the strategy at yourself makes it possible for you to become aware of the weakness or illness that can take hold of your mind, declare a kind of war at yourself to make yourself move forward and wage ruthless war and continual battle on the enemy within you through the application of certain strategies. Once you have absorbed the strategies of self-directed warfare through thought and practice, they will serve as a self-corrective device in your future battles, turning you into a grand strategist (Greene 2006 p. 2). Here are the strategies of self-directed warfare:

Declare War on your Enemies: the Polarity Strategy

Life is endless battle and conflict, and you cannot fight effectively unless you can identify your enemies. People are subtle and evasive, disguising their intentions, pretending to be on your side. You need clarity. Learn to smoke out your enemies, to spot them by the signs and patterns that reveal hostility. Then, once you have them in your sight, inwardly declare war. As the opposite poles of a magnet create motion, your enemies—your opposites—can fill you with purpose and direction. As people who stand in your way, who represent what you loathe, people to react against, they are a source of energy. Do not be naïve: with some enemies there can be no compromise, no middle ground (Greene 2006 p. 3). He that is not with you is against you (Luke 11:23). "Do not depend on the enemy not coming; depend rather on being ready for him" (Sun-Tzu, *The Art of War,* fourth century BC).

The image of this strategy is the Earth. The enemy is the ground beneath your feat. It has a gravity that holds you in place, a force of resistance. Root yourself deep in this earth to gain firmness and strength. Without an enemy to walk upon, to trample, you lose your bearings and all sense of proportion.

If you count on safety and do not think of danger, if you do not know enough to be wary when enemies arrive, this is called a sparrow nesting on a tent, a fish swimming in a cauldron—they will not last a day (Chuko Liang, AD 181-234).

Always keep the search for and use of enemies under control. It is clarity you want, not paranoia. It is the downfall of many tyrants to see

an enemy in everyone. They lose their grip on reality and become hopelessly embroiled in the emotions their paranoia churns up. By keeping an eye on possible enemies, you are simply being prudent and cautious. Keep your suspicions to yourself, so that if you are wrong, no one will know. Also, beware of polarising people so completely that you cannot back off. Margaret Thatcher, usually brilliant at the polarising game, eventually lost control of it: she created too many enemies and kept repeating the same tactic, even in situations that called for retreat. Franklin Delano Roosevelt was a master polariser, always looking to draw a line between himself and his enemies. Once he had made that line clear enough, though, he backed off, which made him look like a conciliator, a man of peace who occasionally went to war. Even if that impression was false, it was the height of wisdom to create it. (Greene, 2006 p. 14)

Do not Fight the Last War: The Guerrilla War of the Mind Strategy

What most often weighs you down and brings you misery is the past, in the form of unnecessary attachments, repetitions of tired formulas, and the memories of old victories and defeats. You must consciously wage war against the past and force yourself to react to the present moment. Be ruthless on yourself; do not repeat the same tired methods. Sometimes you must force yourself to strike out in new directions, even if they involve risk. What you may lose in comfort and security, you will gain in surprise, making it harder for your enemies to tell what you will do. Wage guerrilla war on your mind, allowing no static lines of defence, no exposed citadel—make everything fluid and mobile (Greene, 2006 p. 15). Thus one's victory in the battle cannot be repeated—they take their form in response to inexhaustibly changing circumstances (Sun-Tzu, forth century BC).

The image of this strategy is water. Adapting its shape to wherever it moves in the stream, pushing rocks out of its way, smoothing boulders, it never stops, is never the same. The faster it moves, the clearer it gets (Greene, 2006 p. 25). Some generals failed because they worked out everything by rules. They knew what Frederick did at one place and Napoleon at another. They were always thinking of what Napoleon would do. I do not understand the value of military knowledge, but if men make war in slavish observance of rules, they will fail. War is progressive (Ulysses S. Grant, 1822-1885).

This strategy has no reversal. There is never any value in fighting the last war. But while you are eliminating that pernicious tendency, you must imagine that your enemy is trying to do the same—trying to learn from and adapt to the present. Some of history's worst military disasters

have come not out of fighting the last war but out of assuming that that's what your opponent will do. When Saddam Hussein of Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, he thought the United States had yet to recover from "Vietnam syndrome"—the fear of casualties and loss that had been so traumatic during the Vietnam period—and that it would either avoid war altogether or would fight in the same way it had, trying to win the fight from the air instead of on the ground. He did not realise that the American military was ready for a new kind of war. Remember: the loser in any battle may be too traumatised to fight again but may also learn from the experience and move on. Err on the side of caution; be ready. Never let your enemy surprise you in war. (Greene, 2006 p. 26)

Amid the Turmoil of Events, do not Lose Your Presence of Mind: the Counterbalance Strategy

In the heat of battle, the mind tends to lose its balance. Too many things confront you at the same time—unexpected setbacks, doubts and criticisms from your own allies. There is a danger of responding emotionally, with fear, depression, or frustration. It is vital to keep your presence of mind, maintain your mental power whatever the circumstances. You must actively resist the emotional pull of the moment—staying decisive, confident, and aggressive no matter what hits you. Make the mind tougher by exposing it to adversity. Learn to detach yourself from the chaos of the battlefield. Let others lose their head; your presence of mind will steer you clear of their influence and keep you on course (Greene, 2006 p. 27).

The image of this strategy is the wind. The rush of unexpected events, and the doubt and criticisms of those around you, are like a fierce wind at sea. It can come from any point of the compass, and there is no place to go to escape from it, no way to predict when and in what direction it will strike. To change direction with each gust of wind will only throw you out to sea. Good pilots do not waste time worrying about what they cannot control. They concentrate on themselves, the skill and steadiness of their hand, the course they have plotted, and their determination to reach port, come what may (Greene, 2006 p. 39).

A great part of courage is the courage of having done the thing before (Ralph Waldo Emerson, 1803-1882). This strategy has no reversal. It is never good to lose your presence of mind, but you can use those moments when it is under threat to know how to act in the future. You must find a way to put yourself in the thick of battle, and then watch yourself in action. Look for your own weaknesses, and think about how to compensate for them. People who have never lost their presence of mind are actually in danger: someday they will be taken by surprise, and

the fall will be harsh. All great generals, from Julius Caesar to Patton, have at some point lost their nerve and then have been the stronger for winning it back. The more you have lost your balance, the more you will know about how to correct yourself. You do not want to lose your presence of mind in key situations, but it is a wise course to find a way to make your enemies lose theirs. Take what throws you off balance and impose it on them. Make them act before they are ready. Surprise them—nothing is more unsettling than the unexpected need to act. Find their weakness, what makes them emotional, and give them a double dose of it. The more emotional you can make them, the farther you will push them off course.

Create a Sense of Urgency and Desperation: The Death-Ground Strategy

You are your own worst enemy. You waste precious time dreaming about the future instead of engaging in the present. Since nothing seems urgent to you, you are only half involved in what you do. The only way to change is through action and outside pressure. Put yourself in a situation where you have too much at stake to waste time or resources— if you cannot afford to lose, you will not. Cut your ties to the past; enter unknown territory where you must depend on your wits and energy to see you through. Place yourself on "death ground", where your back is against the wall and you have to fight like hell to get out alive (Greene, 2006 p. 41). The ancient commanders of armies, who knew the powerful influence of necessity well, and how it inspired their soldiers with the most desperate courage, neglected nothing to subject their men to such a pressure (Nicholo Machiavelli, 1469-1527).

The image of this strategy is fire. By itself it has no force; it depends on its environment. Give it air, dry timber, a wind to fan the flame, and it will gain a terrifying momentum, growing hotter, feeding off itself, consuming everything on its path. Never leave such power to chance (Greene 2006 p. 51). Then you will survive if you fight quickly and perish if you do not, this is called death ground. Put them in a spot where they will have no place to go, and they will die before fleeing. If they are to die there, what can they not do? Warriors exact their full strength. When warriors are in great danger, then they have no fear. When there is nowhere to go, they are firm, when they are deeply involved, they stick to it. If they have no choice, they will fight (Sun-Tzu, *The Art of War,* fourth century BC).

If the feeling of having nothing to lose can propel you forward, it can do the same for others. You must avoid any conflict with people in this position. Maybe they are living in terrible conditions or, for whatever

reason, are suicidal; in any case they are desperate, and desperate people will risk everything in a fight. This gives them a huge advantage. Already defeated by circumstances, they have nothing to lose. You do. Leave them alone. Conversely, attacking enemies when their morale is low gives you the advantage. Maybe they are fighting for a cause they know is unjust or for a leader they do not respect. Find a way to lower their spirits even further. Troops with low morale are discouraged by the slightest setback. A show of force will crush their fighting spirit. Always try to lower the other side's sense of urgency. Make your enemies think they have all the time in the world; when you suddenly appear at their border, they are in a slumbering state, and you will easily overrun them. While you are sharpening your fighting spirit, always do what you can to blunt theirs.

3.2 Organisational (Team) Warfare

You may have brilliant ideas, you may be able to invent unbeatable strategies—but if the group that you lead, and that you depend on to execute your plans, is unresponsive and uncreative, and if its members always put their personal agendas first, your ideas will mean nothing. You must learn the lesson of war: it is the structure of the army—the chain of command and the relationship of the parts to the whole—that will give your strategies force. The primary goal in war is to build speed and mobility into the very structure of your army. That means having a single authority on top, avoiding the hesitancy and confusion of divided leadership. It means giving soldiers a sense of the overall goal to be accomplished and the latitude to take action to meet that goal; instead of reacting like automatons, they are able to respond to events in the field. Finally, it means motivating soldiers, creating an overall esprit de corps that gives them irresistible momentum. With forces organised in this manner, a general can adapt to circumstances faster than the enemy can, gaining a decided advantage. This military model is extremely adaptable to any group. It has one simple requirement: before formulating a strategy or taking action, understand the structure of your group. You can always change it and redesign it to fit your purposes (Greene, 2006 pp. 53-54).

Avoid the Snare of Groupthink: The Command-and-Control Strategy

The problem in leading any group is that people inevitably have their own agendas. If you are too authoritarian, they will resent you and rebel in silent ways. If you are too easygoing, they will revert to their natural selfishness and you will lose control. You have to create a chain of command in which people do not feel constrained by your influence yet

follow your lead. Put the right people in place—people who will enact the spirit of your ideas without being automatons. Make your commands clear and inspiring, focusing attention on the team, not the leader. Create a sense of participation, but do not fall into Groupthink—the irrationality of collective decision making. Make yourself look like a paragon of fairness, but never relinquish unity of command (Greene, 2006 p. 55). Madness is the exception in individuals but the rule in groups (Friedrich Nietzsche, 1844-1990).

The image of this strategy is the reins. A horse with no bridle is useless, but equally bad is the horse whose reins you pull at every turn, in a vain effort at control. Control comes from almost letting go, holding the reins so lightly that the horse feels no tug but senses the slightest change in tension and responds as you desire. Not everyone can master such an art (Greene, 2006 p. 66). Better one bad general than two good ones (Napoleon Bonaparte 1769-1821).

No good can ever come out of a divided leadership. If you are ever offered a position in which you will have to share command, turn it down, for the enterprise will fail and you will be held responsible. Better to take a lower position and let the other person have the job. It is always wise, however, to take advantage of your opponent's faulty command structure. Never be intimidated by an alliance of forces against you: if they share leadership, if they are ruled by committee, your advantage is more than enough. In fact, do as Napoleon did and seek out enemies with that kind of command structure. You cannot fail to win (Greene, 2006 p. 67).

Segment your Forces: The Controlled Chaos Strategy

The critical elements in war are speed and adaptability—the ability to move and make decisions faster than the enemy. But speed and adaptability are hard to achieve today. We have more information than ever before at our fingertips, making interpretation and decision making more difficult. We have more people to manage, those people are more widely spread, and we face more uncertainty. Learn from Napoleon, warfare's greatest master: speed and adaptability come from flexible organisation. Break your forces into independent groups that can operate and make decisions on their own. Make your forces elusive and unstoppable by infusing them with the spirit of the campaign, giving them a mission to accomplish, and then letting them run (Greene, 2006 p. 69). Separate to live; unite to fight (Napoleon Bonaparte, 1769-1821).

The image of this strategy is the spider's web. Most animals attack along a straight line; the spider weaves a web, adapted to its location and spun

in a pattern whether simple or complex. Once the web is woven, the work is done. The spider has no need to hunt; it simply waits for the next fool to fall into the web's barely visible strands (Greene, 2006 p. 77).

Thus the army moves for advantage, and changes through segmenting and reuniting. Thus its speed is like the wind, its slowness like the forest; its invasion and plundering like a fire. It is as difficult to know as the darkness; in movement it is like thunder. (Sun-Tzu, fourth century BC).

This strategy has a reversal. Since the structure of your army has to be suited to the people who compose it, the rule of decentralisation is flexible: some people respond better to rigid authority. Even if you run a loosed organisation, there may be times when you will have to tighten it and give your officers less freedom. Wise generals set nothing in stone, always retaining the ability to reorganise their army to fit the times and their changing needs. (Greene, 2006 p. 78)

Transform your War into a Crusade: Morality Strategies

The secret to motivating people and maintaining their morale is to get them to think less about themselves and more about the group. Involve them in a cause, a crusade against a hated enemy. Make them see their survival as tied to the success of the army as a whole. In a group in which people have truly bonded, moods and emotions are so contagious that it becomes easy to infect your troops with enthusiasm. Lead from the front: let your soldiers see you in the trenches, making sacrifices for the cause. That will fill them with the desire to emulate and please you. Make both rewards and punishments rare but meaningful. Remember: a motivated army can work wonders, making up for any lack of material resources (Greene, 2006 p. 79).

The image of this strategy is the ocean's tide. It ebbs and flows so powerfully that no one in its path can escape its pull and move against it. Like the moon, you are the force that sets the tide, which carries everything along in its wake (Greene, 2006 p. 94). The way means inducing the people to have the same aim as the leadership, so that they will share death and share life, without fear of danger (Sun-Tzu, fourth century B.C.). This strategy has a reversal. If morale is contagious, so is its opposite: fear and discontent can spread through your troops like wildfire. The only way to deal with them is to cut them off before they turn into panic and rebellion. In 58 B.C., when Rome was fighting the Gallic War, Julius Caesar was preparing for battle against the Germanic leader Ariovistus. Rumors about the ferocity and size of the German

forces were flying, and his army was panicky and mutinous. Caesar acted fast: first he had the rumormongers arrested. Next he addressed his soldiers personally, reminding them of their brave ancestors who had fought and defeated the Germans. He would not lead their weaker descendants into battle; since the Tenth Legion alone seemed immune to the growing panic, he would take them alone. As Caesar prepared to march with the valiant Tenth Legion, the rest of the army, ashamed, begged him to forgive them and let them fight. With a show of reluctance, he did so, and these once frightened men fought fiercely. In such cases you must act like Caesar, turning back the tide of panic. Waste no time, and deal with the whole group. People who spread panic or mutiny experience a kind of madness in which they gradually lose contact with reality. Appeal to their pride and dignity; make them feel ashamed of their moment of weakness and madness. Remind them of what they have accomplished in the past, and show them how they are falling short of the ideal. This social shaming will wake them up and reverse the dynamic (Greene, 2006 p. 94).

3.3 Defensive Warfare

To fight in a defensive manner is not a sign of weakness; it is the height of strategic wisdom, a powerful style of waging war. Its requirements are simple: First, you must make the most of your resources, fighting with perfect economy and engaging only in battles that are necessary. Second, you must know how and when to retreat, luring an aggressive enemy into an imprudent attack. Then, waiting patiently for his moment of exhaustion, launch a vicious counterattack. In a world that frowns at displays of overt aggression, the ability to fight defensively—to let others make the first move and then wait for their own mistakes to destroy them—will bring you untold power. Because you waste neither energy nor time, you are always ready for the next inevitable battle. Your career will be long and fruitful. To fight this way, you must master the arts of deception. By seeming weaker than you are, you can draw the enemy into an ill-advised attack; by seeming stronger than you are— perhaps through an occasional act that is reckless and bold—you can deter the enemy from attacking you. In defensive warfare you are essentially leveraging your weaknesses and limitations into power and victory. Defensive warfare instructs you in economy of means, counterattack, intimidation and deterrence, and how to retreat skillfully and lie low when under aggressive attack (Greene, 2006 pp. 95-96).

Pick your Battles Carefully: The Perfect-Economy Strategy

We all have limitations—our energies and skills will take us only as far as they can. Danger comes from trying to surpass our limits. Seduced by

some glittering prize into overextending ourselves, we end up exhausted and vulnerable. You must know your limits and pick your battles carefully. Consider the hidden costs of a war: time lost, political goodwill squandered, an embittered enemy bent on revenge. Sometimes it is better to wait, to undermine your enemies covertly rather than hitting them straight on. If battle cannot be avoided, get them to fight on your terms. Aim at their weaknesses; make the war expensive for them and cheap for you. Fighting with perfect economy, you can outlast even the most powerful foe (Greene, 2006 p. 97).

The image of this strategy is the swimmer. The water offers resistance; you can move only so fast. Some swimmers pound at the water, trying to use force to generate speed—but they only make waves, creating resistance in their path. Others are too delicate, kicking so lightly they barely move. Consummate swimmers hit the surface with perfect economy, keeping the water in front of them smooth and level. They move as fast as the water will let them and cover great distances at a steady pace. (Greene, 2006 p. 108) The value of a thing sometimes lies not in what one attains with it but in what one pays for it—what it costs us. (Friedrich Nietzsche, 1844-1900)

This strategy has no reversal. There can never be any value in fighting uneconomically, but it is always a wise course to make your opponents waste as much of their resources as possible. This can be done through hit-and-run tactics, forcing them to expend energy chasing after you. Lure them into thinking that one big offensive will ruin you; then bog that offensive down in a protracted war in which they lose valuable time and resources. Frustrated opponents exhausting energy on punches they cannot land will soon make mistakes and open them up to a vicious counterattack (Greene, 2006 p. 108).

Turn the Tables: The Counterattack Strategy

Moving first—initiating the attack—will often put you at a disadvantage: you are exposing your strategy and limiting your options. Instead discover the power of holding back and letting the other side move first, giving you the flexibility to counterattack from any angle. If your opponents are aggressive, bait them into a rash attack that will leave them in a weak position. Learn to use their impatience, their eagerness to get at you, as a way to throw them off balance and bring them down. In difficult moments do not despair or retreat: any situation can be turned around. If you learn how to hold back, waiting for the right moment to launch an unexpected counterattack, weakness can become strength (Greene, 2006 p. 108)

The soundest strategy in war is to postpone operations until the moral disintegration of the enemy renders the delivery of the mortal blow both possible and easy (Vladimir Lenin, 1870-1924).

The image of this strategy is the bull. It is large, its stare is intimidating, and its horn can pierce your skin. Attacking it and trying to escape it are equally fatal. Instead stand your ground and let the bull charge your cape, giving it nothing to hit, making its horns useless. Get it angry and irritated—the harder and more furious it charges, the faster it wears itself down. A point will come when you can turn the game around and go to work, carving up the once fearsome beast (Greene, 2006 p. 121).
The whole art of war consists in a well-reasoned and extremely circumspect defensive, followed by a rapid and audacious attack (Napoleon Bonaparte, 1769-1821).

This strategy has a reversal. The counterattack strategy cannot be applied in every situation: there will always be times when it is better to initiate the attack yourself, gaining control by putting your opponents on the defensive before they have time to think. Look at the details of the situation. If the enemy is too smart to lose patience and attack you, or if you have too much to lose by waiting, go on the offensive. It is also usually best to vary your methods, always having more than one strategy to draw on. If your enemies think you always wait to counterattack, you have the perfect setup for moving first and surprising them. So mix things up. Watch the situation and make it impossible for your opponents to predict what you will do.

Create a Threatening Presence: Deterrence Strategies

The best way to fight off aggressors is to keep them from attacking you in the first place. To accomplish this you must create the impression of being more powerful than you are. Build up a reputation: You are a little crazy. Fighting you is not worth it. You take your enemies with you when you lose. Create this reputation and make it credible with a few impressive—impressively violent—acts. Uncertainty is sometimes better than overt threat: if your opponents are never sure what messing with you will cost, they will not want to find out. Play on people's natural fears and anxieties to make them think twice. (Greene, 2006 p. 123)

The image of this strategy is the porcupine. It seems rather stupid and slow, easy prey, but when it is threatened or attacked, its quills stand erect. If touched, they come out easily in your flesh, and trying to extract them makes their hooked ends go deeper and deeper, causing more damage. Those who have fought with a porcupine learn never to repeat

their experience. Even without fighting it, most people know to avoid it and leave it in peace. (Greene, 2006, p. 135). When opponents are unwilling to fight with you, it is because they think it is contrary to their interests, or because you have misled them into thinking so (Sun-Tzu, fourth century B.C.).

This strategy has a reversal. The purpose of strategies of deterrence is to discourage attack, and a threatening presence or action will usually do the job. In some situations, though, you can more safely achieve the same thing by doing the opposite: play dumb and unassuming. Seem inoffensive, or already defeated, and people may leave you alone. A harmless front can buy you time: that is how Claudius survived the violent, treacherous world of Roman politics on his way to becoming emperor. This strategy needs patience, though, and is not without risk: you are deliberately making yourself the lamb among the wolves. In general, you have to keep your attempts at intimidation under control. Be careful not to become intoxicated by the power fear brings: use it as a defense in times of danger, not as your offense of choice. In the long run, frightening people creates enemies, and if you fail to back up your tough reputation with victories, you will lose credibility. If your opponent gets angry enough to decide to play the same game back at you, you may also escalate a squabble into a retaliatory war. Use this strategy with caution.

Trade Space for Time: The Non-engagement Strategy

Retreat in the face of a strong enemy is a sign not of weakness but of strength. By resisting the temptation to respond to an aggressor, you buy yourself valuable time—time to recover, to think, to gain perspective. Let your enemies advance; time is more important than space. By refusing to fight, you infuriate them and feed their arrogance. They will soon overextend themselves and start making mistakes. Time will reveal them as rash and you as wise. Sometimes you can accomplish most by doing nothing (Greene, 2006 p. 137). The image of this strategy is the desert sands. In the desert there is nothing to feed on and nothing to use for war: just sand and empty space. Retreat to the desert occasionally, to think and see with clarity. Time moves slowly there, which is what you need. When under attack, fall back into the desert, luring your enemies into a place where they lose all sense of time and space and fall under your control (Greene, 2006 p. 143).

" Space I can recover. Time, never". (Napoleon Bonaparte, 1769-1821). To remain disciplined and calm while waiting for disorder to appear amongst the enemy is the art of self-possession. (Sun-Tzu, fourth century B.C.)

This strategy has no reversal. When enemies attack you in overwhelming force, instead of retreating you may sometimes decide to engage them directly. You are inviting martyrdom, perhaps even hoping for it, but martyrdom, too, is a strategy, and one of ancient standing: martyrdom makes you a symbol, a rallying point for the future. The strategy will succeed if you are important enough—if your defeat has symbolic meaning—but the circumstances must work to highlight the rightness of your cause and the ugliness of the enemy's. Your sacrifice must also be unique; too many martyrs, spread over too much time, will spoil the effect. In cases of extreme weakness, when facing an impossibly large enemy, martyrdom can be used to show that your side's fighting spirit has not been extinguished, a useful way to keep up morale. But, in general, martyrdom is a dangerous weapon and can backfire, for you may no longer be there to see it through, and its effects are too strong to be controlled. It can also take centuries to work. Even when it may prove symbolically successful, a good strategist avoids it. Retreat is always the better strategy. Retreat must never be an end in itself; at some point you have to turn around and fight. If you do not, retreat is more accurately called surrender: the enemy wins. Combat is in the long run unavoidable. Retreat can only be temporary.

3.4 Offensive Warfare

The greatest dangers in war, and in life, come from the unexpected: people do not respond the way you had thought they would, events mess up your plans and produce confusion, circumstances are overwhelming. In strategy this discrepancy between what you want to happen and what does happen is called "friction." The idea behind conventional offensive warfare is simple: by attacking the other side first, hitting its points of vulnerability, and seizing the initiative and never letting it go, you create your own circumstances. Before any friction can creep in and undermine your plans, you move to the offensive, and your relentless maneuvers force so much friction on the enemy that he collapses. This is the form of warfare practised by the most successful captains in history, and the secret to their success is a perfect blend of strategic cleverness and audacity. The strategic element comes in the planning: setting an overall goal, crafting ways to reach it, and thinking the whole plan through in intense detail. This means thinking in terms of a campaign, not individual battles. It also means knowing the strengths and weaknesses of the other side, so that you can calibrate your strikes to its vulnerabilities. The more detailed your planning, the more confident you will feel as you go into battle, and the easier it will be to stay on course once the inevitable problems arise. In the attack itself, though, you must strike with such spirit and audacity that you put your enemies on their

heels, giving irresistible momentum to your offensive. Strategies for offensive warfare will help you to put your desires and goals into a larger framework known as "grand strategy." They will show you how to look at your enemies and uncover their secrets. They will describe how a solid base of planning will give you fluid options for attack and how specific maneuvers (the flanking maneuver, the envelopment) and styles of attack (hitting centers of gravity, forcing the enemy into positions of great weakness) work brilliantly in war. Finally, they will show you how to finish off your campaign. Without a vigorous conclusion that meets your overall goals, everything you have done will be worthless. Mastering the various components of offensive warfare will give all of your attacks much greater force.

Lose Battles but Win the War: Grand Strategy

Everyone around you is a strategist angling for power, all trying to promote their own interests, often at your expense. Your daily battles with them make you lose sight of the only thing that really matters: victory in the end, the achievement of greater goals, lasting power. Grand strategy is the art of looking beyond the battle and calculating ahead. It requires that you focus on your ultimate goal and plot to reach it. In grand strategy you consider the political ramifications and long-term consequences of what you do. Instead of reacting emotionally to people, you take control, and make your actions more dimensional, subtle, and effective. Let others get caught up in the twists and turns of the battle, relishing their little victories. Grand strategy will bring you the ultimate reward: the last laugh (Greene, 2006 p. 147).

The image of this strategy is the mountaintop. Down on the battlefield, everything is smoke and confusion. It is hard to tell friend from foe, to see who is winning, to foresee the enemy's next move. The general must climb high above the fray, to the mountaintop, where everything becomes clearer and more in focus. There, he can see beyond the battlefield—to the movement of reserves, to the enemy camp, to the battle's future shape. Only from the mountaintop can the general direct the war (Greene, 2006 p. 164). It is a common mistake in going to war to begin at the wrong end, to act first and to wait for disaster to discuss the matter (Thucydides, between 460 and 455 B.C.-circa 400 B.C.).

This strategy should be applied with caution. Grand strategy involves two dangers that you must consider and combat. First, the successes it brings you in your first campaigns may have the same effect on you that easy victory on the battlefield gives a general: drunk on triumph, you may lose the sense of realism and proportion on which your future moves depend. Even such supreme grand strategists as Julius Caesar and

Napoleon eventually fell victim to this dynamic: losing their sense of reality, they began to believe that their instincts were infallible. The greater the victory, the greater the danger. As you get older, as you move to your next campaign, you must retrench, strain doubly hard to rein in your emotions, and maintain a sense of realism. Second, the detachment necessary to grand strategy can bring you to a point where you find it hard to act. Understanding the world too well, you see too many options and become as indecisive as Hamlet. No matter how far we progress, we remain part animal, and it is the animal in us that fires our strategies, gives them life, animates us to fight. Without the desire to fight, without a capacity for the violence war churns up, we cannot deal with danger. The prudent Odysseus types are comfortable with both sides of their nature. They plan ahead as best they can, see far and wide, but when it comes time to move ahead, they move. Knowing how to control your emotions means not repressing them completely but using them to their best effect.

Know your Enemy: The Intelligence Strategy

The target of your strategies should be less the army you face than the mind of the man or woman who runs it. If you understand how that mind works, you have the key to deceiving and controlling it. Train yourself to read people, picking up the signals they unconsciously send about their innermost thoughts and intentions. A friendly front will let you watch them closely and mine them for information. Beware of projecting your own emotions and mental habits onto them; try to think as they think. By finding your opponents' psychological weaknesses, you can work to unhinge their minds (Greene, 2006 p. 165).

The image of this strategy is the shadow. Everyone has a shadow, a secret self, a dark side. This shadow comprises everything people try to hide from the world—their weaknesses, secret desires, selfish intentions. This shadow is invisible from a distance; to see it you must get up close, physically and most of all psychologically. Then it will come into relief. Follow close in your targets footsteps and he will not notice how much of his shadow he has revealed (Greene, 2006 p. 177).

Thus the reason the farsighted ruler and his superior commander conquer the enemy at every move, and achieve success far beyond the reach of the common crowd, is advance knowledge. Such knowledge cannot be had from ghosts and spirits, educed by comparison with past events, or verified by astrological calculations. It must come from people—people who know the enemy's situation (Sun-Tzu, fourth century BC)

Beware, your enemy also seeks to know you. Even as you work to know your enemies, you must make yourself as formless and difficult to read as possible. Since people really only have appearances to go on, they can be readily deceived. Act unpredictably now and then. Throw them some golden nugget of your inner self—something fabricated that has nothing to do with who you really are. Be aware that they are scrutinizing you, and either give them nothing or feed them misinformation. Keeping yourself formless and inscrutable will make it impossible for people to defend themselves against you and render the intelligence they gather on you useless.

Overwhelm Resistance with Speed and Suddenness: The Blitzkrieg Strategy

In a world in which many people are indecisive and overly cautious, the use of speed will bring you untold power. Striking first, before your opponents have time to think or prepare, will make them emotional, unbalanced, and prone to error. When you follow with another swift and sudden maneuver, you will induce further panic and confusion. This strategy works best with a setup, a lull—your unexpected action catches your enemy off guard. When you strike, hit with unrelenting force. Acting with speed and decisiveness will garner you respect, awe, and irresistible momentum (Green, 2006 p. 179).

The image of this strategy is the storm. The sky becomes still and calm, and a lull sets in, peaceful and soothing. Then, out of nowhere, lightning strikes, the wind picks up...and the sky explodes. It is the suddenness of the storm that is so terrifying (Greene, 2006 p. 185).

War is such that the supreme consideration is speed. This is to take advantage of what is beyond the reach of the enemy, to go by way of routes where he least expects you, and to attack where he has made no preparations. (Sun-Tzu, fourth century BC.) You must be slow in deliberation and swift in execution. (Napoleon Bonaparte, 1769-1821)

This strategy has a reversal. Slowness can have great value, particularly as a setup. To appear slow and deliberate, even a little foolish, will lull your enemies, infecting them with a sleepy attitude. Once their guard is down, an unexpected blow from the side will knock them out. Your use of slowness and speed, then, should be deliberate and controlled, never a natural tempo that you fall into. In general, when facing a fast enemy, the only true defense is to be as fast or faster. Only speed can neutralise speed. Setting up a rigid defense, as the shah did against the Mongols, only plays into the hands of the swift and mobile.

Control the Dynamics: Forcing Strategies

People are constantly struggling to control you—getting you to act in their interests, keeping the dynamic on their terms. The only way to get the upper hand is to make your play for control more intelligent and insidious. Instead of trying to dominate the other side's every move, work to define the nature of the relationship itself. Shift the conflict to terrain of your choice, altering the pace and stakes to suit you. Maneuver to control your opponents' minds, pushing their emotional buttons, and compelling them to make mistakes. If necessary, let them feel they are in control in order to get them to lower their guard. If you control the overall direction and framing of the battle, anything they do will play into your hands (Greene, 2006 p. 187).

The image of this strategy is the boxer. The superior fighter does not rely on his superior punch or quick reflexes. Instead he creates a rhythm to the fight that suits him, advancing and retreating at a pace he sets, he controls the ring, moving his opponent to the centre, to the ropes, towards or away from him. Master of time and space, he creates frustration, compels mistakes, and engenders a mental collapse that precedes the physical. He wins not with his fists but by controlling the ring (Greene, 2006, p. 201). In order for one to have rest, it is necessary to keep the enemy occupied. This throws them back on the defensive, and once they are placed that way they cannot rise up again during the entire campaign (Frederick the Great 1712-1786).

This strategy has no reversal. Any effort to seem not to control a situation, to refuse to influence a relationship, is in fact a form of control. By ceding power to others, you have gained a kind of passive authority that you can use later for your own purposes. You are also the one determining who has control by relinquishing it to the other side. There is no escape from the control dynamic. Those who say they are doing so are playing the most insidious control game of all.

Hit them where it Hurts: The Centre-of-Gravity Strategy

Everyone has a source of power on which he or she depends. When you look at your rivals, search below the surface for that source, the center of gravity that holds the entire structure together. That center can be their wealth, their popularity, a key position, a winning strategy. Hitting them there will inflict disproportionate pain. Find what the other side most cherishes and protects—that is where you must strike (Greene, 2006 p. 203).

The image of this strategy is the wall. Your opponents stand behind a wall, which protects them from strangers and intruders. Do not hit your head against the wall or lay siege to it; find the pillars and supports that make it stand and give it strength. Dig under the wall, sapping its foundations until it collapses on its own. (Greene, 2006 p. 211). The first principle is that the ultimate substance of the enemy strength must be traced back to the fewest possible sources, and ideally to one alone. The attack on these sources must be compressed into the fewest possible actions. It is by constantly seeking out the centre of the enemy's power, by daring all to win all that one can really defeat the enemy (Carl von Clausewitz, *On War,* 1780-1831).

There is no reversal to this strategy. Every living creature has a center of gravity. Even the most decentralised group has to communicate and depend on a network that is vulnerable to attack (Greene, 2006 p. 211).

Defeat them in Detail: The Divide-and-Conquer Strategy

When you look at your enemies, do not be intimidated by their appearance. Instead look at the parts that make up the whole. By separating the parts, sowing dissension and division from within, you can weaken and bring down even the most formidable foe. In setting up your attack, work on their minds to create internal conflict. Look for the joints and links, the things that connect the people in a group or connect one group to another. Division is weakness, and the joints are the weakest part of any structure. When you are facing troubles or enemies, turn a large problem into small, eminently defeatable parts (Greene, 2006 p. 213).

The image of this strategy is the knot. It is large, hopelessly entangled, and seemingly impossible to unravel. The knot consists of thousands of smaller knots, all twisted and intertwined. Let time go by and the knot will get only worse. Instead of trying to pick it apart from this side or that, take up your sword and cut it in half with one blow. Once divided, it will come undone on its own (Greene, 2006 p. 226).

In antiquity those who were referred to as excelling in the employment of the army were able to keep the enemy's forward and rear forces from connecting; the many and few from relying on each other; the noble and lowly from coming to each other's rescue; the upper and lower ranks from trusting each other; the troops to be separated, unable to re-assemble, or when re-assembled, not to be well-ordered (Sun-Tzu, fourth century BC).

Dividing your forces as a way of creating mobility can be a powerful strategy, as Napoleon demonstrated with his flexible system of corps, which let him hit his enemy unpredictably from many different angles. But to make his system work, Napoleon needed precise coordination of its parts and overall control over their movements—and his goal was ultimately to bring the parts together to strike a major blow. In guerrilla warfare a commander will disperse his forces to make them harder to hit, but this, too, demands coordination: a guerrilla army cannot succeed if the parts are unable to communicate with each other. In general, any division of your forces must be temporary, strategic, and controlled. In attacking a group in order to sow division, be careful that your blow is not too strong, for it can have the opposite effect, causing people to unite in times of great danger. That was Hitler's miscalculation during the London Blitz, his bombing campaign designed to push England out of World War II. Intended to demoralise the British public, the Blitz only made them more determined: they were willing to suffer short-term danger in order to beat him in the long run. This bonding effect was partly the result of Hitler's brutality, partly the phenomenon of a culture willing to suffer for the greater good. Finally, in a divided world, power will come from keeping your own group united and cohesive, and your own mind clear and focused on your goals. The best way to maintain unity may seem to be the creation of enthusiasm and high morale, but while enthusiasm is important, in time it will naturally wane, and if you have come to depend on it, you will fail. Far greater defenses against the forces of division are knowledge and strategic thinking. No army or group can be divided if it is aware of the enemy's intentions and makes an intelligent response. Strategy is your only dependable sword and shield (Greene, 2006 p. 227).

Expose and Attack your Opponent's Soft Flank: The Turning Strategy

When you attack people directly, you stiffen their resistance and make your task much harder. There is a better way: distract your opponents' attention to the front, then attack them from the side, where they least expect it. By hitting them where they are soft, tender, and unprotected, you create a shock, a moment of weakness for you to exploit. Bait people into going out on a limb, exposing their weakness, then rake them with fire from the side. The only way to get stubborn opponents to move is to approach them indirectly (Greene, 2006 p. 229).

It is by turning the enemy, by attacking his flank, that battles are won (Napoleon Bonaparte, 1769-1821). The image of this strategy is the lobster. The creature seems intimidating and impenetrable, with its sharp claws quick to grab, its hard protective shell, its powerful tail propelling it out of danger. Handle it directly and you will pay the price. But turn it over with a stick and reveal its tender underside and the creature is rendered helpless (Greene 2006 p. 240).

This strategy has a reversal. In politics, occupying the flank by taking a similar position to the other side, co-opting its ideas for your own purposes, is a powerful ploy, one that President Clinton used to great effect in his triangulations with the Republicans. This gives the opponent nothing to strike at, no room to maneuver. But staying too long on the opponent's flank can bring a price: the public—the real soft flank for any politician—loses its sense of what the triangulator stands for, what sets him and his party apart from the other side. Over time this can prove dangerous; polarity—creating the appearance of sharp differences—is more effective in the long run. Beware of occupying the opponent's flank at the expense of exposing your own.

Envelop the Enemy: The Annihilation Strategy

People will use any kind of gap in your defenses to attack you or revenge themselves on you. So offer no gaps. The secret is to envelop your opponents—create relentless pressure on them from all sides, dominate their attention, and close off their access to the outside world. Make your attacks unpredictable to create a vaporous feeling of vulnerability. Finally, as you sense their weakening resolve, crush their willpower by tightening the noose. The best encirclements are psychological—you have surrounded their minds (Greene, 2006 p. 243). The image of this strategy is a noose. Once it is in place, there is no escape, no hope. At the mere thought of being caught in it, the enemy will grow desperate and struggle, its frantic efforts to escape only hastens its destruction (Greene, 2006 p. 252).

This strategy is applied with caution. The danger of envelopment is that unless it is completely successful, it may leave you in a vulnerable position. You have announced your plans. The enemy knows that you are trying to annihilate it, and unless you can quickly deliver your knockout punch, it will work furiously not only to defend itself but to destroy you—for now your destruction is its only safeguard. Some armies that have failed in their envelopments have found themselves later encircled by their enemies. Use this strategy only when you have a reasonable chance of bringing it to the conclusion you desire.

Maneuver them into Weakness: The Ripening-for-the Sickle Strategy

No matter how strong you are, fighting endless battles with people is exhausting, costly, and unimaginative. Wise strategists generally prefer the art of maneuver: before the battle even begins, they find ways to put their opponents in positions of such weakness that victory is easy and quick. Bait enemies into taking positions that may seem alluring but are actually traps and blind alleys. If their position is strong, get them to abandon it by leading them on a wild-goose chase. Create dilemmas: devise maneuvers that give them a choice of ways to respond—all of them bad. Channel chaos and disorder in their direction. Confused, frustrated, and angry opponents are like ripe fruit on the bough: the slightest breeze will make them fall (Greene, 2006 p. 253).

The image of this strategy is the sickle, the simplest of instruments. To cut the tall grass or unripened field of wheat with it is exhausting labour. But let the stalks turn golden brown, hard and dry, and in that brief time even the dullest sickle will mow the wheat with ease (Greene, 2006 p. 269).

Battles are won by slaughter and maneuver. The greater the general, the more he contributes in maneuver, the less he demands in slaughter.... Nearly all the battles which are regarded as masterpieces of the military art...have been battles of maneuver in which very often the enemy has found himself defeated by some novel expedient or device, some queer, swift, unexpected thrust or stratagem. In such battles the losses of the victors have been small (Winston Churchill, 1874-1965). This strategy is applied with care. There is neither point nor honour in seeking direct battle for its own sake. That kind of fighting, however, may have value as part of a maneuver or strategy. A sudden envelopment or powerful frontal blow when the enemy is least expecting it can be crushing. The only danger in maneuver is that you give yourself so many options that you yourself get confused. Keep it simple—limit yourself to the options you can control.

Negotiate while Advancing: The Diplomatic-War Strategy

People will always try to take from you in negotiation what they could not get from you in battle or direct confrontation. They will even use appeals to fairness and morality as a cover to advance their position. Do not be taken in: negotiation is about maneuvering for power or placement, and you must always put yourself in the kind of strong position that makes it impossible for the other side to nibble away at you during your talks. Before and during negotiations, you must keep

advancing, creating relentless pressure and compelling the other side to settle on your terms. The more you take, the more you can give back in meaningless concessions. Create a reputation for being tough and uncompromising, so that people are back on their heels before they even meet you (Greene, 2006 p. 271). The image of this strategy is a big stick. You may speak softly and nicely, but the other side sees that you hold something fearsome in your hand. He does not have to feel the actual pain of it striking his head; he knows the stick is there, that it is not going away, that you have used it before, and that it hurts. Better to end the argument and negotiate a settlement, at whatever price, than risk a painful thwack (Greene, 2006 p. 282). Let us not consider ourselves victorious until the day after battle, nor defeated until four days later.... Let us always carry the sword in one hand and the olive branch in the other, always ready to negotiate but negotiating only while advancing (Prince Klemens von Metternich, 1773-1859).

This strategy has a reversal. In negotiation as in war, you must not let yourself get carried away: there is a danger in advancing too far, taking too much, to the point where you create an embittered enemy who will work for revenge. So it was after World War I with the Allies, who imposed such harsh conditions on Germany in negotiating the peace that they arguably laid the foundations for World War II. A century earlier, on the other hand, when Metternich negotiated, it was always his goal to prevent the other side from feeling wronged. Your purpose in any settlement you negotiate is never to satisfy greed or to punish the other side but to secure your own interests. In the long run, a punitive settlement will only win you insecurity.

Know how to end Things: The Exit Strategy

You are judged in this world by how well you bring things to an end. A messy or incomplete conclusion can reverberate for years to come, ruining your reputation in the process. The art of ending things well is knowing when to stop, never going so far that you exhaust yourself or create bitter enemies that embroil you in conflict in the future. It also entails ending on the right note, with energy and flair. It is not a question of simply winning the war but the way you win it, the way your victory sets you up for the next round. The height of strategic wisdom is to avoid all conflicts and entanglements from which there are no realistic exits (Greene, 2006 p. 283).

The image of this strategy is the sun. When it finishes its course and sets below the horizon, it leaves behind a brilliant and memorable after-glow. Its return is always desired (Greene, 2006 p. 295). To go too far is as bad as to fall short (Confucius (551?-479 B.C.). To conquer is

nothing. One must profit from one's success (Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821). There can be no value in ending anything badly. There is no reversal for this strategy.

3.5 Unconventional Warfare

A general fighting a war must constantly search for an advantage over the opponent. The greatest advantage comes from the element of surprise, from hitting enemies with strategies that are novel, outside their experience, completely unconventional. It is in the nature of war, however, that over time any strategy with any possible application will be tried and tested, so that the search for the new and unconventional has an innate tendency to become more and more extreme. At the same time, moral and ethical codes that governed warfare for centuries have gradually loosened. These two effects dovetail into what we today call "dirty war," where anything goes, down to the killing of thousands of unwarned civilians. Dirty war is political, deceptive, and supremely manipulative. Often the last recourse of the weak and desperate, it uses any means available to level the playing field. The dynamic of the dirty has filtered into society and the culture at large. Whether in politics, business, or society, the way to defeat your opponents is to surprise them, to come at them from an unexpected angle. And the increasing pressures of these daily wars make dirty strategies inevitable. People go underground: they seem nice and decent but use slippery, devious methods behind the scenes. The unconventional has its own logic that you must understand. First, nothing stays new for long. Those who depend on novelty must constantly come up with some fresh idea that goes against the orthodoxies of the time. Second, people who use unconventional methods are very hard to fight. The classic, direct route—the use of force and strength—does not work. You must use indirect methods to combat indirection, fight fire with fire, even at the cost of going dirty yourself. To try to stay clean out of a sense of morality is to risk defeat. The strategies of unconventional warfare will initiate you into the various forms of the unorthodox. Some of these are strictly unconventional: deceiving your opponents and working against their expectations. Others are more political and slippery: making morality a strategic weapon, applying the arts of guerrilla warfare, mastering the insidious forms of passive aggression. And some are unapologetically dirty: destroying the enemy from within, inflicting terror and panic. These are designed to give you a greater understanding of the diabolical psychology involved in each strategy, helping to arm you with the proper defense.

Weave a seamless Blend of Fact and Fiction: Misperception Strategies

Since no creature can survive without the ability to see or sense what is going on around it, you must make it hard for your enemies to know what is going on around them, including what you are doing. Disturb their focus and you weaken their strategic powers. People's perceptions are filtered through their emotions; they tend to interpret the world according to what they want to see. Feed their expectations, manufacture a reality to match their desires, and they will fool themselves. The best deceptions are based on ambiguity, mixing fact and fiction so that the one cannot be disentangled from the other. Control people's perceptions of reality and you control them (Greene, 2006 p. 299). The image of this strategy is the fog. It makes the shape and colour of objects impossible to know. Learn to create enough of it and you free yourself from the enemy's intrusive gaze; you have room to maneuver. You know where you are headed, while the enemy goes astray, deeper and deeper into the fog (Greene, 2006 p. 311).

One who is good at combating the enemy fools it with inscrutable moves, confuses it with false intelligence, makes it relax by concealing one's strength,...deafens its ears by jumbling one's orders and signals, blinds its eyes by converting one's banners and insignias,...confounds its battle plan by providing distorted facts (Tou Bi Fu Tan, *A Scholar's Dilettante Remarks on War*, 16th century A.D.).

This strategy is applied with caution. To be caught in a deception is dangerous. If you do not know that your cover is blown, now, suddenly, your enemies have more information than you do and you become their tool. If the discovery of your deceit is public, on the other hand, your reputation takes a blow, or worse: the punishments for spying are severe. You must use deception with utmost caution, then, employing the least amount of people as possible, to avoid the inevitable leaks. You should always leave yourself an escape route, a cover story to protect you should you be exposed. Be careful not to fall in love with the power that deception brings; the use of it must always be subordinate to your overall strategy and kept under control. If you become known as a deceiver, try being straightforward and honest for a change. That will confuse people—because they will not know how to read you, your honesty will become a higher form of deception.

Take the Line of Least Expectation: The Ordinary-Extraordinary Strategy

People expect your behaviour to conform to known patterns and conventions. Your task as a strategist is to upset their expectations. Surprise them and chaos and unpredictability—which they try

desperately to keep at bay—enter their world, and in the ensuing mental disturbance, their defenses are down and they are vulnerable. First, do something ordinary and conventional to fix their image of you, then hit them with the extraordinary. The terror is greater for being so sudden. Never rely on an unorthodox strategy that worked before—it is conventional the second time around. Sometimes the ordinary is extraordinary because it is unexpected (Greene, 2006 p. 313).

The image of this strategy is a plow. The ground must be prepared. The blades of the plow churn the earth in constant motion, bringing air into the soil. The process must go on every year, or the most pernicious weed will take over and the clumped soil will choke off all life. From the earth, plowed and fertilized, the most nourishing and wondrous plants can emerge (Greene, 2006 p. 330).

No one is so brave that he is not disturbed by something unexpected. (Julius Caesar (100-44 B.C.) In general, in battle one engages the enemy with the orthodox and gains victory through the unorthodox.... The unorthodox and the orthodox mutually produce each other, just like an endless cycle. Who can exhaust them? (Sun-tzu, fourth century B.C.)

This strategy has no reversal. There is never any value in attacking opponents from a direction or in a way that they expect, allowing them to stiffen their resistance—that is, unless your strategy is suicide.

Occupy the Moral high Ground: The Righteous Strategy

In a political world, the cause you are fighting for must seem more just than the enemy's. Think of this as moral terrain that you and the other side are fighting over; by questioning your enemies' motives and making them appear evil, you can narrow their base of support and room to maneuver. Aim at the soft spots in their public image, exposing any hypocrisies on their part. Never assume that the justice of your cause is self-evident; publicise and promote it. When you yourself come under moral attack from a clever enemy, do not whine or get angry; fight fire with fire. If possible, position yourself as the underdog, the victim, the martyr. Learn to inflict guilt as a moral weapon (Greene, 2006 p. 331).

The image of this strategy is the germs. Once they get inside and attack the body, they spread quickly. Your attempts to destroy them make them stronger and harder to root out. The best defence is prevention. Anticipate the attack and inoculate yourself against it. For such organism you have to fight fire with fire (Greene, 2006 p. 340).

The pivot of war is nothing but name and righteousness. Secure a good name for yourself and give the enemy a bad name; proclaim your righteousness and reveal the unrighteousness of the enemy. Then your army can set forth in a great momentum, shaking heaven and earth (Tou Bi Fu Tan, sixteenth century AD).

This strategy has a reversal. A moral offensive has a built-in danger: if people can tell what you are doing, your righteous stance may disgust and alienate them. Unless you are facing a vicious enemy, it is best to use this strategy with a light touch and never seem shrill. Moral battles are for public consumption, and you must constantly gauge their effect, lowering or raising the heat accordingly.

Deny them Targets: The Strategy of the Void

The feeling of emptiness or void—silence, isolation, non-engagement with others—is for most people intolerable. As a human weakness, that fear offers fertile ground for a powerful strategy: give your enemies no target to attack, be dangerous but elusive and invisible, then watch as they chase you into the void. This is the essence of guerrilla warfare. Instead of frontal battles, deliver irritating but damaging side attacks and pinprick bites. Frustrated at their inability to use their strength against your vaporous campaign, your opponents will grow irrational and exhausted. Make your guerrilla war part of a grand political cause—a people's war—that crests in an irresistible revolution (Greene, 2006 p. 343). The image of this strategy is the mosquito. Most animals present a front, back and sides that can be attacked or threatened. Mosquitoes, though, give nothing but an irritating whir in the ear, from all sides and angles. You cannot hit them, you cannot see them. Your flesh, meanwhile, affords them endless targets. Enough bites and you realise that the only solution is to stop fighting and move as far away as possible (Greene, 2006 p. 353).

Anything that has form can be overcome; anything that takes shape can be countered. This is why sages conceal their forms in nothingness and let their minds soar in the void (Huainanzi, second century B.C.). This strategy has no reversal. A guerrilla strategy is extremely hard to counter, which is what makes it so effective. If you find yourself in a fight with guerrillas and you use conventional methods to fight them, you play into their hands; winning battles and taking territory means nothing in this kind of war. The only effective counterstrategy is to reverse the guerrillas' strategy, neutralising their advantages. You must refuse them the freedom of time and space they need for their mayhem. You must work to isolate them—physically, politically, and morally. Above all, you must never respond in a graduated manner, by stepping

up your forces bit by bit, as the United States did in the Vietnam War. You need a quick, decisive victory over such an opponent. If this seems impossible, it is better to pull out while you can than to sink into the protracted war the guerrilla fighter is trying to lure you into (Greene, 2006 p. 354).

Seem to work for the Interests of others while furthering your Own: The Alliance Strategy

The best way to advance your cause with a minimum effort and bloodshed is to create a constantly shifting network of alliances, getting others to compensate for your deficiencies, do your dirty work, fight your wars, spend energy pulling you forward. The art is in choosing those allies who fit the needs of the moment and fill the gaps in your power. Give them gifts, offer them friendship, help them in time of need—all to blind them to reality and put them under subtle obligation to you. At the same time, work to sow dissension in the alliances of others, weakening your enemies by isolating them. While forming convenient coalitions, keep yourself free of negative entanglements (Greene, 2006 p. 355).

Enter into action under the cover of helping another's interests, only to further your own in the end.... This is the perfect stratagem and disguise for realising your ambitions, for the advantages you seem to offer only serve as lures to influence the other person's will. They think their interests are being advanced when in truth they are opening the way for yours (Baltasar Gracian, 1601-1658).

The image of this strategy is stepping-stone. The stream runs fast and dangerous, but you must cross it at some point. There lie some stones in a haphazard line that can get you to the other side. If you linger too long on one stone, you will lose your balance. If you go too fast or skip one, you will slip. Instead, you must jump lightly from one stone to the next and never look back (Greene, 2006 p. 368).

Beware of sentimental alliances where the consciousness of good deeds is the only compensation for noble sacrifices (Otto von Bismarck, 1815-1898). If you play the alliance game, so will those around you and you cannot take their behaviour personally—you must keep dealing with them. But there are some types with whom any kind of alliance will harm you. You can often recognise them by their over-eagerness to pursue you: they will make the first move, trying to blind you with alluring offers and glittering promises. To protect yourself from being used in a negative way, always look at the tangible benefits you will gain from this alliance. If the benefits seem vague or hard to realise,

think twice about joining forces. Look at your prospective allies' past for signs of greed or of using people without giving in return. Be wary of people who speak well, have apparently charming personalities, and talk about friendship, loyalty, and selflessness: they are most often con artists trying to prey on your emotions. Keep your eye on the interests involved on both sides, and never let yourself be distracted from them.

Give your Rivals enough Rope To Hang Themselves: The One-Upmanship Strategy

Life's greatest dangers often come not from external enemies but from our supposed colleagues and friends, who pretend to work for the common cause while scheming to sabotage us and steal our ideas for their gain. Although, in the court in which you serve, you must maintain the appearance of consideration and civility, you also must learn to defeat these people. Work to instill doubts and insecurities in such rivals, getting them to think too much and act defensively. Bait them with subtle challenges that get under their skin, triggering an overreaction, an embarrassing mistake. The victory you are after is to isolate them. Make them hang themselves through their own self-destructive tendencies, leaving you blameless and clean (Greene, 2006 p. 369).

The image of this strategy is the mask. Every performer on the crowded stage is wearing a mask—a pleasant, appealing face to show the audience. Should an apparently innocent bump from a fellow performer make a mask fall, a far less pleasant look will be revealed, and one that few will forget even after the mask is restored (Greene, 2006 p. 382). Never interfere with an enemy that is in the process of committing suicide (Napoleon Bonaparte 1769-1821). We often give our rivals the means of our own destruction (Aesop, sixth century B.C.).

This strategy has no reversal. Sometimes outright war is best—when, for example, you can crush your enemies by encirclement. In the ongoing relationships of daily life, though, one-upmanship is usually the wiser strategy. It may sometimes seem therapeutic to outfight your rivals directly; it may sometimes be appealing to send an overtly intimidating message. But the momentary gains you may earn with a direct approach will be offset by the suspicions you arouse in your colleagues, who will worry that someday you will strong-arm them, too. In the long run, it is more important to secure good feelings and maintain appearances. Wise courtiers always seem to be paragons of civilised behaviour, encasing their iron fist in a velvet glove.

Take Small Bites: The *Fait Accompli* Strategy

If you seem too ambitious, you stir up resentment in other people; overt power grabs and sharp rises to the top are dangerous, creating envy, distrust, and suspicion. Often the best solution is to take small bites, swallow little territories, playing upon people's relatively short attention spans. Stay under the radar and they will not see your moves. And if they do, it may already be too late; the territory is yours, a fait accompli. You can always claim you acted out of self-defense. Before people realise it, you have accumulated an empire (Greene, 2006 p. 383).

The image of this strategy is the artichoke. At first glance it seems unappetising, even forbidding, with the meager edible matter in its hard exterior. The reward, however, comes in taking it apart, devouring it leaf by leaf. Its leaves slowly become more tender and tastier, until you arrive at the succulent heart (Greene, 2006 p. 390). To multiply small successes is precisely to build one treasure after another. In time one becomes rich without realising how it has come about (Frederick the Great, 1712-1786).

Should you see or suspect that you are being attacked bite by bite, your only counterstrategy is to prevent any further progress or *fait accomplis*. A quick and forceful response will usually be enough to discourage the nibblers, who often resort to this strategy out of weakness and cannot afford many battles. If they are tougher and more ambitious, like Frederick the Great, that forceful response becomes more crucial still. Letting them get away with their bites, however small, is too dangerous—nip them in the bud (Greene, 2006 p. 391).

Penetrate their Minds: Communication Strategies

Communication is a kind of war, its field of battle the resistant and defensive minds of the people you want to influence. The goal is to advance, to penetrate their defenses and occupy their minds. Anything else is ineffective communication, self-indulgent talk. Learn to infiltrate your ideas behind enemy lines, sending messages through little details, luring people into coming to the conclusions you desire and into thinking they have got there by themselves. Some you can trick by cloaking your extraordinary ideas in ordinary forms; others, more resistant and dull, must be awoken with extreme language that bristles with newness. At all costs, avoid language that is static, preachy, and overly personal. Make your words a spark for action, not passive contemplation (Greene, 2006 p. 293).

The image of this strategy is the stiletto. It is long and tapered to a point. It requires no sharpening. In its form lies its perfection as an instrument to penetrate cleanly and deeply. Whether thrust into the flank, the back, or through the heart, it has a fatal effect (Greene, 2006 p. 405).

I cannot give birth to wisdom myself and the accusation that many make against me, that while I question others, I myself bring nothing wise to light due to my lack of wisdom, is accurate. The reason for this is as follows: God forces me to serve as a midwife and prevents me from giving birth (Socrates, 470-399 B.C.).

This strategy has no reversal. Even as you plan your communications to make them more consciously strategic, you must develop the reverse ability to decode the subtexts, hidden messages, and unconscious signals in what other people say. When people speak in vague generalities, for example, and use a lot of abstract terms like "justice," "morality," "liberty," and so on, without really ever explaining the specifics of what they are talking about, they are almost always hiding something. This is often their own nasty but necessary actions, which they prefer to cover up under a screen of righteous verbiage. When you hear such talk, be suspicious. Meanwhile people who use cutesy, colloquial language, brimming with clichés and slang, may be trying to distract you from the thinness of their ideas, trying to win you over not by the soundness of their arguments but by making you feel chummy and warm toward them. Also, people who use pretentious, flowery language, crammed with clever metaphors, are often more interested in the sound of their own voices than in reaching the audience with a genuine thought. In general, you must pay attention to the forms in which people express themselves; never take their content at face value (Greene, 2006 p. 405).

Destroy from Within: The Inner-Front Strategy

A war can only really be fought against an enemy who shows himself. By infiltrating your opponents' ranks, working from within to bring them down, you give them nothing to see or react against—the ultimate advantage. From within, you also learn their weaknesses and open up possibilities of sowing internal dissension. So hide your hostile intentions. To take something you want, do not fight those who have it, but rather join them—then either slowly make it your own or wait for the moment to stage a coup *d'etat*. No structure can stand for long when it rots from within.

The image of this strategy is termite. From deep within the structure of the house, the termite silently eats away at the wood, its armies patiently boring through beams and supports. The work goes unnoticed, but not

the result (Greene, 2006 p. 417). The worst military policy is to assault walled cities.... If your commander, unable to control his temper, sends your troops swarming at the walls, your casualties will be one in three and still you will not have taken the city.... Therefore the expert in using the military subdues the enemy's forces without going to battle, takes the enemy's walled cities without launching an attack (Sun-Tzu, fourth century B.C.).

There are always likely to be disgruntled people in your own group who will be liable to turning against you from the inside. The worst mistake is to be paranoid, suspecting one and all and trying to monitor their every move. Your only real safeguard against conspiracies and saboteurs is to keep your troops satisfied, engaged in their work, and united by their cause. They will tend to police themselves and turn in any grumblers who are trying to foment trouble from within. It is only in unhealthy and decaying bodies that cancerous cells can take root (Greene, 2006 p. 418).

Dominate while Seeming to Submit: The Passive-Aggression Strategy

Any attempt to bend people to your will is a form of aggression. In a world where political considerations are paramount, the most effective form of aggression is the best-hidden one: aggression behind a compliant, even loving exterior. To follow the passive-aggressive strategy, you must seem to go along with people, offering no resistance. But actually you dominate the situation. You are noncommittal, even a little helpless, but that only means that everything revolves around you. Some people may sense what you are up to and get angry. Do not worry—just make sure you have disguised your aggression enough that you can deny it exists. Do it right and they will feel guilty for accusing you. Passive aggression is a popular strategy; you must learn how to defend yourself against the vast legions of passive-aggressive warriors who will assail you in your daily life (Greene, 2006 p. 419).

The image of this strategy is the river. It flows with great force, sometimes flooding its banks and creating untold damage. Try to damn it and you only add to its pent-up energy and increase your risk. Instead divert its course, channel it and make its power serve your purpose (Greene, 2006 p. 432).

As dripping water wears through rock, so the weak and yielding can subdue the firm and strong (Sun Haichen, *Wiles of War* (1991). The reversal of passive aggression is aggressive passivity, presenting an

apparently hostile face while inwardly staying calm and taking no unfriendly action. The purpose here is intimidation: perhaps you know you are the weaker of the two sides and hope to discourage your enemies from attacking you by presenting a blustery front. Taken in by your appearance, they will find it hard to believe that you do not intend to do anything. In general, presenting yourself as the opposite of what you really are and intend can be a useful way of disguising your strategies (Greene, 2006 p. 433).

Sow Uncertainty and Panic through Acts of Terror: The Chain-Reaction Strategy

Terror is the ultimate way to paralyse a people's will to resist and destroy their ability to plan a strategic response. Such power is gained through sporadic acts of violence that create a constant feeling of threat, incubating a fear that spreads throughout the public sphere. The goal in a terror campaign is not battlefield victory but causing maximum chaos and provoking the other side into desperate overreaction. Melting invisibly into the population, tailoring their actions for the mass media, the strategists of terror create the illusion that they are everywhere and therefore that they are far more powerful than they really are. It is a war of nerves. The victims of terror must not succumb to fear or even anger; to plot the most effective counterstrategy, they must stay balanced. In the face of a terror campaign, one's rationality is the last line of defense (Greene, 2006 p. 435).

The image of this strategy is the tidal wave. Something disturbs the water far out at sea—a tremor, a volcano, a landslide. A wave of few inches high begins to ripple, cresting into a larger wave and then a larger one still, the depth of the water giving it momentum, until it breaks on shore with an unimaginable destructive force (Greene, 2006 p. 448).

There is no fate worse than being continuously under guard, for it means you are always afraid (Julius Caesar, 100-44 B.C.). There is no reversal for this strategy. The reverse of terrorism would be direct and symmetrical war, a return to the very origins of warfare, to fighting that is up-front and honest, a simple test of strength against strength—essentially an archaic and useless strategy for modern times.

SELF -ASSESSMENT EXERCISE
Give a synopsis of the strategies for self-directed warfare.

4.0   CONCLUSION

In this unit, we learnt the strategies/principles of war. We saw that there are many classifications of the strategies of war. However, we adopted and reclassified the strategies by Robert Greene, into five namely: self-directed strategy, organisational (team) strategy, defensive strategy, offensive strategy and unconventional strategy. And we learnt the various uses to which they can be put under relevant circumstances.

5.0   SUMMARY

In this unit we learnt that strategy is vital in winning a war. Strategy, we learnt, is a series of lines and arrows aimed at a goal: at getting you to a certain point in the world, at helping you to attack a problem in your path, at figuring out how to encircle and your enemy.

6.0   TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Give a synopsis of the strategies for unconventional warfare.

7.0   REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

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UNIT 3   DICHOTOMIES BETWEEN STRATEGY AND TACTICS

CONTENTS

1.0   Introduction
2.0   Objectives
3.0   Main Content
        3.1 Strategy and Tactics
4.0   Conclusion
5.0   Summary
6.0   Tutor-marked Assignment
7.0   References/Further Reading

1.0   INTRODUCTION

In the last unit, we learnt the strategies of war. At times, the lines between strategy and tactics as levels of war seem to be blurred. This is so much so that some military theorists contend that strategy and tactics are one and the same or that distinguishing between them is like drawing a difference without a distinction. This unit handles the dichotomies between strategy and tactics.

2.0   OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- explain the meaning of tactics as a level of war
- tell how to differentiate tactics from strategy.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT
3.1 Strategy and Tactics

Strategy differs from tactics, in that strategy refers to the employment of all of a party's military capabilities through high level and long term planning, development and procurement to guarantee security or victory. Tactics is the military science employed to secure objectives defined as part of the military strategy; especially the methods whereby men, equipment, aircraft, ships and weapons are employed and directed against an enemy.

Military strategy in the 19th century was still viewed as one of a trivium of "arts" or "sciences" that govern the conduct of warfare; the others being tactics, the execution of plans and maneuvering of forces in battle, and logistics, the maintenance of an army. The view had prevailed since the Roman times, and the borderline between strategy and tactics at this time was blurred, and sometimes categorisation of a decision is a matter of almost personal opinion. Carnot, during the French Revolutionary

Wars, thought it simply involved concentration of troops (Chaliand, 1994 p. 638).

Strategy and tactics are closely related and exist on the same continuum; modern thinking places the operational level between them. All deal with distance, time and force but strategy is large scale, can endure through years, and is societal while tactics are small scale and involve the disposition of fewer elements enduring hours to weeks. Originally strategy was understood to govern the prelude to a battle while tactics controlled its execution. However, in the world wars of the 20th century, the distinction between maneuver and battle, strategy and tactics, expanded with the capacity of technology and transit. Tactics that were once the province of a company of cavalry would be applied to a panzer army. Tactics is derived from the Greek word *taktika* or the arrangement of forces. Strategy was narrowly interpreted as referring to the art of the manoeuvre of forces towards battle while tactics were seen as the art of arrangement of forces on the field of battle (Anderson, 1970 pp. 94-98; Dawson, 1996 pp. 79-80). Clausewitz wrote under "Classifications of the Art of War", "according to our classification, then, tactics teaches *the use of armed forces in the engagement*; strategy, *the use of engagements for the object of the war*' (Raymond Aron, 1976 pp. 95-100).

It is often said that the art of strategies defines the goals to achieve in a military campaign, while tactics defines the methods to achieve these goals. Strategic goals could be "We want to conquer area X", or "We want to stop country Y's expansion in world trade in commodity Z"; while tactical decisions range from a general statement—e.g., "We are going to do this by a naval invasion of the North of country X", "We are going to blockade the ports of country Y", to a more specific "C Platoon will attack while D platoon provides fire cover".

SELF- ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Distinguish between strategy and tactics as levels of war.

4.0   CONCLUSION

This unit explained tactics as a level of war and distinguished it from strategy, another level of war. We saw that although the waters of strategy and tactics do mix sometime in practice, they are better kept apart.

5.0   SUMMARY

Here we learnt that tactics teaches the use of armed forces in the engagement. Despite their inherent similarity, strategy defines the goal to be achieved in a military campaign, while tactics involves the methods of achieving these goals. Strategy is broader in content and outlook than tactics.

6.0   TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

It is often said that the art of strategies defines the goals to achieve in a military campaign, while tactics defines the methods to achieve these goals. **Discuss.**

7.0   REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

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UNIT 4　　　　　　　DIMENSIONS OF TACTICS

CONTENTS

1.0　　Introduction
2.0　　Objectives
3.0　　Main Content
4.0　　Conclusion
5.0　　Summary
6.0　　Tutor-marked Assignment
7.0　　References/Further Reading

1.0　　INTRODUCTION

What we did in the last unit was to explain tactics and strategy as different levels of war and highlight the dichotomies between strategy and tactics. In this unit, we will see in more details the wider dimensions of tactics.

2.0　　OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
- describe the dimensions of tactics that come to bear in the success of a military campaign.

MAIN CONTENT

American military theorists such as Douglas A. Macgregor, David Jablonsky and Antulio Echevarria, have argued that the rise of the extended battlespace means that the levels of war may eventually disappear from the world's military lexicon. According to these theorists, the framework of the levels of war will become at best little more than a checklist of labels or, at worst, abstractions in the conduct of war (Macgregor, 1992-93 pp. 33-47; Jablonsly, 1994; Echevarria II, 2011 pp. 30-36).

Using the First Gulf War of 1991 as a template, Macgregor has argued that precision deep-strike munitions, long-range aircraft and advanced target acquisition by the use of global positioning systems (GPS) now allows a theatre commander to influence battle action directly. Through information and precision technologies, a theatre commander can direct military resources to points in time and space that are critical to a campaign's success. As a result, the categories of American capabilities employed against Iraq in 1991 in terms of their strategic, operational or tactical points of origin were largely indistinguishable. The Coalition

was able to strike simultaneously across all three levels of war with capabilities that were previously considered to be mainly strategic in character (Macgregor 1992-93 pp. 38-39).

Macgregor predicted that, in the 21st century, American forces would possess an increasing suite of capabilities to place an enemy under global attack and subject any adversary to a new form of "multidimensional envelopment" (Macgregor, 1992-93 p. 39). Mass strikes with precision weapons using advanced targeting systems would have the potential to destroy an enemy and to compress the close, deep and rear battles into one continuous strike (Macgregor, 1992-93 pp. 40-41). Moreover, in conditions of simultaneous warfare, there was a strong possibility that decisive strategic results would emerge from tactical actions, so eroding the autonomy of the operational level of war. The ability to command large, globally arrayed forces and to bring them to bear simultaneously against widespread enemy targets in one theatre of war "will become the new and indispensable trademark of modern warfare" (Macgregor, 1992-93 p. 44).

For Macgregor, the consequences of continuous and simultaneous strike operations were revolutionary in terms of the way in which warfare was traditionally conceptualised:

> This form of simultaneous warfare collapses the three levels of war, so to speak, by enlisting the tactics of fire and movement directly in behalf [sic] of the strategic goal. The new structure of warfare integrates and synchronises redundant, multiservice warfighting systems in simultaneous attacks on the enemy throughout his entire depth and in the space above him as well. All of this means that in future conflict the three levels of war, as separate and distinct loci of command and functional responsibilities, will be spaced and timed out of existence (Macgregor, 1992-93 pp. 41-42).

David Jablonsky echoed many of Macgregor's views concerning the impact of simultaneity and the diminishing relevance of the levels of war. In particular, Jablonsky was sceptical over the survival of the operational level of war as a discrete activity. He argued that operational authority would decrease because technology increasingly gave strategic-level commanders greatly improved central control over tactical field units (Jablonsky, 1994 pp. 25-32). Jablonsky predicted that the ability to communicate and receive real-time guidance directly from the strategic level would gradually transform command and control structures in favour of a renewal of the direct link between the strategic and tactical levels of war (Jablonsky, 1994, p. 28).

Jablonsky's work seemed to foreshadow a return to the strategy–tactics dualism that had ruled the art of war on land until the coming of the industrial revolution. Strategic commanders might become omniscient "electronic Napoleons", exercising tactical command via computer screen and video link (Evan, 2004 p. 71). Jablonsky noted that, "with time compressed over extended space and with that immense space rendered comprehensible by a technological coup d'oeil, an entire theatre can become a simultaneous battlefield where events, as in the days of Napoleon, may determine national destinies (Jablonski, 1994 p. 65). As the importance of the three levels of war apparently diminishes, operational commanders might risk becoming mere facilitators rather than decision makers (Jablonsky, 1994 pp. 24-28).

Complementing the studies of Macgregor and Jablonsky, Antulio Echevarria, has argued that the levels of war are little more than "arbitrary categories". Echevarria advocated the adoption of a new concept of war called interdependent manoeuvre. The latter concept is based on an attempt to exploit information-age technologies in order to apply fire and movement across the three levels of war simultaneously (Echevarria, 2001 pp. 13-14). "Interdependent maneuver", Echevarria states, "would . . . exploit the fact that the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war can be seen as a single continuum of military activity" (Echevarria, 2001 p. 15).

In the context of interdependent manoeuvre, 21st-century military theory is best served by visualising warfare as an open and nonlinear—rather than a closed, linear—system of military actions, linked together in space and time by a growing variety of information systems (Echevarria, 2001 pp. 32-36). Military action has two parts: fire (the ability to inflict lethality) and movement (the physical means to deliver that lethality) (Evans, 2004 p. 72). Interdependent manoeuvre would bring the synergy of fire and movement to what traditionally have been known as the operational and strategic levels of war (Echevarria, 2001 p. 15).

Not all American military theorists agree that information technology will render the levels of war irrelevant in future armed conflict. Significantly, two American theorists with European experience, Generals Wesley K. Clark and Montgomery C. Meigs, have viewed the levels of war as retaining their importance (Clark, 2001; Meigs, 2001 pp. 4-15). Clark, the NATO commander who prosecuted the 1999 air war against Serbia over Kosovo, has suggested that events in modern war should now be considered to occur across not just three but four distinct yet unequal levels: tactical, operational, strategic and, in his view, political (Clark, 2001 pp. 10-11). A political level of war must, he

argues, become the framework against which tactics, operations and strategy are conceived and executed. "What we discovered increasingly during the Kosovo campaign", observed Clark, "was that the political and strategic levels impinged on the operational and tactical levels" (Clark, 2001).

Echoing Clark's notion of a political level of war, General Meigs highlighted the challenge, in a volatile information environment, of justifying military activity politically to governments and electorates (Meigs, 2001 pp. 6-9). Skill in tactics and operations would remain vital to strategic success. "It is ironic", Meigs reflected, "that in the information age, the growing technological sophistication of the art of operations requires an even more personal approach by the soldier to his political masters to engender their confidence in his operational art" (Meigs, 2001 p. 13). For both Clark and Meigs, in contemporary military operations, skilled and adaptive planning has become crucial in correlating the levels of war to meet the demands of a security environment increasingly constrained by new political, media and legal factors (Clark, 2001 pp. 419-436; Meigs, 2001 pp. 4-15).

Similarly, the Russian theorist, General Makhmut Gareev, has rejected the "end of the levels of war". Formerly one of Marshal Ogarkov's close intellectual colleagues in the Soviet Army, Gareev became a leading figure in Russian military thought during the 1990s (Gareev 1998). In his military writings, Gareev acknowledges that simultaneity and the dispersed battlespace will change the character of armed conflict, particularly in the sphere of tactics, which he describes as "the most dynamic area of the military art" (Gareev 1998 p. 114). However, Gareev also remains convinced that constants such as the levels of war continue to retain their intrinsic value to the profession of arms. He writes:

> In spite of the fact that powerful means of warfare are in the hands of the highest military command . . . the results of the utilisation of strategic strikes and destruction of hostile groupings will depend on the success of combat actions on the operational and tactical scale. And although the proportions of strategy, operational art and tactics have changed significantly, all these categories of military art retain their importance (Gareev, 1998 pp. 109-126).

Gareev believes that, because the conditions of the new battlespace encourage both long-range strike and rapid manoeuvre, there will have to be a dynamic approach to developing new tactics and operational techniques. The Russian theorist goes on to argue that mastery of technique must always guide the use of technology or else military

practitioners risk a degeneration into attrition. "To keep military art on a high level", Gareev notes, "it is necessary . . . to possess an advanced level of operational–tactical thinking along with a creative approach in order to be able to expeditiously evaluate a situation and to analyse it" (Gareev, 1998 pp. 172-173, 114-115).

Modern armies need to find an optimum balance between technology, doctrine and organisational methods at all levels of war. Without adequate doctrine and organisation to meet the demands of information systems, warfighting methods risk becoming narrowly delimited by new weapons technology. In short, all three levels of war must be defined in terms of their purposes and objectives. Real effectiveness in future conflict would only be possible "provided that relative independence and initiative is entrusted to each level of war, which in turn requires a fundamental transformation not only of means, but also of methods . . . necessitating new requirements in the training of military personnel" (Gareev, 1998 pp. 180, 153-156).

Sharing his thoughts on the foregoing, Michael Evans points out that it seems likely, then, that in the early 21st century, the three levels of war will retain their mental currency, albeit in much more visible and fluid political circumstances than those that distinguished warfare during the 20th century. The continuum of tactics, operations and strategy developed in the womb of continental warfare theory continues to give military practitioners a powerful intellectual framework to analyse the significance of multiple events in conflict as they unfold during a campaign (Evans, 2004 p. 75). To use a metaphor, tactics, operations and strategy are to war as mechanics, physics and astrophysics are to science.

As several British military theorists have noted, while the expanded battlespace and reach of technology increasingly compress the three levels of war, a typology of military action continues to remain important to the profession of arms. The areas of tactics, operations and strategy still remain sufficiently differentiated to endure as intellectual categories into the foreseeable future (Irwin, 1993; Grant 2001-2 pp. 5-13). After all, simultaneous fires on a nonlinear battlespace will still require a linking of combat actions and, as a result, coordination of ends, ways and means will remain vital. War remains an art rather than a science. Consequently, Clausewitz's friction, chaos and chance will invariably intervene to disrupt the workings of technology, placing an emphasis on fallible human judgment in tactics, operations and strategy. When the levels of war cease to perform their differential yet integral service to the art of war, they will disappear from the military lexicon.

In the end, it appears the 21st century technological development has indeed compressed the traditional sphere of tactics, operation and strategy. The way, means and end associated with the US killing of the Iranian General Quassim Suleimani in Iraq via an unmanned drone illustrates the fast diminishing importance of the traditional levels of war. The US targeted the enemy and sent the unmanned drone (from perhaps a war ship stationed somewhere at high). The drone hit the target and returned to base. It is true that some military personnel designed and pressed the button for the drone to move, but the battlefield operation of controlling the drone was effectively erased in the mission. Indeed technology has compressed the traditional levels of war.

SELF- ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Discuss the position that the advancements in modern military technology will erase the relevance of the three traditional levels of war.

3.0 CONCLUSION

In this unit, we considered the dimensions of tactics. We saw that the advancement in military technology has compressed the traditional levels of war, namely: strategy, operation and tactics.

4.0 SUMMARY

Due to recent advancements in military technology such as the sensor-to-shooter, the precision missile, the computerised reconnaissance etc, it has become possible to accomplish a military campaign without recourse to the traditional levels of war, namely strategy, operation and tactics. Some theorists argue that this era marked the end of relevance of these levels of war, while others argue that despite the technological advancements, the levels of war are still relevant.

5.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

First they said tactics was nothing different from strategy. Now they say that tactics and strategy have been rendered useless by recent advancements in military technology. What do you think is the true place and relevance of tactics in today's warfare?

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MODULE 4

Unit 1   Theoretical Underpinnings of Operational Design and the Relationship between Operational Art and Operational Design
Unit 2   Depicting the Operational Environment and Understanding the Operational Environment and the Problem
Unit 3   The Operational Approach and Interaction of Operational Design and Planning
Unit 4   Organising for Operational Design and Planning, and Operational Design and Planning during Execution

UNIT 1   THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF OPERATIONAL DESIGN AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OPERATIONAL ART AND OPERATIONAL DESIGN

CONTENTS

1.0   Introduction
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1.0   INTRODUCTION

Operational design is the conception and construction of the framework that underpins a campaign or major operation plan and its subsequent execution. Early operational design focuses on conceptual planning. The potential value-added of operational design are: increased emphasis on the role of the commander, enhanced dialogue between commanders and staffs across levels, deeper (and earlier) understanding of the operational environment, better understanding of the problem and its root causes and better guidance to drive detailed planning. Others are shared visualisation of the flow of the operation, enhanced adaptability to changes in the environment or problem and expanded role of the assessment process. These and related issues are the business of this

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unit, especially as it concerns the theoretical underpinnings of operational design and the relationship between operational design and operational art.

2.0   OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
- describe operational design
- explain the theories underpinning operational design
- explain the relationship between operational art and operational design.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Theoretical Underpinnings of Operational Design

All too often, the critical importance of military theory is either not well understood or is completely ignored by many officers. A reason for this is their apparent lack of knowledge and understanding of the relationship between theory and practice and the real purpose of military theory. Many officers are also contemptuous of theory because they over emphasise the importance of technology (Henry E. Eccles, 1965 p. 59). First, you know, a new theory is attacked as absurd; then it is admitted to be true, but obvious and insignificant; finally it is seen to be so important that its adversaries claim that they themselves discovered it.

Extensive theory—developed by both classical and contemporary writers and practitioners—underpins the planning and execution of military operations. Some theoretical constructs such as center of gravity relate specifically to military operations, while constructs such as systems theory can apply across a wide range of disciplines. Operational design combines aspects of military theory, systems theory, writings on the nature of problems and problem solving, and the challenge of critical and creative thinking in order to help the joint force commander and staff understand and develop effective solutions for complex military problems.

Numerous theories describe the nature of problems and problem solving. Understanding the nature of different types of problems greatly assists the commander's and staff's efforts to understand (or frame) the problem that must be solved. The discussion of systems theory is relevant because the problem typically can be described in terms of interaction of systems in the operational environment.

Problems can be thought of as ranging from simple or well-structured to complex or ill-structured. In 1973, Horst Rittel and Melvin M. Webber formally described the concept of wicked problems in a treatise that contrasted "wicked" problems with relatively "tame," soluble problems in mathematics, chess, or puzzle solving (Rittel &Webber, 1973 pp 155-169). Their treatise describes the following ten characteristics of wicked problems:

(1)   There is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem.
(2)   Wicked problems have no stopping rule.
(3)   Solutions to wicked problems are not true-or-false, but better or worse.
(4)   There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a wicked problem.
(5)   Every solution to a wicked problem is a "one-shot operation"; because there is no opportunity to learn by trial-and-error, every attempt counts significantly.
(6)   Wicked problems do not have an enumerable (or an exhaustively describable) set of potential solutions, nor is there a well-described set of permissible operations that may be incorporated into the plan.
(7)   Every wicked problem is essentially unique.
(8)   Every wicked problem can be considered to be a symptom of another problem.
(9)   The existence of a discrepancy representing a wicked problem can be explained in numerous ways. The choice of explanation determines the nature of the problem's resolution.
(10)The planner has no right to be wrong (planners are liable for the consequences of the actions they generate).

As with other theories, the challenge is one of describing how to apply the above descriptions to a practical military situation. Whether the problem is described as simple or complex, the commander must sufficiently understand the problem in order to successfully design, plan, and execute joint operations. It is not an understatement to say that understanding the nature and varying complexities of problems is fundamental to the commander's ability to frame problems, and thus solve them. History is rich with examples of commanders who have led their forces to defeat because they have failed to fully understand the problem to be solved.

The combination of design and planning is intended as a problem-solving approach that supports decision making, and this approach must

address ill-defined problems. Van Riper links decision making to systems theory and the nature of problems with the following statement:

> To make an effective decision a person must understand which of the two kinds of systems he or she is dealing with, one that is structurally complex or one that is interactively complex. The two systems require fundamentally different decision-making approaches. Structurally complex systems allow for analytical decision-making (sic) while interactively complex systems require intuitive decision-making (sic). Extremely difficult problems—sometimes called "wicked problems" are always a result of interactive complexity; they call for systemic decision-making (sic) (Van Ripper, 2010 p. 6).

With respect to whether Western decision making is up to the challenge of dealing with complex problems, Van Riper cites Dr. Andres Ilachinski:

> The traditional Western scientific method is predicated on a reductionist philosophy, in which the properties of a system are deduced by decomposing the system into progressively smaller and smaller pieces. In the act of exploring the properties reductionism loses sight of the dynamics. The analysis of complex adaptive systems (interactively complex systems) instead requires a holistic or constructionist approach (Andrew Ilachinski, 1996 p. 184).

Military theory covers a broad spectrum of topics from tactics through grand strategy. Some constructs from various writers apply directly to operational design and planning. A seminal military theoretical work is *On War*, a book about war and military strategy by Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz published in 1832 and subsequently translated several times. *On War* includes numerous constructs directly relevant to operational design, particularly with respect to current elements of operational design that planners use to help develop the operational approach.

Examples of such relevant constructs to military theory are as follow:

(1)   *Center of gravity* is "The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act." (See Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Planner's Handbook for Operational Design" Joint and Coalition Warfighting Suffolk, Virginia, the US, 2011 p. II-9). The centre of gravity was originally seen as where the army was most densely concentrated, but this meaning has lost much of its original sense due to the greatly expanded modern

areas of operations and widely distributed nature of joint operations. One of the most important tasks confronting the joint force commander's staff during early operational design is the identification of friendly and enemy centre of gravities. Although not always possible, identifying the centre of gravity early in planning helps focus the operational approach. However, premature identification of the centre of gravity may result in erroneous identification and hence self-deceit.

(2)   *Culmination* has both offensive and defensive application. In the offense, the culminating point is the point in time and space at which an attacker's combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender. A defender reaches culmination when the defending force no longer has the capability to go on the counteroffensive or defend successfully. During stability operations, culmination may result from the erosion of national will, decline of popular support, questions concerning legitimacy or restraint, or lapses in protection leading to excessive casualties.

(3)   Clausewitz also believed in the *dialectic approach* to military analysis as a "method of intellectual investigation." Also known as the Socratic technique of exposing false beliefs and eliciting the truth, dialectic is essentially an intellectual exchange of ideas between two or more people who hold different points of view about a subject and who wish to establish the truth through reasoned arguments. For example, while senior leaders may have a clear strategic perspective of the problem, subordinate leaders often have a better understanding of specific circumstances that comprise the operational situation. Both perspectives are essential to a sound solution. Subordinate commanders should be aggressive in sharing their perspective with their superiors early in design, and both should resolve differences at the earliest opportunity and throughout the planning and execution. A common understanding of the operational environment and problem to be solved is essential. The dialectic approach enhances critical thinking.

Baron Antoine-Henri Jomini was a general in the French and later in the Russian service, and one of the most celebrated writers on the art of war in the Napoleonic era. Among many other constructs, Jomini wrote about interior and exterior lines of operations, defining the former as "…those lines adopted by one of two armies to oppose several hostile bodies, and having a direction that the general can (create a center of gravity) and maneuver with his whole force in a shorter period of time than it would require for the enemy to oppose to them a greater force. Exterior lines lead to the opposite result and are those formed by an army which operates at the same time on both flanks of the enemy, or

against several of its masses" (Baron Antoine-Henri Jomini, 1865 p. 93). *Line of operations* is a current element of operational design and an essential component of the commander's operational approach, a primary product of early operational design. While interior and exterior lines are still relevant in defining the geographic orientation of a force in relation to the enemy or an objective, a *line of effort* is a contemporary variant that connects actions, tasks, effects and objectives to the end state. *Lines of effort* and *lines of operations* can be used in combination to describe an operational approach (Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Planner's Handbook for Operational Design", 2011 p. II-10).

British theorist B. H. Liddell Hart popularised the term indirect approach, which generally entails the avoidance of enemy strength (an idea also attributed to Sun Tzu). A key aspect of operational design is determining whether to attack the enemy center of gravity directly or indirectly. Following World War I, Liddell Hart, set out to address the causes of the war's high casualty rate. He arrived at a set of principles that he considered the basis of all good strategy, principles which, Liddell Hart claimed, were ignored by nearly all commanders in World War I. He reduced this set of principles to a single phrase: the indirect approach; and to two fundamentals: 1) direct attacks against an enemy firmly in position almost never work and should never be attempted; and 2) to defeat the enemy one must first upset his equilibrium, which is not accomplished by the main attack, but must be done before the main attack can succeed. In Liddell Hart's words:

> In strategy the longest way round is often the shortest way there; a direct approach to the object exhausts the attacker and hardens the resistance by compression, whereas an indirect approach loosens the defender's hold by upsetting his   balance (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B._H._Liddell_Hart).

An indirect approach attacks the enemy's centre of gravity by applying combat power against a series of decisive points that lead to the defeat of the centre of gravity while avoiding enemy strength. Originally applied to tactical force-on-force operations, the idea of direct and indirect approaches (a current element of operational design) can apply at all levels of war and in operations where the centre of gravity is not an enemy military force.

The forgoing theories can be combined for a coherent whole. Military operations are inherently complex and the variables associated with each are too numerous to count. In some respects, large-scale, force-on-force combat operations could be considered less complex than counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and other operations against less-

advanced enemies because circumstances usually favour analytical rather than intuitive decision making. In these circumstances, strategic objectives are often clearer, the desired end state is more precisely defined, and forces tend to be confident in the superiority of their equipment, training, and education. However, large-scale combat will likely be the exception rather than the norm and typically will be followed by stability operations in situations as complex as the US faced in Afghanistan.

Critical and creative thinking as well as decision-making capabilities must be up to the challenges of war. In its purest form, operational design relies on critical thinking that builds on a current and coherent understanding of the relevant relationships. Operational designers should apply critical and creative thinking to understand, visualise, and describe problems—particularly those that are complex and ill-defined—and develop approaches to solve them. A design-inspired framework represents a broad operational approach conceived as a result of understanding gained largely through critical and creative thinking and dialog—the basic mechanism of design—and articulated through the commander's intent and guidance.

3.2   Relationship between Operational Art and Operational Design

First, in designing joint operations, the joint force commander must come to grips with each operational situation on its own terms, accepting that this understanding rarely will be complete or entirely correct, but at best will approximate reality. The underlying causes and dynamics will be anything but obvious, while the repercussions of action often will be broad and unpredictable. The interests of various stakeholders may be unclear, and even identifying those stakeholders may be difficult. In this environment, the joint force cannot afford to apply preconceived methods reflexively, but instead must conform its methods to the specific conditions of each situation (Capstone Concept for Joint Operations 15 January 2009). In terms of military theory, the most important conceptual breakthrough in the continental school of strategy was the formal recognition and refinement of an operational level of war and an operational art. The operational level of war may be defined as the connecting link between strategy and tactics while the operational art is the theory and practice of preparing and conducting operations in order to connect tactical means to strategic ends (Michael Evans, 2004 p. 43).

Operational art and operational design provide a bridge between strategy and tactics—they help the joint force commander and joint force

component commanders direct actions that will create the conditions to achieve strategic objectives and a desired end state. Operational art is generally considered the domain of senior commanders (those commanding a joint force or Service/functional component of a joint force) because of the experience, education, intuition, judgment, and vision expected of senior military officers and necessary to link the specific actions of the joint force to broad strategic end states.

Operational design extends operational art's vision with a creative methodology that helps commanders and staff understand the nature of the operational environment, the problem facing them, and possible broad solutions to the problem. Operational design uses various design elements (tools) —such as objective, line of operations, and decisive point—that help the commander and staff develop and refine the broad approach that will guide detailed planning.

How does the commander understand the operational environment; frame a complex, ill-structured problem; design a broad operational approach that gives direction to planning; and know when to adjust the approach when circumstances change in order to achieve objectives and accomplish the assigned mission? He does so through harnessing the relationship between operational art and operational design.

Operational Art is "The cognitive approach by commanders and staff—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations and organise and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means" (Joint Chief of Staff, Planner's Handbook for Operational Design 2011 p. III-2). This application occurs through the thought process commanders use to overcome the ambiguity and uncertainty of a complex operational environment, understand the problem facing them, and visualise how best to effectively and efficiently employ military capabilities to accomplish their mission. Operational art also promotes unified action by helping the joint force commander and staff to understand how to facilitate the integration of inter-organisational partners toward achieving strategic and operational objectives.

Operational art requires broad vision, the ability to anticipate, and the skill to plan, prepare, execute, and assess. It helps commanders and their staff order their thoughts and understand the conditions for victory before seeking battle. Without operational art, campaigns and operations would be a set of disconnected events. Operational art governs the deployment of forces, their commitment to or withdrawal from a joint operation, and the arrangement of battles and major operations to achieve operational and strategic military objectives. This includes

fundamental methods associated with synchronizing and integrating military forces and capabilities, in conjunction with those of agencies and multinational partners, in operations often far removed in time from the desired end state.

Through operational art, commanders integrate ends, ways, and means across the levels of war to achieve the desired end state. This requires commanders to answer the following questions:

(1)   What is the military end state that must be achieved, how is it related to the strategic end state, and what objectives must be achieved to enable that end state? (Ends)
(2)   What sequence of actions is most likely to achieve those objectives and end state? (Ways)
(3)   What resources are required to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means)
(4)   What is the chance of failure or unacceptable consequences in performing that sequence of actions? (Risk)

Early operational design helps the commander and staff to understand the problem before they try to solve it. Together, operational art and operational design help the joint force commander and staff to strengthen the relationship between strategy and tactics.

Operational design extends operational art's vision with a creative methodology that helps commanders and planners answer the ends—ways—means—risk questions. The following stand out as key requirements of operational design:

(1)   Understand the operation's context—the strategic guidance (desired national and military end states, objectives, and operational limitations), the nature of the operational environment, and the problem that requires commitment of military capabilities.
(2)   Given this context, develop an approach to overcome the problem and set the conditions to achieve objectives that create the desired end state.
(3)   During design, resolve differences in perspective with key leaders on the national and military end states, objectives, and the problem;
(4)   Redesign as required during execution.

Joint force commanders and planners can use operational design to a lesser or greater degree when planning any joint operation, from simple to complex. However, the greatest potential benefit of a focused design

effort conducted as early as possible in planning is to understand and solve particularly ill-structured (or "ill-defined") problems. Notwithstanding a commander's judgment, education, and experience, today's general operating environment presents some challenges so complex that understanding the problem and visualising a solution will exceed a single individual's ability. In one respect, the design challenge increases when the joint operation involves other inter-organisational partners (this is typically the case) due to their unique considerations. However, the involvement of selected inter-organisational partners helps planners understand their perspectives and leverage their expertise toward a quicker understanding of the operational environment and the problem. Operational design is essential in building a common perspective and shared understanding to create unity of effort (Joint Chiefs of Staff, Planner's Handbook for Operational Design, 2011 p. III-3).

A well-devised operational design should promote effectiveness and efficiency, greater coherence during transitions between successive operations, better integration and coordination with inter-organisational partners, fewer unintended consequences, and the flexibility to adapt when the situation changes. More importantly, when unintended consequences do occur, they are less likely to create surprise or shock because branches and sequels have been accounted for during detailed planning.

Operational design begins when the commander anticipates or receives a requirement to plan an operation and continues throughout planning and execution. Design helps describe the conceptual linkage of the operation's ends, ways, and means. Planners use various elements of operational design—intellectual tools that help them visualise the arrangement of joint capabilities in time, space, and purpose to accomplish the mission.

Many factors can affect individual design elements and the overall operational design. For example, the nature of a state's multinational partners' strategic objectives could influence the approach to achieving the joint force commander's strategic and operational objectives. The availability of host nation support, diplomatic permission to overfly nations, access to en route air bases, and the allocation of strategic mobility assets will affect operational reach, lines of effort, and lines of operations. The identification, accessibility, and nature of the center of gravity will influence the overall operational approach. Most important are those unknowns and other factors that would cause planners to revisit earlier design hypotheses and assumptions, reframe the problem, and modify or discard the current operational approach. These factors

are likely candidates for the commander's critical information requirements. During planning, the commander and staff must consider ways, means, and measures to monitor and assess these factors.

Early operational design (during mission analysis) is characterised as more conceptual in nature than later detailed joint operations planning process planning steps such as cause of action analysis. From the perspective of the joint force commander and core planning team, the balance of activities early in planning is heavily weighted toward design, and the balance shifts toward detailed joint operations planning process activities and additional design elements as the nature of the operational environment and problem become clearer. Mission analysis is heavily focused on design, which some consider to be conceptual planning, until the joint force commander publishes planning guidance, the operational approach, commander's intent, and the commander's critical information requirements. These products of mission analysis usually mark a shift in emphasis toward subsequent joint operations planning process steps (detailed planning) during which planners devise course of actions and continue to refine the operational approach. Given sufficient information and understanding during early design, the joint force commander might choose to shift course of action development, with a goal of issuing planning guidance that narrows course of action alternatives or focuses on a single course of action.

During execution, changes in the operational environment or the nature of the problem can drive an immediate increase in design activity necessary to revisit earlier conclusions, "reframe" (revise the understanding of) the environment and problem facing the joint force commander, adjust current operations accordingly, and even begin a new design effort that significantly changes the original operational approach.

(1) *Early Operational Design*. During planning initiation and mission analysis, the commander and staff focus on developing and understanding context for the impending operation, which includes understanding the operational environment, framing the problem, and developing a broad operational approach. Joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) is an important source of information that supports these activities, but all staff estimates and other sources contribute. Early operational design helps the commander visualise the operational environment and true nature of the problem and describe an approach that sets necessary conditions, achieves objectives, and accomplishes the mission. A number of design elements are particularly useful during early operational design.

End state and objective are key elements in forming the context for the operation because they identify specified ends. Center of gravity is relevant to early design, although the inability to identify the centre of gravity at this point should not delay the initial design and subsequent planning. The commander may have to deploy and employ forces while continuing to learn about the centre of gravity as operations progress. Decisive points are geographic places, specific key events, critical factors, or functions that, when acted upon, allow a commander to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contributes materially to achieving success. Line of effort and line of operations are particularly useful for considering the sequence of actions within various functional groupings and for portraying the results graphically. *Line of effort* is a functionally oriented companion to *line of operations*, which typically is a physically oriented line that defines the geographical orientation of the force to an enemy, usually in the context of friendly actions on a connection of decisive points in time and space. The operational approach typically connects decisive points along these lines.

The problem statement (the product of framing the problem) considers the impact of tension and competition in the operational environment and broadly describes the requirements for transformation, anticipated changes in the operational environment, and critical transitions.

The result of early operational design is a broad operational approach—developed as a product with text and graphics—that articulates the broad actions the commander believes the force should take in the operational environment to achieve the desired end state. The joint force commander should include the design elements mentioned earlier in this product, as well as other elements if they help clarify the broad approach to achieving objectives. The operational approach, either as a separate product or incorporated in the commander's planning guidance, drives follow-on detailed planning. The approach is also a product the commander and staff can use to explain the operational problem and the broad solution to superiors, subordinates, other inter-organisational partners. Detailed planning can cause course of action and concept of operations (CONOPS) adjustments that remain consistent with the operational approach, and changes will occur during execution as well. But changes that constitute a fundamental shift in the approach will usually require the staff to begin a redesign effort.

Available planning time is relatively unconstrained in deliberate planning circumstances, so the commander may keep the effort focused

on mission analysis and early design actions as the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment continues to refine the understanding of the operational environment. During crisis-action planning, time constraints may cause the commander to issue planning guidance and the joint force commander's initial intent while continuing to gather information and refine the operational approach.

(2) *Operational Design during Course of Action (COA) and Plan/Order Development:* Focusing on the operational approach and supporting staff estimates, planners continue mission analysis and begin course of action development. The joint force commander will typically incorporate a revised operational approach in commander's intent and planning guidance, key outputs of mission analysis. Planners continue to refine and focus the operational approach during subsequent joint operations planning process steps until they produce the final plan or order. They use additional elements of operational design, such as termination and operational reach, as these elements become more relevant to detailed planning.

(3)   *Operational Design during Execution:* As a conceptual component of planning, operational design also applies to planning branches and sequels to the current operation during execution just as it does to pre-execution planning. Commanders and planners continue to consider design elements during execution, and adjust both current operations and future plans to capitalise on tactical and operational successes as the joint operation unfolds. The plans staff section's effort focuses on future plans and also may support the operations staff section in branch planning for future operations. The operations staff section typically focuses on current operations and related branch planning. The timeframe of focus for these efforts varies according to the level of command, type of operation, joint force command's desires, and other factors. The plans staff section usually concentrates on planning subsequent phases (sequels) of the operation, and participates in planning branches to the current operation (Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Planner's Handbook for Operational Design" 2011 p. III-7).

Through early and continuous assessment, the staff and joint force commander monitor the operational environment and progress toward setting conditions and achieving objectives. Assessment helps the commander ensure that the operational approach, concept of operations, and tasks to subordinate and supporting commands remain feasible and acceptable in the context of higher policy, guidance, and orders. If the current approach is failing to meet these criteria, if aspects of the

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operational environment or problem change significantly, or if operations meet with unexpected success, the joint force commander may decide to begin a redesign effort, revisit earlier design assumptions, conclusions, and decisions that led to the current operational approach, and redesign the operational approach if necessary. This could cause small adjustments to current operations or a significant reorientation that reframes the operational environment, develops new objectives, or realigns organisational relationships.

The Role of the Commander: "When all is said and done, it is really the commander's *coup d' oeil*, his ability to see things simply, to identify the whole business of war completely with himself, that is the essence of good generalship" (Carl vonClausewitz, *On War*).

The commander is the focal point of decision making during military operations, and plays an essential role in planning. The commander should be the central figure in design, not only due to education and experience, but also because the commander's judgment and decisions are required to guide the staff through the planning process. Too often, commanders defer to the planning staff, even to the point that the staff drafts the commander's planning guidance and intent statement. This approach may work when addressing relatively simple planning problems; but many contemporary operational challenges that seem "simple" can be deceptively complex, particularly when their impact is viewed within the larger strategic framework.

To get the most from the design effort, the joint force commander's critical thinking, foresight, intuition, and visualisation are essential during the initial stage of design. Identifying the true nature of a complex problem and designing an approach to the solution are key design outputs that drive subsequent planning and execution (James Mattis, 2009). The joint force commander can facilitate planning and diminish the burden on the staff by becoming intimately involved in design and planning and making timely decisions throughout mission analysis and course-of-action discussions. The commander can emphasise the importance of an open and honest dialogue that questions assumptions, vision, guidance, and end state in order to gain a deeper understanding of what the joint force commander and staff cannot explain or know about the operational environment and the problem. However, other responsibilities may affect the timing and extent of the commander's participation.

> From the beginning, however, I felt the effort was doomed. Although the commander had authorised for the effort to commence, he never did participate himself. According to what I understood of the Design process- the

commander had to be involved—deeply involved. It was, after all, his process. This was for him. All the commander got from the effort was a backbrief once the final product was completed. While this was perhaps better than no involvement, it was too little too late: at that point he was already divorced from the logic that had driven us to our solutions (Major Grant Martin, 2011).

Commanders direct throughout planning. This direction takes the form of interaction with the staff, guidance on the development of products, and decisions at key points in the process, such as approval of a course of action. In crisis action situations, this interaction typically is continuous as the joint operation planning process steps are compressed and blended together. Regardless of time constraint, the commander should create conditions that facilitate the staff's critical and creative thinking and sharing of ideas and recommendations. Such participation is particularly critical early in the process.

Throughout planning and execution, the joint force commander will interact with higher, subordinate, and supporting commanders, agency leaders, multinational partners, ambassadors in the operational area, and other key sources. Each of these may provide bits and pieces of information that contribute to the staff's understanding of both the environment and the true nature of the problem. It is essential that the joint task force's knowledge-sharing protocols and mechanisms facilitate the exchange of this information. Consider the following example:

> This happened the other day with our commander. We had been working on a project for two weeks. As we briefed him it became apparent that he didn't agree. So we began to deep dive on different aspects of our problem framing…we found out info that our commander had gathered during a command visit that we didn't have any knowledge of. At the same time, we had intel that our commander had not seen and thus we provided key info to help complete his frame. Out of this we all reached common understanding…and all in less than an hour with the commander. I don't think this process is new. I think it is the staffing process that has always been used…but now we need to formalise it as a key element of developing understanding (SAMS, *Art of Design,* p. 176 quoted in Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Planner's Handbook for Operational Design, 2011 p. III-9).

Joint force commanders ensure subordinate commands sufficient time to plan. They do so by issuing a warning order to subordinates at the earliest opportunity and by collaborating with other commanders, agency leaders, and multinational partners (as appropriate) to develop and articulate a clear understanding of the commander's mission, intent, guidance, and priorities. Joint force commanders resolve issues that are beyond the staff's authority. Examples include the close-hold, compartmented planning that occurs with some sensitive operations as well as the continuing challenge of incorporating inter-organisational partners in joint operations planning process. "The key is not to make quick decisions, but to make timely decisions" (General Colin Powell, Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff).

In particular, commanders collaborate with their superiors to resolve differences of interpretation of higher-level objectives and the ways and means to accomplish these objectives. A joint task force commander might tend to expect that the combatant command headquarters has correctly described the operational environment, framed the problem, and devised a sound approach to achieve the best solution. But strategic guidance can be vague, and the commander must interpret and filter it for the staff. While combatant commander and national leaders may have a clear strategic perspective of the problem, operational-level commanders and subordinate leaders often have a better understanding of specific circumstances that comprise the operational situation (SAMS, p. 176). Both perspectives are essential to a sound solution. Subordinate commanders should be aggressive in sharing their perspective with their superiors and resolving differences early in design as well as during detailed planning and execution.

Depicting the Methodology: the primary components of operational design's methodology are the operational environment, the problem and the operational approach. The joint force commander and staff typically progress through these components in a generally accepted order. However, this is a journey of discovery, particularly early in planning. While some things must be done before others, the learning that occurs when considering one component will require revisiting the learning that occurs in another component. Thus design is iterative in nature. What the joint force commander and staff learn later will often affect previous conclusions and decisions. These must be re-examined, and could lead to revision of subsequent conclusions.

Operational design begins with understanding strategic guidance, which should provide strategic objectives, tasks to the joint force, and operational limitations. With this initial information, the joint force commander and staff determine the current state of the operational

environment (or current system), and then determine the future state of
the operational environment (desired system)—the conditions that
should exist when operations end. As the iteration of thought and
discussion related to the current and desired systems continues, the joint
force commander and staff begin to identify the problem—the factors
that must be addressed to achieve the desired system conditions. As
these factors emerge, the joint force commander and staff determine
broad actions (the operational approach) that can address the factors.
There are three purposes for developing an operational approach: it
provides the foundation for the commander's planning guidance to the
staff and other partners; it provides the model for execution of the
campaign or operation and development of assessments for that
campaign or operation; and it enables a better understanding of the
operational environment and of the problem.

Joint operation planning requires a balance of art and science.
Operational art is a doctrinal term defined as the cognitive approach by
commanders and staff—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience,
creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and
operations and organise and employ military forces by integrating ends,
ways, and means. This application occurs through the thought process
the joint force commanders use to visualise how to best efficiently and
effectively use military capabilities to accomplish their mission.

Operational art encompasses intuition, an unquantifiable talent for
applying a level of insight that underpins the commander's decisions on
all aspects of joint operations. Operational design provides a
methodology that extends operational art's creative thinking and
intuition. This methodology is an iterative approach that allows for the
joint force commander's vision and mastery of operational art to help
planners answer ends–ways–means–risk questions and appropriately
structure campaigns and major operations. Operational design elements,
such as objective, end state, and line of operations, are tools that help
joint force commanders and staffs visualise, describe, and modify a joint
operation's framework. Such elements support joint operation planning
and the joint force commander and staff use them throughout the joint
operation planning process. Operational design and joint operation
planning process are complementary elements of the overall planning
process.

The joint force commander's role in planning, as a fundamental
responsibility of command, should include personal involvement and
guidance to the staff, particularly during early design. The commander
uses planning to increase understanding of the environment and the
problem in order to support sound decision making. The joint force

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commander typically has information not available to the staff as well as a broader base of experience, judgment, and intuition to guide decision making. Regardless of time constraint, the joint force commander should create conditions that facilitate the staff's critical and creative thinking and sharing of ideas and recommendations. Such participation is essential early in the process.

SELF -ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Explain the following concepts: (1) Operational design, (2) operational art and (3) operational planning. Show the relationship between operational art and operational design. Do you think that operational design can effectively be divorced from operational planning?

4.0   CONCLUSION

This unit discussed operational planning and design. It gave the theoretical underpinnings of operational design and explained the concepts of operational planning and operational art. In the first place, it synchronised the various theories of operational planning and design. Then it explained the differences and similarities between operational art and operational design. It proceeded to align the meanings and spheres of coverage of operational planning and operational design, showing that both do begin from the outset and continue till the end of engagement, enabling the joint force commander and staff to continue to make useful alteration to plan and design, shifting the parameters of the line of operation and line of effort until the end state is achieved.

5.0   SUMMARY

In this unit, we learnt that operational design is the conception and construction of the framework that underpins a campaign or major operation plan and its subsequent execution. Early operational design focuses on conceptual planning. The potential value-added of operational design are: increased emphasis on the role of the commander, enhanced dialogue between commanders and staffs across levels, deeper (and earlier) understanding of the operational environment, better understanding of the problem and its root causes and better guidance to drive detailed planning. Others are shared visualisation of the flow of the operation, enhanced adaptability to changes in the environment or problem and expanded role of the assessment process. These and related issues were the pre-occupation of this unit, especially as they concern the theoretical underpinnings of operational design and the relationship between operational design and operational art.

6.0   TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

What do you understand by "line of operation" and "line of effort"? Discuss the relationship between them, showing how their variables guide the joint force commander and staff in adjusting the operational plan and operational design towards achieving the end state.

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UNIT 2   DEPICTING THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT, AND UNDERSTANDING THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THE PROBLEM

CONTENTS

1.0   Introduction
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1.0   INTRODUCTION

A joint force commander would have received briefing about the objective the state wants to achieve in an armed conflict; he would have carefully designed the operation and had a well-laid operational plan. The moment he moves his forces into the field of operation; he would realise that the constituents of the operational environment are radically different from what he had expected. The position and response of the enemy force could have a telling effect on his operational design and planning, to the extent that he has to re-design and re-plan to be able to face the battle squarely. This is why it is important that the joint force commander and indeed the operational staff and the plan staff should depict the operational environment as part of the operational plan and design. They should endeavour to understand the operational environment and the problem to avoid last minute surprises on the battle field.

2.0   OBJECTIVES
At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
* describe how to depict the operational environment as part of the operational planning and design
* explain why the joint force commander, the operations staff section and the plans staff section should endeavour to understand the operational environment the problem.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1.   Depicting the Operational Environment

The joint force commander and the operations staff and the plans staff sections should depict the operational environment as part of the operational design and planning. They should also strive to depict and prepare to manage the environment after they have won the war. Having no decisions reached about how to exploit a victory or how to resolve the future of the war can be an egregious error. Context is the set of circumstances or events (the interrelated conditions) that forms the environment within which something exists or occurs. Any military commitment occurs within a context larger than just the commander's mission. Getting the context right as early as possible is important to early operational design and helps the commander develop an operational approach to address the right problem.

The operational environment construct is a way to understand context in a specific joint operation. The operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. The joint force commander's operational environment encompasses physical areas and factors (of the air, land, maritime, and space domains) and the information environment (which includes cyberspace). Included within these areas are all enemy, friendly, and neutral systems that are relevant to a specific joint operation. One way to visualise, understand, and depict this environment is as a complex and adaptive system of systems. Operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. System is a functionally, physically, and/or behaviourally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements; that group of elements forming a unified whole. Problem is the factors that must be addressed to move the current system to a desired state. Operational approach is a commander's description of the broad actions that the force must take in order to achieve the desired military end state.

A party should have strategic guidance that provides initial context to help the joint force commander frame the environment. This guidance typically consists of strategic objectives, the related tasks the joint force commander must accomplish, and a description of the circumstances that cause the state to commit her military capabilities. Planners can think of the environment as a set of systems. The systems will interact and adapt during the course of an operation based on what the joint force does and how the systems of opposition react. The commander can visualize how this system of systems looks at the start of operations (current system), determine what the system should look like when

operations conclude (desired system), and identify those factors that must be addressed (the problem) to move the current system to the desired system. The operational approach describes how the joint force commander addresses the problem (how operations will transform the current system to the desired system).

Understanding a complex operational environment requires a combination of art and science and the ability to blend knowledge, experience, intuition, and critical thinking that are essential to operational design with analytical methods and tools that support detailed planning. The remainder of this subunit describes a systems-oriented technique to depict the operational environment. The joint force commander and his staff use this technique as a vehicle to stimulate dialogue, which in turn can promote critical and creative thinking and deeper understanding. One way to visualise and think about the operational environment is as a set of interacting systems.

While some systems (such as infrastructure) are relatively static, many systems in the operational environment are inherently complex and dynamic. Most systems can often exhibit unpredictable, surprising, and uncontrollable behaviours. Rather than being an engineered solution, a military operation evolves as the joint force adapts responsively to systems that also are adapting. This is why the application of operational art emphasises the importance of the creative imagination, judgment, experience, and skill of commanders and staff (Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Planner's Handbook for Operational Design 2011 p. IV-3).

The system commonly used in discussions of the operational environment is referenced by the PMESII (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information and Infrastructure). PMESII can accommodate most aspects of the operational environment. Except the last of the PMESII, the other aspects of the operational environment are inherently complex and dynamic.

The joint force commander and staff describe relevant systems in sufficient detail to identify potential key links and nodes. These are nodes that are critical to the functioning of their systems. Some key nodes may become decisive points for military operations, since successful action on these nodes could allow the joint force commander to gain a marked advantage over the enemy or otherwise to contribute materially to achieving success.

Key nodes are often linked to, or resident in, multiple systems. For example, the major bridges over a river could be key nodes in the infrastructure and military systems during traditional combat operations

because they enable the joint force or enemy to move supplies and military forces across the obstacle and prevent the opponent from doing so. In this example, the bridges are essential to military operations in early phases of the operation, and could be important to later stabilisation and reconstruction activities. Therefore, the joint force commander and staff could identify the bridges as decisive points and consider how to gain control of the bridges early in the operation.

During counterinsurgency operations, a country's religion subsystem (part of the social system) could be central to the functioning of the country's social system, and the core group of religious leaders (or a single leader) could be the religion subsystem's key node. Depending on the country's social and political structure, this same group of religious leaders also could be a key node in the political system and have great influence over the state's relevant population. Weakening or eliminating a key node could cause its related group of nodes and links to function less effectively or not at all, while strengthening the key node could enhance the performance of the subsystem and larger system. However, this determination is more straightforward in systems of things (such as infrastructure) than in systems of people (such as social and political systems); the joint force commander should not prematurely accept the expected effectiveness of actions for or against key people.

Certain characteristics of the operational environment will be more significant than others based on the joint force's mission and nature of the operation. For example, the presence of civilian relief organisations would be an important factor during a foreign humanitarian assistance operation. During a counter-drug operation, significant characteristics could include the relationships among narcotic trafficking organisations and the government in the region. During major operations involving combat, significant characteristics of the operational environment could involve the location of critical resource (such as source of water during desert operations), the enemy's line of communication and external sources of supply, and the location and viability of friendly and third-party forces. Depending on the assigned mission, economic trade between the enemy and third-party nations could influence the joint force commander's decision making process. These examples represent nodes and links that can be represented on a system depiction of the operational environment.

The operational environment is defined as a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. To visualize an approach that can achieve objectives and accomplish the mission, the joint force commander must be able to describe both the beginning state of the

operational environment and the state of the environment desired when operations have achieved a desired end state. One way to do so is to visualise the environment in terms of constantly interacting systems, which are complex, adaptive, and in flux.

3.2 Understanding the Operational Environment and the Problem

The job of the joint force commander and staff does not end with depicting the environment. It goes further to understanding the depicted operational environment, figuring out available problems and solving them.

> "…conflict is inherently complex and unpredictable. It is a non-deterministic human endeavor whose ramifications are never fully guaranteed, because our adversaries have free will, which will inevitably affect the operating environment in unpredictable ways. The enemy's free will, manifested by courage, imagination, resolve, and other human factors, deny (sic) predictability in most aspects of war" (James Mattis, 2008).

Depicting the operational environment simply involves methods that help the commander and staff graphically show and discuss node-link arrangements. A level of understanding obviously occurs during the process of depicting and discussing system relationships. However, developing an extensive understanding of the operational environment involves far more. It requires understanding how the environment's systems behave and interact, which will vary from state to state, from region to region and from one set of operational circumstances to another. Understanding the environment also requires the ability to think through cause and effect—how the joint force's action on one component of a system will likely affect that system and others.

Critical thinking is instrumental to a sufficient understanding of the operational environment. When commanders, staff, and others participate in critical thinking exchanges, they increase the organisation's shared knowledge base. For example, the free exchange of ideas between the commander and staff that should typify early operational design is an activity that shares the individual knowledge of numerous functional experts, modifies and increases their collective knowledge, promotes their shared understanding, and fosters an environment of collaboration and learning. For these reasons, this sub-unit begins with a brief introduction and recommendation with respect to critical thinking:

It is so damn complex. If you ever think you have the solution to this, you're wrong, and you're dangerous. You have to keep listening and thinking and being critical and self-critical" (H. R. McMaster, quoted in "Letter From Iraq: The Lesson of Tal Afar- Is it too late for the Administration to correct its course in Iraq?" The New Yorker (2006), George Packer).

There are competing perspectives on what critical thinking is and on how to develop critical thinking skills. Critical thinking and creative thinking are related. Creative thinking is about evaluation and synthesis. Evaluation is judging based on evidence (appraise, conclude, justify, value). Synthesis is re-arranging ideas into a new whole (create, assemble, compose, design). Critical thinking on the other hand is about analysis, application, comprehension and knowledge. In analysis, you break down objects into similar parts and analyse (compare, contrast, distinguish). In application, you apply to actual situations (apply, choose, demonstrate, produce, etc). In comprehension, you grasp the meaning (comprehend, define, discuss, explain). Finally, in knowledge, you recall data or information (define, describe, identify, list, recall) (Bloom's Taxonomy of Learning, 1956).

From a design perspective, critical thinking should occur as part of an interactive and iterative methodology involving the commander, staff, and other subject matter experts as necessary. Critical thinking requires the active participation of members and the free-ranging (but respectful) exchange of different perspectives that some refer to as discourse. The methodology involves making assumptions, defending or refuting arguments, drawing conclusions, and determining the meaning of what is observed in the operational environment. The desired result at any point in time is the best possible understanding of the operational environment and the problem to support development of the operational approach and the commander's subsequent planning guidance to the staff and other commanders. This interaction occurs not only in initial meetings focused on design early in planning, but also throughout planning and execution. Commanders have an essential role in creating an open atmosphere for discourse (SAMS *Art of Design* Student Text Version 2.0).

> Commanders should be transparent with subordinates and convince them that their views, ideas, and perspectives are invaluable to the success of the organisation. …The commander must take care to avoid organisational obstacles and be willing to share the work of command, including allowing subordinates and staff officers to exercise healthy initiative and experimentation…. None of

this is new, of course. Good commanders have done it for years. The point here is that these conditions are essential for the practice of Design. Where they are absent, Design simply won't work (SAMS Art of Design Student Text Version 2.0).

Designing is creative and is best accomplished through discourse. Discourse is the candid exchange of ideas without fear of retribution that results in a synthesis and a shared visualisation of the operational problem (Joint Advanced Warfighting School *Operational Art and Campaigning Primer* AY 09-10).

Group discourse allows a rich framing and understanding of a complex and dynamic problem. Discourse allows a synthesis of ideas that is greater than the sum of its parts (US Special Operations command J8-S Briefing Operational Design Primer, 4 Feb 09).

Establishing a Baseline: In order to develop an initial picture of the operational environment, the following items provide a good baseline:

(1)   National strategic objectives. These objectives provide strategic purpose (the ends) that guides how commanders use their ways and means. A joint task force commander should have the added benefit of the combatant commander's theater-strategic objectives. These objectives and other strategic guidance represent the desired strategic end state, which is the broadly expressed set of conditions that should exist at the end of the involvement in the crisis or contingency. Because the major systems (military, economic, social, and others) in the operational environment are in flux, the desired conditions that comprise the specified end state may change during the course of the operation. Yet objectives based on these desired conditions provide context, and help national leaders describe what they want the environment to be when operations conclude. While many end-state conditions will not be static, it may be possible to maintain the general conditions (such as Iraqi forces remaining out of Kuwait after the 1990-91 Persian Gulf Conflict) indefinitely or for an extended period.

(2)   The desired military end state, which is typically a point in time and/or circumstances beyond which the state does not require the military instrument of national power as the primary means to achieve remaining national objectives. Achieving the military end state does not mean that the joint force disengages entirely, but

instead that joint operations focus on support to other agencies or organisations. Even if other agencies are in the lead in later phases of the operation, the joint force commander will often control many or most of the capabilities (personnel and equipment for command and control, protection, etc.) necessary. (3) The joint force commander's mission or set of tasks specified in some type of initiating directive (warning order, planning order, existing operational plan, etc.) together with other implied tasks necessary to accomplish the specified tasks.

(4)   The current intelligence estimate, which should provide the baseline for the commander's and staff's understanding of the operational environment. This estimate is produced through the analytical process and joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment.

These enabling baselines will lead to the end state and will be a condition to achieving the desired system.

Time is a significant consideration when determining the desired system. How time relates to the desired system heavily influences not only the expectations of higher authorities but also how commanders use forces and capabilities to achieve desired conditions. Staff must exercise diligence throughout design to account for the time expected to achieve the conditions. They also qualify whether the desired conditions are intended to be lasting or transient in nature. This temporal dimension is essential to developing effective operational approaches and managing expectations.

Once armed with an initial understanding of the operational environment's current and desired systems, the design effort shifts to the challenge of understanding and describing the problem (those factors that must be addressed to change the current system to the desired system) (Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Planner's Handbook for Operational Design", p. V-9). Understanding the problem is essential to solving the problem. It involves understanding and isolating the root causes of the issue at hand—defining the essence of a complex, ill-structured problem. The essential activities continue to be thinking critically and conducting open, frank discussion with stakeholders, considering their diverse perspectives, and thereby discovering and understanding the underlying nature of the problem. Bringing adequate order to complex problems to facilitate subsequent detailed planning requires an iterative discourse between commander, staff, and others. The initial depiction of the desired system is based in large part on the objectives, tasks, and other guidance that higher headquarters provides to the joint force

commander. As the joint force commander and staff continue their analysis and gain a deeper understanding of the systems and forces at work, additional considerations will often emerge that can refine higher headquarters objectives, the conditions to achieve them, and the factors representing the problem. These refinements will change the understanding and depiction of the operational environment.

Understanding the problem (which resides within the current system) is essential to understanding the operational environment. However, understanding how other parts of the operational environment relate to (or interact with) the problem is essential to developing a solution (the operational approach). Problems that require commitment of military capabilities can range from relatively simple to extremely complex. Circumstances that result in combat are never simple, although some combat situations are less complex than others. Likewise, some irregular warfare circumstances can be more complex and their operational and strategic objectives more difficult to achieve than those of traditional, force-on-force military operations. Initial observable symptoms often do not reflect the true nature and root cause(s) of the problem, so commanders and staffs must devote sufficient time and effort early in planning to correctly frame the problem before considering specific courses of action.

There is a natural tendency for commanders and planners to expect that the higher command accurately understands the situation, has framed the problem, and has provided appropriate tasks to subordinates. The higher authority's initial tasks and guidance to the joint force commander might or might not analyse, describe, and address the underlying causes and considerations early in a crisis. Particularly in a crisis for which no plan exists, the higher command's initial warning order or other planning directive seldom contains a comprehensive or final solution on the exact nature and underlying causes or of an approach to solving the problem. Even if higher headquarters' analysis has occurred, the joint force commander and staff should ensure by their independent analysis (as time allows) that they agree, and they should work to resolve different perspectives with higher authority and subordinate commanders. Subordinate commanders should frame their circumstances, define the problem for themselves from their respective vantage points, and share their understanding with their superiors and subordinates. This interaction is necessary to achieve a true, shared, systemic understanding of the operational environment, especially when the problem is complex and planning time is relatively compressed. Consensus on the core problem will help ensure a common perspective on the approach to its solution.

As the commander and staff gain an understanding of the problem within the context of the operational environment, potential solutions should become evident. The configuration of tensions, competition, opportunities, and challenges may reveal ways to interact with various aspects of the environment in order to transform it to the desired system. Analysing these options often requires coupling potential actions to a problem by quickly war-gaming their possible outcomes. This deepens understanding, informs the commander's ability to visualise friendly actions, and enables the commander to expedite detailed planning by developing intent and planning guidance.

> The joint force commander often encounters very complex situations that must be framed individually as early as possible. Understanding must be built over time. The commander must identify and understand the important relationships within such complex situations and use them advantageously. One must also understand the likely second- and third-order consequences or implications of various actions. Operational artists should consider that even the desirable effects of the most appropriate actions can decay as the surrounding system responds to the infusion of energy. A detailed understanding of the system dynamics helps the commander to begin to choose an appropriate approach to transform the situation to one that is more desirable and to observe the response of the system in order to recognise when diminishing return sets in so a new, more effective response can be formulated. The discourse of design provides the understanding that the commander and staff draw upon to frame this new complex problem" (US Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center Pamphlet 10, Design in Military Operations, 20 September 2010).

There is no gainsaying that the commander and staff should understand the environment's forces at work. Understanding how to solve the problem and change the current system to the desired system involves understanding the actors and influences at work in the operational environment. The commander and staff identify motivations and agendas among the relevant actors with regard to the desired transformation. They consider factors that influence these motivations and agendas. They also evaluate tendencies, potentials, trends, tensions, and other factors that influence the interactions among social, cultural, and ideological forces. These factors may include political, social, or cultural dispositions in one group that may hinder collaboration with another group.

Actors: Commanders use their expanding understanding of the environment to understand and explain behaviours of relevant actors in the operational environment. An actor is an individual or group within a specific system(s) who acts to advance personal or other interests. Relevant actors may include states, governments, multinational actors, coalitions, regional groupings, alliances, terrorist networks, criminal organisations, cartels, multinational and international corporations, nongovernmental organisations, and others able to influence the situation either through, or in spite of, the established civil, religious, or military authorities. A few will be key actors who are crucial to the operation's success. The staff can depict key actor relationships within a larger system. Often, relationships among actors are multifaceted and differ depending on the scale of interaction and their temporal aspects (history, duration, type, and frequency). Clarifying the relationships among actors requires intense effort since relationships must be examined from multiple perspectives. Commanders can also depict relationships by identifying and categorising their unique characteristics.

Tendencies: In developing their understanding of the interactions and relationships of relevant actors in the operational environment, the commander and staff consider natural tendencies in their analyses. Tendencies reflect the inclination to think or behave in a certain manner. Tendencies are not considered deterministic; instead they are models that describe the thoughts or behaviours of relevant actors. Tendencies help identify the range of possibilities that relevant actors may develop with or without external influence. Once identified, commanders and staffs evaluate the potential of these tendencies to manifest within the operational environment.

Potentials: The commander and staff also consider potentials, which are inherent abilities or capacities for the growth or development of a specific interaction or relationship. Not all interactions and relationships support achieving the desired end state. The desired end state accounts for tendencies and potentials that exist among the relevant actors or other factors in the operational environment.

Tensions: Tension is the resistance or friction among and between actors. The commander and staff identify the tension by analysing the context of the relevant actors' tendencies, potentials, and the operational environment. In determining the problem, the is need to analyse and identify the positive, neutral, and negative implications of tensions in the operational environment given the differences between existing and desired conditions, understanding that the force's actions within the operational environment may exacerbate latent tensions. Tensions that can be exploited to drive change may be vital to transforming existing conditions. Tensions that may undermine transformation must be

addressed appropriately. Because tensions arise from differences in perceptions, goals, and capabilities among relevant actors, they are inherently destabilising and can both foster and impede transformation. By analysing these tensions, the commander identifies the problem that the design will ultimately solve.

A red team is a group of soldiers that help the intelligence staff gather information. A red team can help the joint force commander and staff better understand the environment's tensions, potentials, and tendencies. The intelligence staff section typically uses a red team to support course of action development and war-gaming, but the joint force commander should consider forming a red team early in operational design. This team can center on the intelligence staff section, but should also include subject matter experts in social, economic, diplomatic, and other disciplines relevant to the mission at hand.

In describing the problem, the staff identifies those areas of tension that merit further consideration as areas of possible intervention. Commanders and staff determine how environmental conditions, actors, or relationships may resist or facilitate moving the system from the observed to the desired system and how to leverage environmental inertia to achieve desired conditions. The staff also considers how the individual systems can be expected to resist or facilitate moving the system from the observed to the desired state and how their inertia in the environment can be leveraged to ensure achievement of the desired conditions.

The joint force commander and staff consider how potential actions will enable the force to maintain the initiative. They must take into account operational limitations; those actions required or prohibited by higher authority, such as a constraint, restraint, and other restrictions that limit the commander's freedom of action. The staff evaluates what combination of actions might derail opposing actors from achieving their goals while moving the observed system toward the desired system. This entails evaluating an action's potential risks and the relevant actors' freedom of action. Likewise, identifying the possible emergence of unintended consequences or threats, commanders and staffs may discover exploitable opportunities to create conditions that support the desired system. The staff also explores the risks and opportunities of action by considering exploitable tensions. This includes identifying capabilities and vulnerabilities of the actors who would oppose the achievement of the desired system. Commanders and staffs can then formulate methods to neutralise those capabilities and exploit vulnerabilities.

Once the commander and staff have listed the problem's factors, considered the tendencies and potentials of the relevant actors, and identified tensions between the existing conditions and the desired end state, they develop a problem statement. This statement, which is the basis for developing the operational approach, is a narrative that lists the problem's factors, describes areas of tension, competition, and opportunity, and identifies the areas for action that will transform existing conditions toward the desired end state before adversaries begin to transform current conditions to their desired end state. Iraqi forces occupy Kuwait and US citizens at risk in Persian Gulf are examples of problem factors that had to be addressed by the combatant commander in Operation Desert Storm and in follow-on actions in order to set the conditions required to achieve the desired system and accomplish strategic objectives in that conflict. Such factors provide the basis for the eventual functional lines of effort and geographic lines of operations that can be the centerpiece of the operational approach.

The operational environment provides context—the set of circumstances within which the joint force commander will operate. The joint force commander and staff need the best possible understanding of this context and the problem to be solved to design an effective approach to solve the problem. Higher headquarters typically provides the initial context for an operation in the form of a warning order, alert order, or planning requirement, but this initial context will not be complete. Additional analysis will be necessary, particularly for a complex operational environment and ill-defined problem.

Understanding the operational environment requires understanding how its systems behave and interact, which varies from state to state, from region to region, and from one set of operational circumstances to another. It also requires the ability to think through cause and effect— how the joint force's actions on one component of a system will likely affect that system and others. It involves understanding and isolating the root causes of the issue at hand—defining the essence of a complex, ill-structured problem—so the joint force commander and staff can visualize and describe a solution that will drive detailed planning. Joint doctrine's operational design incorporates the up-front emphasis on the critical and creative thinking necessary to understand the operational environment and problem at hand.

SELF- ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Using the notion of PMESII, explain how the joint force commander can use nodes and links in depicting the operational environment.

4.0 CONCLUSION

In this unit, we discussed two related aspects of operational planning and design, namely: depicting the operational environment, and understanding the operational environment and the problem. Under depicting the operational environment, we saw the meaning of terms such as operational environment, system, problem and operational approach. We also saw the general and specific constituents of an operational environment. As it relates to understanding the operational environment and the problem, we saw the usefulness of critical thinking in understanding operational environment. We saw the meaning and use of critical thinking in the particular field of understanding operational environment, especially its importance in establishing the baseline, namely: the national strategic objectives, the desired military end state, the joint force commander's mission or set of tasks and the current intelligence estimate. We saw generally how understanding the problem is a condition to achieving the military end state. Again, we saw the environments at work, capable of influencing the military end state, such as the actors, tendencies, potentials and tensions.

5.0 SUMMARY

The operational environment provides context—the set of circumstances within which the joint force commander will operate. The joint force commander and staff need the best possible understanding of this context and the problem to be solved to design an effective approach to solve the problem. Understanding the operational environment requires understanding how its systems behave and interact, which varies from state to state, from region to region, and from one set of operational circumstances to another. It also requires the ability to think through cause and effect—how the joint force's actions on one component of a system will likely affect that system and others. It involves understanding and isolating the root causes of the issue at hand.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1.   You have been appointed the joint force commander to lead Operation Lions Party, to enter Sambisa Forest and effectively and permanently dislodge the remnants of the Boko Haram insurgents. The Force Headquarters has concluded the operational design and the operational plans and given you these as instruction on how to conduct the operation. On getting to the Sambisa Forest you are met with operational conditions quite different from what the force Headquarters contemplated. Elaborately discuss how you will proceed.

2.   Explain the acronym PMESII and show how it is vital to depicting and understanding the operational environment.

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**UNIT 3   THE   OPERATIONAL   APPROACH   AND
             INTERACTION OF OPERATIONAL DESIGN AND
             PLANNING**

CONTENTS

1.0   Introduction
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3.0   Main Content
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       3.2   Interaction between Operational Design and Planning
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1.0   INTRODUCTION

This unit studies two related aspects of operational planning and design, namely: the operational approach and the interaction of operational design and planning. Operational approach reflects understanding of the operational environment and the problem while describing the commander's visualisation of a broad approach for achieving the desired end state. The operational approach promotes mutual understanding and unity of effort throughout the echelons of command and partner organisations. The operational approach is a joint force commander's description of the broad actions the force must take in order to achieve the desired end state. It is the joint force commander's visualisation of how the operation should transform current conditions into the desired conditions at end state—the way the commander wants the operational environment to look when operations conclude. The operational approach is how the joint force commander believes his state's instruments of national power and other inter-organisational actions should address the various factors that comprise the gap between the current and desired systems. Using a design methodology that emphasises critical and creative thinking in developing this approach enables a better understanding of the operational environment and of the problem. The resulting product provides the foundation for the joint force commander's planning guidance to the staff and collaboration with inter-organisational partners. The approach also provides the model for executing the operation and determining relevant assessment ways, means, and measures. The joint force commander's approved operational approach should be a text and graphics product of early operational design that will provide the basis for continuing with mission analysis and subsequent detailed planning. The joint force

commander and staff should continually review, update, and modify the approach throughout planning and execution as the operational environment, end state objectives, or the problem change. While they do this, the joint force commander and staff should continue to align the interaction between operational design and planning to ensure that both effectively lead to the end state.

2.0   OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
- explain the importance of operational approach in design and planning
- explain why and how the joint force commander should effectively impress his approach on the staff to ensure everyone works together towards the end objectives of the mission
- show how operational design interacts with operational planning from the outset to the conclusion of the mission.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   The Operational Approach

Once the commander and staff are reasonably comfortable with their understanding of the current and desired operational environments and the nature of the problem, they can work backward from national strategic and military end-state objectives through the conditions necessary to achieve the objectives and the more specific actions necessary to create these conditions. The approach considers the equities of actors, their strengths and weaknesses, and the forces (tendencies, potentials, tensions, etc.) at work in the operational environment. It should also identify potential unintended desired and undesired effects of actions along the way, which could become the basis for subsequent branches to the operational plan. Desired effects could create opportunities that the joint force commander can leverage upon, while the joint force commander may need to prevent or neutralise undesired effects to protect the operational approach.

Some elements of operational design are important to the early design effort. Examples include end state, objective, center of gravity, direct versus indirect approach, lines of operations, and lines of effort, which figure prominently in developing the operational approach. Lines of operation and lines of effort are particularly useful in graphically relating the sequence of actions necessary to create conditions and achieve objectives. A Line of Operations (LOO) is a physical line that

usually defines the geographic orientation of the friendly force in relation to the enemy and or an objective in combat operations. A Line of Effort (LOE) links multiple tasks and missions when positional references to an enemy have little relevance, such as in stability operations. There is no "school solution" for how the planners should construct LOOs and LOEs. Although a LOO typically is geographic in nature, the commander may mix functional factors and key milestones with key terrain and geographic objectives. Likewise, geographic relationships may be relevant to a line of effort, such as the time-distance relationship between a state's only operational airport and an earthquake disaster site during foreign humanitarian assistance operations.

Center of gravity is a key operational design element and relevant to the early design effort. Early identification of friendly and enemy centre of gravity will affect the operational approach. The joint force commander's approach must address the enemy centre of gravity if one can be identified this early. Particularly in a crisis, there is tension between the value of detailed centre of gravity analysis and the necessity of developing a broad operational approach to drive detailed planning. The enemy's centre of gravity should be evident in large-scale combat operations, and simply identifying it in the operational approach may be sufficient for planning to continue. In operations such as counterinsurgency, early identification of the centre of gravity may be more difficult and may require detailed analysis beyond the time when the joint force commander approves the operational approach. In this case, the joint force commander could provide a best guess of the centre of gravity based on the intelligence staff section's current joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment and the commander's judgment. Just as the joint force commander will continue to revise initial planning guidance and intent statements throughout planning, the joint force commander and staff will continue to revise the operational approach based, in part, on the fidelity of additional centre of gravity analysis.

There is need for the commander to publish the operational approach to staff and others. Particularly in crisis action situations, the operational approach is necessarily broad so that the joint force commander can provide guidance as soon as possible to inform subsequent detailed planning. The methodology is iterative in nature, and details uncovered during further mission analysis, course of action development, and joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment will help refine the operational approach.

As the operational approach emerges, the staff devises assessment indicators of progress that should be eventually incorporated in the plan or order and used during execution. Certain assessment indicators act as triggers during the operation to help the commander determine the necessity to revisit the original operational approach, reframe the problem, and perhaps revise the original operational approach. In particular, the staff designs reframing indicators to identify conditions in the operational environment that have changed or that are not well understood. These indicators could reveal a shift in the problem such that the current approach may no longer be valid. Some reframing indicators will be commander's critical information requirement candidates (Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Planner's Handbook for Operational Design 2011 p. VI-6).

The operational approach should promote mutual understanding and unity of effort throughout the echelons of command and partner organisations, a key consideration as the commander develops the approach. For example, the nature of multinational partners' strategic objectives could influence the approach to achieving the commander's strategic and operational objectives. The availability of host-nation support, diplomatic permission to overfly nations, access to en route air bases, and the allocation of strategic mobility assets are examples of factors that should be known before the commander approves the approach for subsequent detailed planning. Likewise, the operational approach can be a valuable tool for briefing senior leaders and a mechanism for achieving consensus on the problem, the specific nature of strategic objectives and the desired end state, the conditions necessary to achieve the end state, and other potential issues.

The operational approach must address both resources and risk. Because the operational approach will drive subsequent planning, the commander must be reasonably confident that the approach's level of risk is acceptable and the approach can be accomplished with the resources expected to be available. Rarely does one organisation directly control all the necessary resources. Therefore, the joint force commander should consider the capabilities of other partners and establish relationships to ensure sufficient resources. Likewise, the commander and staff identify and consider risk throughout the iterative application of design. Collaboration, coordination, and cooperation among multinational military and civilian partners are essential to identifying potential options for mitigating risk, conserving resources, and achieving unity of effort. These are easier to identify if military and civilian partners participate in design from the outset to build trust and confidence in the effort and one another. The commander's planning guidance explains

the acceptable level of risk and either outline or direct development of risk mitigation measures.

3.2   Interaction of Operational Design and Planning

Operational design is distinct from, yet complements, operational planning. Planning is the act of using the mental model (visualisation), produced during operational design discourse, to act in the physical world. When the hardest part of the problem is identifying and describing the problem, engineering functions alone are inadequate and design is essential. Otherwise, in the absence of a design process, military planners will default to doctrinal norms, building plans based upon familiar patterns rather than upon an understanding of the particular situation and how individual actions contribute to the overall goal.

Some writers suggest that design is distinct from, yet complements detailed planning. This perspective promotes the belief that design and planning should be described as related but separate and that the commander should have specific design teams that provide results of their efforts to planners who will then prepare the detailed plan. However, whether a distinct design effort occurs before or in conjunction with formal planning is likely determined by operational circumstances, complexity of the problem, available resources, and the commander's preference. For example, peacetime deliberate planning associated with a theater campaign plan and for potential contingencies could allow the time necessary for the commander to form a dedicated design team, marshal external subject matter experts, conduct extended discourse, and develop a broad operational approach before any detailed planning begins. However, the limited time typically associated with crisis action planning circumstances will require design activities to occur in close conjunction with (or as part of) mission analysis. In any case, design and planning are not mutually exclusive.

Perspectives regarding how best to accomplish design are converging, but continue to differ. Likewise, design and planning relate but they are not identical. Operational design and joint operational planning process are complementary elements of the overall planning process. Planning consists of two separate, but closely related components: a conceptual component and a detailed component. The conceptual component is represented by the cognitive application of design. The detailed component translates broad concepts into a complete and practical plan. During planning, these components overlap with no clear delineation between them.

A fundamental responsibility of command, design is present not only in planning, but also throughout the planning-execution-assessment continuum. It is important to understand the problem, the environment, the enemy, and the purpose of an operation. This awareness is fundamental to the first step in planning or problem framing to better convey its purpose and importance.

Operational design begins early and continues throughout planning and execution. This is consistent with the perspectives of Services that have written extensively about design in their doctrine. The challenge is not that early planning efforts cannot accommodate the philosophy, critical thinking, and techniques of design. Instead, the challenge may be one of retooling the most important planning step—mission analysis—in joint and Service education and training. The rest of this subunit will discuss the interaction of operational design and joint operational planning process with a focus on mission analysis.

Planning Initiation, Mission Analysis, and Operational Design: The design effort can begin immediately on identification of a directed or anticipated planning requirement. Planning initiation is usually a transient step in joint operations planning process, since most commanders and staffs begin mission analysis immediately after the commander's initial guidance. The commander provides enough guidance to the staff and subordinate commands to get the process going. This guidance could specify time constraints, outline initial coordination requirements, or authorise movement of key capabilities within the joint force commander's authority. The guidance would typically be brief when responding to a contingency for which a plan exists, but initial guidance in the face of new planning requirements (unplanned contingencies) would typically be more extensive.

The joint force's mission is the task or set of tasks, together with the purpose, that clearly indicate the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. The primary purpose of mission analysis is to understand the operational environment, the problem, and purpose of the operation and to issue appropriate guidance to drive the rest of the planning process. The joint force commander and staff can accomplish mission analysis through a number of activities that develop, analyse, and provide the information essential to subsequent detailed planning. Although some activities occur before others, mission analysis typically involves substantial parallel processing of information by the commander and staff, particularly in a crisis-action situation.

During deliberate planning (absent typical time restraints of a crisis), some commanders might choose to delay certain activities normally

associated with mission analysis in order to focus the staff on the early operational design effort. In these situations, the commander and staff would concentrate on activities typically associated with early mission analysis, such as understanding higher headquarters guidance, framing the operational environment, confirming strategic objectives and the military end state, and determining the fundamental problem that must be solved.

However, crisis-action planning rarely affords time for the relaxed approach described above. As the joint force commander and lead planners work initial design-related issues, many other command and staff activities occur in parallel. Functional staff sections create or update staff estimates, organisations prepare for deployment, and the joint force headquarters forms (if one does not already exist). An extreme case might even require deployment of combat forces as a flexible deterrent option before planning for the larger operation or campaign moves beyond a complete mission analysis or course of action development. Faced with an ill-defined military problem in a crisis-action situation, the commander may have to issue planning guidance, an initial intent, and a draft mission statement (key products of mission analysis) while still refining the operational approach.

Among the most important considerations in mission analysis (and essential to effective operational design) is the necessity to resolve different perspectives with higher authority and subordinate commanders. This is not a step in the process per se, but should be an iterative pursuit throughout mission analysis by both the commander and staff with respective counterparts. The higher command's initial warning order or other planning directive seldom contains a comprehensive or final solution to the exact nature and underlying causes of the crisis or of the approach to solving the problem. Commanders at all levels should frame their situation, define the problem for themselves from their respective vantage points, and share their understanding with their superiors and subordinates. Superiors usually have a broader contextual perspective that helps them understand how the potential operation relates to the larger strategy and desired national end state. But subordinate commanders often have a better understanding of the circumstances and nuances that comprise the specific crisis, and must share this perspective with their superiors early in planning and throughout execution. A significant goal of this interaction during early planning is to achieve consensus quickly on a shared understanding of the situation. This consensus benefits from candid discourse between superiors, subordinates, peers, and staff, as well as strategic awareness at all levels.

Design is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualise, and describe complex, ill-structured problems and develop approaches to solve them. Critical thinking captures the reflective and continuous learning essential to design. Creative thinking involves thinking in new, innovative ways while capitalising on imagination, insight, and novel ideas.

The emphasis on design as conceptual planning highlights the importance of synthesis to mission analysis. Understanding a complex operational environment and ill-defined problem requires beginning from a particular perspective, assimilating information from a variety of sources, using critical thinking to test hypotheses, and forming new perspectives that could be substantially different from the starting point. Synthesis is essential even when execution begins since execution is essentially a form of hypothesis testing. The hypothesis that underpins the operational approach could prove invalid soon after first contact with a thinking, adaptive adversary.

Operational design elements seem part of the planning process. Many of these are traditional elements, such as center of gravity, line of operations, and culmination. Others, such as line of effect and line of effort, are more recent additions to the list based on nuances of irregular warfare and on how the joint community's thoughts on planning and design have continued to evolve. Some design elements are important to the design effort early in mission analysis. For example, line of operations and line of effort are particularly useful for arranging series of activities, tasks and other factors along geographic and functional lines to describe the broad approach to set conditions and achieve objectives.

Identification of friendly and enemy centre of gravity is one of the most important early requirements confronting the joint force commander's staff. The joint force commander's operational approach must address the centre of gravity if one can be identified this early in the planning process. Particularly during crisis-action planning, there is tension between the value of detailed centre of gravity analysis and the necessity of developing a broad operational approach to drive the rest of the planning process. The enemy's centre of gravity should be evident in large-scale combat operations, and simply identifying it in the operational approach may be sufficient for planning to continue. In operations such as counterinsurgency, early identification of the centre of gravity may be more difficult, and may require detailed analysis beyond the time when the joint force commander approves the operational approach. In this case, the joint force commander could provide a best estimate of the centre of gravity based on the intelligence

staff section's current intelligence and the staff's design efforts. Just as the joint force commander will continue to revise initial planning guidance and intent statements throughout planning, the joint force commander and staff will continue to revise the operational approach based, in part, on the fidelity of additional centre of gravity analysis.

Assessment: Assessment is a process that measures progress of the joint force toward mission accomplishment. The focus is on determining progress toward the desired system state of the operational environment and delivering relevant reliable feedback into the planning process to adjust operations during execution. Commanders continuously assess the operational environment and the progress of operations, and compare them to their initial vision and intent. Commanders adjust operations based on their assessment to ensure objectives are met and the military end state is achieved.

As the operational approach emerges during mission analysis, the staff devises assessment indicators of progress that should be incorporated in the plan or order and used during execution. Certain assessment indicators act as triggers during the operation to help the commander determine the necessity to revisit the original operational approach, reframe the problem, and perhaps revise the original operational approach. In particular, the staff designs reframing indicators to identify conditions in the operational environment that have changed or that they do not understand and that could cause a shift in the problem such that the current approach may no longer be valid. Assessment indicators are candidates for the list of priority intelligence requirements and the joint force commander's critical information requirement.

Assessment is continuous and directly tied to the commander's decisions throughout planning, preparation, and execution of operations. Staff help the commander by monitoring the numerous aspects that can influence the outcome of operations and provide the commander timely information needed for decisions. The commander's critical information requirement process is linked to the assessment process by the commander's need for timely information and recommendations to make decisions. The assessment process helps staff by identifying key aspects of the operation that the commander is interested in closely monitoring and where the commander wants to make decisions. Examples of joint force commander's critical decisions include when to transition to another phase of a campaign, what the priority of effort should be, or how to adjust command relationships between component commanders.

Joint force commanders and their staff determine relevant assessment actions and measures during planning. They consider assessment measures as early as mission analysis, and include assessment measures and related guidance in commander and staff estimates. They use assessment considerations to help guide operational design because these considerations can affect the sequence and type of actions along lines of operation and lines of efforts. During execution, they continually monitor progress toward accomplishing tasks, creating desired conditions, and achieving objectives. Assessment actions and measures help commanders adjust operations and resources as required, determine when to execute branches and sequels, and make other critical decisions to ensure current and future operations remain aligned with the mission and end state. Normally, the joint force operation staff section with the intelligence staff section is responsible for coordinating assessment activities. For subordinate commanders' staff, this may be accomplished by equivalent elements within joint functional and/or Service components. The chief of staff facilitates the assessment process and determination of the commander's critical information requirement by incorporating them into the headquarters' battle rhythm. Various elements of the joint force commander's staff use assessment results to adjust both current operations and future planning.

Friendly, adversary, and neutral diplomatic, informational, and economic actions that occur in the operational environment can affect military actions and objectives. When relevant to the mission, the commander also must plan for using assessment to evaluate the results of these actions. This typically requires collaboration with other agencies and multinational partners — preferably within a common, accepted process — in the interest of unified action. For example, failure to coordinate over-flight and access agreements with foreign governments in advance or to adhere to international law regarding sovereignty of foreign airspace could result in mission delay, failure to meet objectives, and/or an international incident. Many of these organisations may be outside the joint force commander's authority. Accordingly, the joint force commander should consider these issues during operational design and grant some joint force organisations authority for direct coordination with key outside organisations to the extent necessary to ensure timely and accurate assessments.

Levels of War and Assessment: Assessment occurs at all levels and across the entire range of military operations. Even in operations that do not include combat, assessment of progress is just as important and can be more complex than traditional combat assessment. As a general rule, the level at which a specific operation, task, or action is directed should be the level at which such activity is assessed. To do this, joint force

commanders and their staffs consider assessment ways, means, and measures during planning, preparation, and execution. This properly focuses assessment and collection at each level, reduces redundancy, and enhances the efficiency of the overall assessment process.

Assessment at the operational and strategic levels typically is broader than at the tactical level (e.g., combat assessment) and uses measures of effectiveness that support strategic and operational mission accomplishment. Strategic- and operational-level assessment efforts concentrate on broader tasks, effects, objectives, and progress toward the end state. Continuous assessment helps the joint force commander and joint force component commanders determine if the joint force is "doing the right things" to achieve objectives, not just "doing things right." The joint force commander also can use measures of effectiveness to determine progress toward success in those operations for which tactical-level combat assessment ways, means, and measures do not apply.

Tactical-level assessment typically uses measures of performance to evaluate task accomplishment. The results of tactical tasks are often physical in nature, but also can reflect the impact on specific functions and systems. Tactical-level assessment may include assessing progress by phase lines; neutralisation of enemy forces; control of key terrain or resources; and security, relief, or reconstruction tasks. Assessment of results at the tactical level helps commanders determine operational and strategic progress, so joint force commanders must have a comprehensive, integrated assessment plan that links assessment activities and measures at all levels.

Combat assessment is an example of a tactical-level assessment and is a term that can encompass many tactical-level assessment actions. Combat assessment typically focuses on determining the results of weapons engagement (with both lethal and nonlethal capabilities), and thus, is an important component of joint fires and the joint targeting process. Combat assessment is composed of three related elements: battle damage assessment, munitions effectiveness assessment, and future targeting or re-attack recommendations. However, joint force functional and Service components can also apply combat assessment methodology to other tactical tasks not associated with joint fires (e.g., disaster relief delivery assessment, relief effectiveness assessment, and future relief recommendations).

Assessment Process and Measures: The assessment process uses measures of performance to evaluate task performance at all levels of war and measures of effectiveness to determine progress of operations

toward achieving objectives. Measures of effectiveness help answer questions like: "are we doing the right things, are our actions producing the desired effects, or are alternative actions required?" Measures of performance are closely associated with task accomplishment. Measures of performance help answer questions like: "was the action taken, were the tasks completed to standard, or how much effort was involved?" Well-devised measures can help the commanders and staff understand the causal relationship between specific tasks and desired effects.

Some of the key terms relevant in assessment are defined below:

a) Measure of performance — A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment.
b) Measure of effectiveness — A criterion used to assess changes in system behaviour, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect.
c) Reframing indicator — An assessment indicator that helps identify changes in the operational environment that could cause a shift in the problem such that the current approach may no longer be valid.

Measures of effectiveness assess changes in system behaviour, capability, or operational environment. They measure the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect; they do not measure task performance. These measures typically are more subjective than measures of operation, and can be crafted as either qualitative or quantitative. Measures of effectiveness can be based on quantitative measures to reflect a trend and show progress toward a measurable threshold. The measuring progress in conflict environments framework provides good examples of measures of effectiveness that have been vetted by the interagency, cover all five sectors of stability operations, and address both drivers of conflict and institutional performance in dealing with them. Some examples include:

Measures of operation measures task performance. They are generally quantitative, but also can apply qualitative attributes to task accomplishment. Measures of operation are used in most aspects of combat assessment, since it typically seeks specific, quantitative data or a direct observation of an event to determine accomplishment of tactical tasks. But measures of operation have relevance for noncombat operations as well (e.g., tons of relief supplies delivered or noncombatants evacuated). Measures of operation can also be used to measure operational and strategic tasks, but the type of measurement may not be as precise or as easy to observe.

The assessment process and related measures and reframing indicators should be relevant, measurable, responsive, and resourced so there is no false impression of accomplishment. Quantitative measures can be helpful in this regard.

Measures of operation and measures of effectiveness should be relevant to the task, effect, operation, the operational environment, the end state, and the commander's decisions. This criterion helps avoid collecting and analyzing information that is of no value to a specific operation. It also helps ensure efficiency by eliminating redundant efforts. Assessment measures should have qualitative or quantitative standards they can be measured against. To effectively measure change, a baseline measurement should be established prior to execution to facilitate accurate assessment throughout the operation. Both measures can be quantitative or qualitative in nature, but meaningful quantitative measures are preferred because they are less susceptible to subjective interpretation. Assessment processes should detect situation changes quickly enough to enable effective response by the staff and timely decisions by the commander. The joint force commander and staff should consider the time required for an action or actions to produce desired results within the operational environment and develop indicators that can respond accordingly. Many actions directed by the joint force commander require time to implement and may take even longer to produce a measurable result. To be effective, assessment must be adequately resourced. Staff should ensure resource requirements for data collection efforts and analysis are built into plans and monitored. Effective assessment can help avoid duplication of tasks and unnecessary actions, which in turn can help preserve combat power.

Commanders and staff derive relevant assessment measures and reframing indicators during the planning process and reevaluate them continuously throughout preparation and execution. They consider assessment measures during mission analysis, refine these measures in the joint force commander's planning guidance and in commander's and staff's estimates, wargame the measures during course of action development, and include measures of assessment and measures of effectiveness in the approved plan or order. An integrated data collection management plan is critical to the success of the assessment process, and should encompass all available tactical, theater, and national intelligence sources.

Just as tactical tasks relate to operational- and strategic-level tasks, effects, and objectives, there is a relationship between assessment measures. By monitoring available information and using measures of

effectiveness and measures of performance as assessment tools during planning, preparation, and execution, commanders and staffs determine progress toward creating desired effects, achieving objectives, and attaining the military end state, and modify the plan as required. Well-devised measures of performance and measures of effectiveness, supported by effective information management, help the commanders and staffs understand the linkage between specific tasks, the desired effects, and the joint force commander's objectives and end state.

Reframing Indicators on the other hand are not the same as measures of effectiveness and measures of performance, which are oriented on measuring progress toward creating effects or conditions, achieving objectives, and reaching the end state. A reframing indicator should be structured to identify a condition in the operational environment that has changed, or is not understood, that could cause a shift in the problem such that the current operational approach may no longer be valid. Although many reframing indicators will not meet the requirement for commander's critical information, some reframing indicators could be included in commander's critical information requirement if they represent information that would cause the commander to consider near-term reframing and potential redesign. An example of such information could be the impending alliance of a regional nation with the enemy that would shift the balance of power in spite of an earlier design assumption that this alliance would not occur.

Reframing indicators should support the commander's ability to understand, learn, adapt, and reframe as necessary. These indicators typically orient on the operational environment's key nodes, relationships, capabilities, enablers, and actions of stakeholders, all of which might affect the fundamental components of the operational approach. Examples of such information include the following:

(a)   Changes in the original problem statement.
(b)   Significant changes in the enemy composition.
(c)   Significant changes in the expected enemy approach.
(d)   Significant changes in friendly capability.
(e)   Higher headquarter policy changes or directives that change the desired end state.
(f)   Unexpected lack of friendly progress toward objectives.
(g)   Shifts in international support and/or domestic will.
(h)   Key assumptions prove to be invalid.

Many commanders' critical information requirements, measures of effectiveness, measures of performance and reframing indicators can seem to overlap given the potential purposes of the information. Some

reframing indicators, measures of effectiveness, and measures of performance will become commander's critical information requirements because of their importance to the mission and necessity for a commander's decision. In any case, reframing indicators will compete directly with commander's critical information requirements for limited assessment resources. With commander's critical information requirement tied directly to the commander's decisions, and measures of effectiveness/performance providing typically responsive feedback on progress, there will be pressure to move assets earmarked for reframing indicators to a seemingly more productive commander's critical information requirement or measures of effectiveness/performance. This tension may develop because most reframing indicators may not change very quickly and the changes may be more subtle. An increase in enemy activity and intensity may increase the asset support requirements for commanders' critical information requirement and measures of effectiveness/performance. However, this same enemy increased activity may be an indication of their effort to change the operational environment or shift the problem. Shifting resources committed to reframing indicators may degrade or eliminate the ability to sense the shift in the environment or problem at a crucial time.

As the commander and staff gain an understanding of the problem within the context of the operational environment, potential solutions should become evident. The joint force commander and staff use their understanding of the current operational environment, the nature of the problem, and how they believe the environment should look when operations conclude to develop a broad solution called the operational approach. Operational approach is a commander's description of the broad actions the force must take in order to achieve the desired end state.

The operational approach is a visualisation of broad, general actions—typically described using constructs such as center of gravity, lines of effort and lines of operations—to produce conditions that define the way the joint force commanders wants the operational environment to look when operations end. This approach provides the framework that underpins the operation, is one of the primary products of early operational design, and can become part of the joint force commander's more detailed planning guidance and intent.

While some contend that design occurs before planning, others address operational design as a methodology or activity that begins with the planning initiation step and heavily influences mission analysis, which is front-loaded with design-related actions. Operational design continues throughout the joint operation planning process steps as the operational

approach drives course-of-action development. The commander and staff can adjust the approach based on results of course of action development and changes to (or discoveries about) the operational environment.

Preparing to evaluate progress during execution occurs during planning when planners determine how to monitor the joint force's progress toward creating conditions and achieving objectives that will accomplish the mission and satisfy the desired strategic end state. Measures of performance and measures of effectiveness help determine whether the joint force is both "doing things right" and "doing the right things." There are reframing indicators, which focus on changes in the operational environment or problem that could cause the joint force commander to begin a redesign effort that could change the operational approach.

SELF- ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Distinguish between measure of effectiveness and measure of performance. Show how both can influence the reframing indicators. What relationship do these have with a commander's critical information requirement?

4.0   CONCLUSION

This unit discussed the meaning and importance of operational approach in design and planning and why and how the joint force commander should effectively impress his approach on the staff to ensure everyone is carried along and work together towards the end objectives of the mission. It also discussed how operational design interacts with operational planning from the outset to the conclusion of the mission.

5.0   SUMMARY

This unit studied two major aspects of operational planning/design, namely: the operational approach and the interaction of operational design and planning. On operational approach, the unit covered basic military, doctrinal issues such as course of action, end state, objectives, centre of gravity, direct versus indirect approach, lines of operations and lines of effort, which feature prominently in developing the operational approach. On the interaction of operational design and planning, the unit covers operational design elements and planning process, detailed planning, joint operational planning process, and assessment. It shows that design and planning are related but not exactly the same. It covers assessment processes and measure such as measures of effectiveness and

measures of performance, showing how these inform the reframing indicators and how all of these may form the commander's critical information requirement.

6.0   TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1.   Explain the concepts of line of operation and line of effort. How do they give rise to the end state?
2.   Discuss operational design elements and the planning process.
3.   As a joint force commander, explain how you will assess the operation of your mission, showing clearly the tolls of measurement you will use, and the factors that will inform the reframing indicators if any.

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UNIT 4   ORGANISING FOR OPERATIONAL DESIGN AND PLANNING, AND OPERATIONAL DESIGN AND PLANNING DURING EXECUTION

CONTENTS

1.0   Introduction
2.0   Objectives
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      3.1 Organising for Operational Design and Planning
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1.0   INTRODUCTION

This unit covers two related issues of operational design, namely: organising for operational design and planning, and operational design and planning during execution. The aspect of organising operational design and planning deals with joint staff, joint force and design team. The aspect of operational design and planning during execution, on the other hand, deals with execution, planning during execution, operational design during execution, and reframing and redesign.

2.0   OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
- explain how to organise operational design and planning during execution
- describe the intricacies of joint staff, joint force and design team
- explain matters of execution, planning during execution, operational design during execution, and reframing and redesign.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Organising for Operational Design and Planning

Design does not occur in isolation; much of the information available to the commander comes from staff actions, primarily in the form of analysis. Accordingly, staff actions should be viewed as concurrent and complementary—versus   sequential—activities.   For   example,

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understanding the nature of the problem, to include the purpose of the operation, provides the context to drive task analysis. Conversely, the learning gained through task analysis deepens the understanding of the problem and contributes to design.

In leading design, commanders typically draw from a select group within the planning staff, red team members, and subject matter experts internal and external to the headquarters. The commander selects these individuals based on their expertise relative to the problem. The commander expects these individuals to gain insights and inputs from areas beyond their particular expertise—either in person or through reachback—to frame the problem more fully. Design serves to establish the context for guidance and orders. By using members of the planning staff to participate in the design effort, commanders ensure continuity between design and detailed planning as well as throughout the operations process. These are purpose-built, problem-centric teams, and the commander may choose to dissolve them once they complete the design effort.

Typically, the plans directorate of a joint staff establishes a joint planning group (JPG) to integrate planning efforts. The JPG should include representation from all Joint Task Force (JTF) principal and special staff sections, Service/functional components, and inter-organisational partners as required.

The primary purposes for forming a JPG are to conduct crisis action planning at the beginning of an operation, assist in operational plan and operational order development, and perform future planning. The JPG often is the focal point for Operational Order (OPORD) development. Early designation of a JTF will facilitate forming the JPG and formative design and detailed planning. It may be possible to form a JPG without the JTF being fully organised and staffed.

A core JPG can be expanded with "on-call" subject matter experts for select planning requirements. These representatives typically will be needed when the JPG does not have the required subject matter expertise in a particular subject as can occur when trying to frame the problem during early operational design. Subject matter experts might come from Service component commands, inter-organisational partners, and elsewhere on the JTF staff. As with other aspects of joint operations, the plan staff section should include inter-organisational partners in the JPG's composition when appropriate.

A planning team is a functional element formed within the headquarters to solve problems related to a specific task or requirement. A planning

team normally consists of a lead planner, functional planners, component or major subordinate command representatives, and other stakeholders as required. Planning teams are formed for specific planning tasks, and are often disbanded when the task is complete. However, a team also can transition to another task. For example, one or more planning teams may shift to branch planning to support the initial phase of the operations while another team begins sequel planning for the next phase after completing the initial operational order or operational order. Other planning teams may plan for a later phase such as termination of the joint operation and transition of the JTF to another military force, regional organisation, or civilian organisation.

Since multiple planning teams are usually working on planning tasks simultaneously, the JPG chief supervises their efforts to ensure their products meet the needs of the command group and other customers. Likewise, the JPG chief also interfaces with the command group to ensure it provides required guidance, intent, and decisions to support the planning effort.

The intelligence directorate's primary function is to satisfy the joint force commander's and staff's intelligence requirements by planning, conducting, collecting, analysing, and disseminating reliable and timely intelligence pertinent to intentions, indications and warning, intelligence operations, targeting, assessment, and a description of the current operational environment characteristics. Within the scope of the essential elements of information, the intelligence directorate participates in joint staff planning and in coordinating, directing, integrating, and controlling intelligence efforts. The intelligence directorate is the joint force's focal point for developing an understanding of the operational environment.

The joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment is the joint process through which the joint force intelligence directorate manages the analysis and development of products that help the commander and staff understand the complex and interconnected operational environment. Of particular relevance to operational design is the intelligence staff section's responsibility to lead the staff's effort and manage and develop products that provide a systems understanding of the operational environment as part of the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment. This will require cross-functional participation by other joint force staff elements and collaboration with other intelligence agencies, government agencies, and nongovernment centers that possess relevant expertise. Thus the intelligence staff section is a core player in the early design effort and must be responsive to the commander's operational design priorities. The commander can help the

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intelligence staff section by specifying critical information requirements early in the process to focus joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment toward specific products that support the design effort. These products help the commander understand how the joint force's actions might affect the relevant political, social, economic, informational, and other factors that comprise the current environment and affect the end state.

This subunit highlighted the importance of the joint force commander's role in operational design and planning. In support, the plans directorate of a joint staff typically leads the staff's effort to prepare joint plans, orders, and associated estimates of the situation for future efforts. The operations directorate of a joint staff leads current and near-term operations planning during execution. The plans directorate of a joint staff often forms a joint planning group to integrate planning efforts. This group should include representation from all joint force principal and special staff sections, joint force components and supporting commands, and inter-organisational partners as required.

In some circumstances and when resources permit, the joint force commander or plans directorate of a joint staff might decide to form a design team that would focus on working with the joint force commander to frame the environment, frame the problem, and develop the operational approach. The plans directorate of a joint staff (plans staff section) and other key members from across the staff will typically be members of the design team. Regardless of how the staff organises for design and planning, participation by subject matter experts from inter-organisational partners is essential to understanding the operational environment and true nature of the problem.

3.2 Operational Design and Planning during Execution

The enemy always gets a vote in the outcome, so commanders are well advised to heed the often-quoted warning that "no battle plan survives contact with the enemy." This challenge can be greater in counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and similar operations than it is in larger-scale combat, since the enemy has more flexibility to determine when, where, and whether or not to fight (Mattis, 2009). Planning continues as execution begins, with an initial emphasis on producing the operational order if one does not yet exist. As the operation progresses, planning generally occurs in three distinct but overlapping timeframes: future plans, future operations, and current operations.

The joint force plans staff section's effort focuses on future plans. The timeframe of focus for this effort varies according to the level of

command, type of operation, joint force commander's desires, and other factors. Typically the emphasis of the future plans effort is on planning the next phase of operations or sequels to the current operation. In a campaign, this could be planning the next major operation (the next phase of the campaign). Planning also occurs for branches to current operations (future operations planning). The timeframe of focus for future operations planning varies according to the factors listed for future plans, but the period typically is more near-term than the future plans timeframe. Future planning could occur in the plans staff section or JPG, while future operations planning could occur in the joint operations center or operations staff section.

Finally, current operation planning addresses the immediate or very near term planning issues associated with ongoing operations. This occurs in the joint operations center or operations staff section. During execution, accomplishment of the plan's tasks will be monitored and measured for how successfully each objective was completed, along with the input of new data and information as it is obtained to allow selection of branches or sequels, if applicable, or the plan to be modified as necessary. Execution of a plan does not end the planning process. The staff may reenter the planning cycle at any point to receive new guidance, modify the plan, decide if and when to execute branches or sequels, or terminate the operation. Planning also continues for future operations.

During execution, the cross-functional organisation of the staff must be responsive not only to planning requirements for current operations, but must also support the joint force commander's mid- and long-term planning needs. Based on the complexity of the planning problem and time available, future plans and future operations planning teams interact with both internal elements and external elements. These teams normally will reside in the JPG or in one of the principal staff directorates depending on the nature of the specific planning task. Various decision boards provide guidance and decisions during this process.

In contrast to the future operations and future plans planning teams, the current operations planning teams normally complete their assigned planning tasks without significant interaction with other staff elements. Generally, these teams are established in the joint operations center under the supervision of the operations staff section's chief of operations due to the immediate nature of planning requirements. The operations staff section or joint operations centre chief keeps the joint force commander informed of ongoing near-term planning initiatives through appropriate mechanisms such as commander's critical information requirements, serious incident reports, and battle update assessments.

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Operational Design During Execution: The degree to which operational design continues during execution depends on a variety of factors related to the complexity and scope of the mission, the problem, and the operational environment. Simple problems often require simple solutions with no requirement for a distinct design effort before or during execution. Even complicated circumstances, such as large-scale, force-on-force combat operations that require operational design, can have well defined and achievable operational and strategic objectives, a primary focus on the military system, and limited or no long-term post-combat stability operations. Still, planning branches and sequels in these circumstances usually requires selected elements of operational design even if a deliberate design team effort is not required. However, commanders and staff should be cautioned by the following example:

> Complicated problems in a stable context may not need a standing design team. Unfortunately, problem situations do not come with signposts warning of oncoming complexity. The solution to a complicated problem may give rise to unforeseeable side effects and the recognition of complexity. For example, the technical problem of how to provide fresh water to a remote community might be solved by building a well. But if the location of the well provides unequal access, some sub-groups may lose power and influence, catalysing a cascade of complex social processes (SAMS, *Art of Design* Student Text Version 2.0, p. 21).

Ill-defined problems typically represent the greatest challenge to the longevity of the joint force commander's original operational approach once execution begins. They require the most deliberate monitoring, assessment, and planning for potentially fundamental shifts in the problem and operational environment that could drastically change the original operational approach. Because the current context and situation are always evolving during execution, it is likely that the understanding of the problem will also evolve.

Conditions will change during operations because forces are interacting with the operational environment. The joint force commander's and staff's ability to learn as the operation progresses depends on their ability to recognise changes as they occur. Recognising often subtle changes as they develop over time can be essential to mission success, especially those changes that fundamentally affect the operating environment or significantly shift the problem. Recognising that the problem and environment have changed is essential to knowing when the commander might have to change the operational approach. Even

when indicators are inconclusive, numerous events or circumstances, such as the ones listed below, can trigger a requirement to restart deliberate operational design:

(1)   A major event causes "catastrophic change" in the environment.
(2)   A scheduled periodic review shows a problem.
(3)   An assessment challenges understanding of the existing problem and the relevance of the operational approach.
(4)   Failure to make required progress.
(5)   Unanticipated success.
(6)   Key assumptions or hypotheses prove invalid.

Specialised reframing indicators are instrumental in recognising design-related changes in the problem or operational environment. These indicators should support the commander's ability to understand, learn, and adapt, and should cue commanders to rethink their understanding of the operational environment, the problem, or both. When this occurs, the joint force commander should consult with superior, subordinate, and supporting commanders, because it may be time to begin a dedicated reframing and redesign effort. Reframing results from a shift in understanding that leads to a new perspective on the problems or their resolution. Reframing involves significantly refining or discarding the hypotheses or models that form the basis of the design concept. Based on the circumstances and consultation, the joint force commander may determine one of three ways ahead:

(1)   The current joint operation plan is adequate, with either no change or minor change (such as execution of a branch)—the current operational approach remains feasible.
(2)   The joint operation plan's mission and objectives are sound, but the operational approach is no longer feasible or acceptable—a new operational approach is required.
(3)   The mission and/or objectives are no longer valid, thus a new joint operation plan is required—a new operational approach is required to support the further detailed planning.

Commanders conduct operations subject to continuous assessment of results in relation to expectations, modifying both the understanding of the situation and subsequent operations accordingly. If aspects of the operational environment change significantly, the commander may decide to begin a reframing effort and revise earlier design conclusions and decisions that led to the current design inadequacies. This might result in small adjustments to current operations or a branch to the plan, or reframing could require a sequel involving a new operational approach, new objectives, and organisational realignments.

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Operational design and planning continue during execution. As the operation progresses, planning generally occurs in three distinct but overlapping timeframes: future plans, future operations, and current operations. If operations are progressing according to plan, design activities typically consist of adjusting operational design elements such as decisive point and line of effort.

Changes in the operational environment or the nature of the problem during execution can require the joint force commander and staff to review and adapt the approved operational approach as necessary. These changes can trigger the requirement for a redesign effort that revisits earlier assumptions, "reframes" the operational environment and the problem facing the joint force commander, revises the operational approach, and adjusts current operations.

3.3   Operational Implication

Integrating the individual Service's diverse capabilities in joint operations, especially in unified action with inter-organisational partners, begins with operational design. The best conceivable operational approach will be ineffective without the capabilities to execute it, even with comprehensive understanding of the problem and the operational environment. The joint community often thinks of capabilities in terms of systems, organisations, people, and their integration. Because design is an intellectual activity, however, future initiatives to improve our capability reside in three primary areas: doctrine, education, and training.

Design does not replace planning, but planning is incomplete without design. Operational design's added value to traditional joint operation planning, when appropriately reinforced through education and training, should be a recognition by commanders and staffs at all levels that not all problems are created equal, and that an immediate, obvious solution to a problem may not be the right solution. Among other benefits, an understanding of design should stimulate greater collaboration between higher, lower, and adjacent organisations to ensure a common understanding of the environment, the problem, and the approach to solve the problem.

Sound joint training and education rests on a foundation of sound joint doctrine. A good doctrinal base should provide the foundation and impetus for an appropriate level of education and training. However, this must begin with Service education and training programmes at relatively low levels.

 SELF- ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Write short notes on the following: (1) intelligence staff, (2) joint force and (3) design team.

4.0　CONCLUSION

This very last unit of the module covers organisation for operational design, and operational design and planning during execution, while making some emphasis on the operational implication of planning and design. It shows that design cannot take the place of planning although both are related processes. It throws light on how and why planning and design although beginning from the outset of operation, should continue to the execution stage and possibly continue even after the conclusion of the mission.

5.0　SUMMARY

In this unit, we covered two related issues of operational design, namely: organising for operational design and planning, and operational design and planning during execution. The aspect of organising operational design and planning dealt with joint staff, joint force and design team. The aspect of operational design and planning during execution, on the other hand, dealt with execution, planning during execution, operational design during execution, and reframing and redesign. The high point of the unit was the emphasis on how planning relates with design and still is distinct and how planning and design may continue till execution and even after the conclusion of the mission.

6.0　TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Write short notes on execution, planning during execution, operational design during execution, and reframing and redesign.

7.0　REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

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MODULE 5

Unit 1   Meaning and Evolution of Special Operations Forces
Unit 2   Incorporation of Special Operations Forces into National
              Security Strategy and Policy
Unit 3   Special Operations Forces and other Elite Units
Unit 4   Gender Integration in Special Operations Forces

UNIT 1   MEANING AND EVOLUTION OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

CONTENTS

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2.0   Objectives
3.0   Main Content
             3.1 Special Operations Forces
4.0   Conclusion
5.0   Summary
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1.0   INTRODUCTION

Although the use of special operations forces seems like an innovation and something new in the military, it is really an ancient practice. Armies had, as early as 249 BC used special operations forces as part of their military operation. What we have today in most states of the world are but improved versions of special operations forces used in times past. However, tracing the history and evolution of special operations forces shows that they have been formed for the same purposes through the ages.

2.0   OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- narrate the history of the evolution of special operations forces
- explain the use to which they have been put.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Special Operations Forces
Special operations forces (SOF) are military units trained to conduct special operations. (Bowyer, 2005-2008). The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has defined special operations as "military activities conducted by specially designated, organised, trained, and equipped forces, manned with selected personnel, using unconventional tactics, techniques, and modes of employment" (NATO, 2015).

Special operations forces emerged in the early 20th century, with a significant growth in the field during the World War II, when "every major army involved in the fighting" created formations devoted to special operations behind enemy lines (Thomas, 1983). Depending on the country, special forces may perform functions including airborne operations, counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, foreign internal defense, covert operations, direct action, hostage rescue, high-value targets/manhunt, intelligence operations, mobility operations, and unconventional warfare.

In Russian-speaking countries, special operations forces of any country are typically called *spetsnaz*, an acronym for "special purpose". In the United States, the term special forces often refers specifically to the US Army's Special Forces, while the term Special Operations Forces (SOF) is used more broadly for these types of units.

Beginning from the early period, special operations forces have played an important role throughout the history of warfare, whenever the aim was to achieve disruption by "hit and run" and sabotage, rather than more traditional conventional combat. Other significant roles lay in reconnaissance, providing essential intelligence from near or among the enemy and increasingly in combating irregular forces, their infrastructure and activities.

Chinese strategist Jiang Ziya, in his *Six Secret Teachings*, described recruiting talented and motivated men into specialised elite units with functions such as commanding heights and making rapid long-distance advances (Sawyer, 1993). Hamilcar Barca in Sicily (249 BC) had specialised troops trained to launch several offensives per day. In the late Roman or early Byzantine period, Roman fleets used small, fast, camouflaged ships crewed by selected men for scouting and commando missions. Muslim forces also had naval special operations units, including one that used camouflaged ships to gather intelligence and

launch raids and another of soldiers who could pass for Crusaders who would use ruses to board enemy ships and then capture and destroy them (Christides, 2011). In Japan, ninjas were used for reconnaissance, espionage and as assassins, bodyguards or fortress guards, or otherwise fought alongside conventional soldiers (Turnbull, 2003). During the Napoleonic wars, rifle and sapper units were formed that held specialised roles in reconnaissance and skirmishing and were not committed to the formal battle lines.

After the early period came the first specialised units of special operations forces. The British Indian Army deployed two Special Forces during their border wars: the Corps of Guides formed in 1846 and the Gurkha Scouts—a force that was formed in the 1890s and was first used as a detached unit during the 1897–1898 Tirah Campaign (Bellamy, 2011 p. 115).

During the Second Boer War (1899–1902) the British Army's need for more specialised units became most apparent. Scouting units such as the Lovat Scouts, a Scottish Highland regiment made up of exceptional woodsmen outfitted in ghillie suits and well practised in the arts of marksmanship, field craft, and military tactics filled this role. After the war, Lovat's Scouts went on to formally become the British Army's first sniper unit (Plaster, 2006).

During the World War I, the German Stormtroopers and the Italian Arditi were the first modern shock troops. They were both elite assault units trained to a much higher level than that of average troops and tasked to carry out daring attacks and bold raids against enemy defenses. Unlike Stormtroopers, Arditi were not units within infantry divisions, but were considered a separate combat arm (Morisi, 2018).

During the World War II, Britain had the British Commandos, who were the prototype for the modern Special Forces. Volunteers had to undergo an arduous training course. Commandos emerged during the World War II. In 1940, the British Commandos were formed following Winston Churchill's call for "specially trained troops of the hunter class, who can develop a reign of terror down the enemy coast" (Haskew, 2007 p. 47). The Commandos were also widely imitated elsewhere: the French Naval commandos, Dutch Korps Commandotroepen, Belgian Paracommando Brigade, United States Army Rangers and United States Marine Raiders were all influenced to some degree by the British Commandos.

Following advice from the British, Australia began raising special forces (Horner, 1989 p. 21). The first units to be formed were independent companies, which began training at Wilson's Promontory in Victoria in

early 1941 under the tutelage of British instructors. With an establishment of 17 officers and 256 men, the independent companies were trained as "stay behind" forces, a role that they were later employed in against the Japanese in the South West Pacific Area during 1942–43, most notably fighting a guerrilla campaign in Timor, as well as actions in New Guinea (Horner, 1989 pp. 22-26). In all, a total of eight independent companies were raised before they were re-organised in mid-1943 into commando squadrons and placed under the command of the divisional cavalry regiments that were re-designated as cavalry commando regiments. As a part of this structure, a total of 11 commando squadrons were raised.

They continued to act independently, and were often assigned at brigade level during the later stages of the war, taking part in the fighting in New Guinea, Bougainville and Borneo, where they were employed largely in long-range reconnaissance and flank protection roles (Horner, 1989 p. 26). In addition to these units, the Australians also raised the Z Special Unit and M Special Unit. The M Special Unit was largely employed in an intelligence-gathering role, while Z Special Force undertook direct action missions. One of its most notable actions came as part of Operation Jaywick, in which several Japanese ships were sunk in Singapore Harbour in 1943.

The United States formed the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II under the Medal of Honor recipient William J. Donovan. This organisation was the predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and was responsible for both intelligence and special forces missions. The CIA's elite Special Activities Division is the direct descendant of the OSS (Warner, 2000). On February 16, 1942, the US Marine Corps activated a battalion of Marines with the specific purpose of securing beach heads, and other special operations. The battalion became the first special operations force of the US. The battalion became known as Marine Raiders due to Admiral Chester Nimitz's request for "raiders" in the Pacific front of the war. Again, in mid-1942, Major-General Lucian Truscott of the US Army, a liaison officer with the British General Staff submitted a proposal to General George Marshall that an American unit be set up "along the lines of the British Commandos", resulting in the formation of the United States Army Rangers.

States in the Axis powers did not adopt the use of special forces on the same scale as the British. The German army's Brandenburger Regiment was founded as a special forces unit used by the Abwehr for infiltration and long distance reconnaissance in Fall Weiss of 1939 and the Fall Gelb and Barbarossa campaigns of 1940 and 1941. Later during the war

the 502nd SS Jäger Battalion, commanded by Otto Skorzeny, sowed disorder behind the Allied lines by mis-directing convoys away from the front lines.

In Italy, the Decima Flottiglia MAS was responsible for the sinking and damage of considerable British tonnage in the Mediterranean. Also there were other Italian special forces like ADRA (Arditi Distruttori Regia Aeronautica). This regiment was used in raids on Allied airbases and railways in North Africa in 1943. In one mission they destroyed 25 B-17s.

The Imperial Japanese Army first deployed army paratroops in combat during the Battle of Palembang, on Sumatra in the Netherlands East Indies, on 14 February 1942. The operation was well-planned, with 425 men of the 1st Parachute Raiding Regiment seizing Palembang airfield, while the paratroopers of the 2nd Parachute Raiding Regiment seized the town and its important oil refinery. Paratroops were subsequently deployed in the Burma campaign. The 1st Glider Tank Troop was formed in 1943, with four Type 95 Ha-Go light tanks. The paratroop brigades were organised into the Teishin Shudan as the first division-level raiding unit, at the main Japanese airborne base, Karasehara Airfield, Kyūshū, Japan.

During World War II, the Finnish Army and Border Guard organised sissi forces into a long-range reconnaissance patrol (kaukopartio) units. These were open only to volunteers and operated far behind enemy lines in small teams. They conducted both intelligence-gathering missions and raids on e.g. enemy supply depots or other strategic targets. They were generally highly effective. For example, during the Battle of Ilomantsi, Soviet supply lines were harassed to the point that the Soviet artillery was unable to exploit its massive numerical advantage over Finnish artillery.

Special operations forces were used in the Bangladesh Liberation War. The Mukti Bahini was the guerrilla resistance movement formed by the Bangladeshi military, paramilitary and civilians during the War of Liberation that transformed East Pakistan into Bangladesh in 1971 (Alagappa, 2001; Ahmed, 2012). A formal military leadership of the resistance was created in April 1971 under the Provisional Government of Bangladesh (Gates and Roy, 2016). Using guerrilla warfare tactics, the Mukti Bahini secured control over large parts of the Bengali countryside. It conducted successful "ambush and sabotage" campaigns (Jamal, 2008), and included the nascent Bangladesh Air Force and the Bangladesh Navy. The Mukti Bahini received training and weapons from the regular troops (Jamal, 2008), where people in the eastern and

northeastern states share a common Bengali ethnic and linguistic heritage with East Pakistan (Fraser, 2008 p. 7). During the War, the Mukti Bahini became part of the Bangladesh Allied Forces (Stanton, 2012). It was instrumental in securing the Surrender of Pakistan and the liberation of Dacca and other cities in December 1971 (Stanton 2012).

Use of special operations forces continues long after the World War II. Throughout the latter half of the 20th century and into the 21st century, special forces have come to higher prominence, as governments have found that objectives can sometimes be better achieved by a small team of anonymous specialists than a larger and much more politically controversial conventional deployment. In both Kosovo and Afghanistan, special forces were used to co-ordinate activities between local guerrilla fighters and air power. Typically, guerrilla fighters would engage enemy soldiers and tanks causing them to move, where they could be seen and attacked from the air.

Special forces have been used in both wartime and peacetime military operations such as the Laotian Civil War, Bangladesh Liberation War 1971, Vietnam War 1968, Portuguese Colonial War, South African Border War, Falklands War, The Troubles in Northern Ireland, the Jaffna University Helidrop, the first and second Gulf Wars, Afghanistan, Croatia, Kosovo, Bosnia, the first and second Chechen Wars, the Iranian Embassy siege (London), the Air France Flight 8969 (Marseille), Operation Defensive Shield, Operation Khukri, the Moscow theater hostage crisis, Operation Orchard, the Japanese Embassy hostage crisis (Lima), in Sri Lanka against the LTTE, the raid on Osama Bin Laden's compound in Pakistan, the 2016 Indian Line of Control strike, the 2015 Indian counter-insurgency operation in Myanmar, the 2019 US special operations force that killed Al'Baghdadi in Iraq and the 2020 US special operations force that killed Iranian General Qassim Suleimani in Iraq.

SELF- ASSESSMENT EXERCISE
What advantages and or disadvantages do you think the use of special operations forces have over the deployment of traditional troops?

4.0   CONCLUSION

In this unit, we set out to trace the history and evolution of special operations forces. It was established that special operations forces had been in use right from 249 BC. The British specialised units of the special operations forces participated in the Tirah Campaign during 1897-1898 and in the Second Boer War of 1899-1902. In the World War I, German Stormtroopers participated as special operation forces. During the World War II both the Allied and the Axis states used special

operation forces. During the post-World War II era, states have continued to use special operation forces.

5.0 SUMMARY

This unit proved in summary that although the use of special operations forces seems like an innovation and something new in the military, it is really an ancient practice. Armies have, as early as 249 BC used special operation forces as part of their military operation. What we have today in most states of the world are but improved versions of special operations forces used in times past. However, tracing the history and evolution of special operations forces showed that they have been formed for the same purposes through the ages.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Does the Nigerian Army use special operations forces? What is it called? In which campaigns or missions have they been deployed?

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UNIT 2 INCORPORATION OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES INTO NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND POLICY

CONTENTS

1.0   Introduction
2.0   Objectives
3.0   Main Content
4.0   Conclusion
5.0   Summary
6.0   Tutor-Marked Assignment
7.0   References/Further Reading

1.0   INTRODUCTION

Special operations forces are already being used in some states as an integral part of their armies, but with varying degrees of incorporation. This unit is concerned with efforts that can be made with states to further and more seamlessly incorporate special operations forces into the national security strategy and policy.

2.0   OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
- explain the extent to which states have integrated special operations forces into their national security strategy and policy
- state what more needs to be done to make the integration seamless.
- identify the advantages of such integration.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

There are some military operations such as low-density or clandestine operations that need not have the publicity of a conventional deployment, but can be more successfully handled by special operations forces. Special operations force, by avoiding the stumping of a full platoon and instead making use of few highly trained men, is cheap and can quickly achieve the set goal of a mission. Special operations forces have peculiar features and advantages that make it desirable for a nation to incorporate them into their national security strategy and policy. Special operations forces have peculiar capabilities that include the following: Special reconnaissance and surveillance in hostile environments, foreign internal defense, training and development of

other states' military and security forces, offensive action, support to counter-insurgency through population engagement and support, counter-terrorism operations, sabotage and demolition, hostage rescue, high value target/manhunt. Other capabilities can include body-guarding; waterborne operations involving combat diving/combat swimming, maritime boarding and amphibious missions; as well as support of air force operations.

A state thus arrives at a critical inflection point in the development and employment of its special operations forces, where budget pressures and exhaustion with large-scale wars place a new premium on small-footprint operations and partnering with allies to provide cost-effective defense. Special operations forces are uniquely designed to play both of those roles (Robinson, 2013 p. 3).

Over the past decade, special operations forces have honed their counterterrorism man-hunting ability and notched significant operational successes, most prominently in missions such as the one that killed al-Qaeda founder and leader Osama bin Laden. These unilateral man-hunting skills represent only one of their two basic capabilities—albeit the one that has understandably received the most attention and resources in recent years. Their other capability is developing and working alongside indigenous forces to combat terrorists, insurgents, and transnational criminal networks through an orchestrated set of defense, information, and civil affairs programmes (Robinson, 2013 p. 3).

There is also the progressive strategy that takes cognisance of the need to expand the ability of special operations forces and conventional forces to operate together seamlessly in an environment of irregular and hybrid threats. The recent intensive use of special operations forces in combination with conventional forces represents a potentially potent new form of land power that could address threats without resorting to large-scale interventions. But several additional steps are needed. New command structures could facilitate special operations forces-centric and hybrid special operations forces-conventional operations. Habitual special operations-conventional teaming would deepen the interdependence and familiarity gained in the past decade. Intensifying training for special operations forces and ancillary forces could be a powerful mechanism for (1) developing common procedures for operating in small, distributed, blended formations and (2) building a cadre of trained advisers able to fulfill a national security strategy that places a growing emphasis on partnered operations. (Robinson, et al 2013)

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An enormous investment has been made in expanding and equipping special operations forces over the past decade. They have doubled in size and been deployed more often and for longer periods than ever before. They have more generals and admirals leading their ranks compared with what it was a dozen years ago. Use of special operations forces is innovative, low-cost, and involves small-footprint to achieve security objectives, which endears it to being incorporated and utilised fully in national security strategy and policy. The other reason to expect a high demand for special operations forces is the continuing prevalence of irregular threats to national security, the types of threats that these forces are designed to address.

Due to the mechanised nature of war a small team of highly trained soldiers with the advantage of surprise could exact greater damage to the enemy's ability to fight than an entire platoon. The idea of a small team of parachute trained soldiers to operate behind enemy lines to gain intelligence, destroy enemy aircraft and attack their supply and reinforcement routes is the basis for the formation and use of special operations forces. Special operations forces are designed for missions that conventional forces cannot undertake, such as those that require operating in a low profile manner, behind enemy lines, or in politically sensitive places. They are also ideally suited to work with other states' special operations forces.

The increased use of special operations forces by states after the World War II endears it to incorporation into national security strategy and policy. Throughout the latter half of the 20th century and into the 21st century, special forces have come to higher prominence, as governments have found objectives can sometimes be better achieved by a small team of anonymous specialists than a larger and much more politically controversial conventional deployment. In both Kosovo and Afghanistan, special forces were used to co-ordinate activities between local guerrilla fighters and air power. Typically, guerrilla fighters would engage enemy soldiers and tanks causing them to move, where they could be seen and attacked from the air.

Special operations forces have been incorporated into national security strategy and policy at varying degrees and there is need for states to deepen the integration by making laws assigning specific roles to the special operations forces and outlining their relationship with the conventional forces and other related or ancillary units.

SELF- ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Why do you think the special operations forces should be incorporated into the national security strategy and policy?

4.0   CONCLUSION

In this unit we examined the degree to which the special operations forces have been incorporated into national security strategy and policy. We found that there are differing degrees to which this incorporation has been made. We found that there is a need to deepen the incorporation by making laws that specifically define their roles and delineates lines of relationship with the conventional forces and other related or ancillary units.

5.0   SUMMARY

We aimed to understand the extent to which states have integrated special operations forces into their national security strategy and policy and what more needs to be done to make the integration seamless. We also sought to understand why it is desirable that such integration be done. We found that the use of special operations forces involves fewer men and officers, costs less and avoids the diplomatic cost of unilateral operations and the general unease that follows announcements of an all - out conventional military deployment for war.

6.0   TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Do the Nigerian Armed Forces have and use special operations forces? Have they been deployed for missions before? Why will you recommend that special operations forces be incorporated into the Nigerian national security strategy and policy?

7.0   REFERENCES/FUTURE READING

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UNIT 3   SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND OTHER ELITE UNITS

CONTENTS

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3.0   Main Content
        3.1 National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
        3.2 Polar Expedition and Antarctic Overwintering Team
        3.3 Mountaineering and Trekking
        3.4 Federal Bureau of Intelligence (FBI)
        3.5 Smokejumpers
4.0   Conclusion
5.0   Summary
6.0   Tutor-Marked Assignment
7.0   References/Further Reading

1.0   INTRODUCTION

Special operations forces do not maintain stand- alone status in military culture. There are other elite military groups that are similar in formation and mission as special operations forces which share similar characteristics. Again some elite groups similar to special operations forces are found in organisations other than the military, for example in the police, firefighting organisations and other security or para-military agencies. Such similar elite groups share culture like the exclusion of women in combat teams and we will see this in detail in the next unit.

2.0   OBJECTIVES
At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
- describe some elite group teams within and outside the military that share features with the special operation forces.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)

NASA is the most interesting analog to special operations forces for several reasons. Long-duration space flight is strongly analogous to the environments required by special operations forces mission in almost all dimensions. Although the danger is not from another human being, the threat of an outer space environment to an unprotected human is

indisputable. The astronaut corps began as a gendered occupation, and is now completely open to women. It is similar to special operations forces in this regard. Hence, because certain NASA missions require long-duration space flight for groups of individuals, team composition has been of long concern to and formally studied by the agency. Finally, teams on long-duration space flight cannot be "rescued" or exfiltrated, so positive team dynamics become an important concern.

NASA did not begin to actively recruit women for the astronaut corps until 1976, although astronaut recruitment began for the Mercury programme in 1959 when the agency was created. NASA opened the programme to women largely because of intense Congressional and media scrutiny of its almost exclusively white, male professional workforce (McQuaid, 2007 pp. 405-434). The first women were not selected for the astronaut corps until 1978. Although NASA claimed that it did not deliberately exclude women, early requirements for astronauts included technical and/or engineering knowledge or degrees and hundreds of hours of flight time, many of which had to be in military high performance jets. Since these fighter pilot positions in both the Navy and the Air Force were closed to women as they were combat positions, women could not get the requisite experience—although the requirement was for flight hours, not combat experience.

A recent NASA publication on the psychology of space exploration noted that "beyond the size of the crew, the mixture of cultural and ethnic backgrounds, and the blend of professional expertise, the most salient crew composition variable is gender" (Bimm, 2012 p. 125). The same publication goes on to note that, "In the general team literature, for example, findings suggest that men and women do work in slightly different ways that may influence team performance such as leadership styles and reactions to stress. Research also suggests that the unique contributions from each gender often improve team performance in settings such as extreme environments, thereby supporting the use of mixed-gender teams" (Bimm, 2012 p. 130).

3.2 Polar Expeditions and Antarctic Overwintering Teams

Several papers have looked at the literature on psychosocial adaptation in isolated and confined extreme (ICE) environments, focusing on polar expeditions and simulated as well as actual space crews (Dion, 2004 p. 75). In perhaps one of the most complete assertion, Sandal, Leon and Polinkas (2006) note that:

> Studies in ICE environments have identified a number of factors that impact the efficiency and quality of interpersonal relationships, including crew structure and cohesion, leadership

style, gender and cultural background of crew members, and intergroup relationships (Sandal, 2006 et al., 286).

This supports the complexity illustrated in the fact that gender is only one of many factors influencing an individual's contribution to team performance and to that team's performance against its mission.

3.3 Mountaineering and Trekking

Himalayan or high-altitude mountaineering can be considered a reasonable analog to special operations forces mission-directed activity. High-altitude mountaineering is conducted in an austere environment, and is highly dangerous. It is considered by many to be the most dangerous sport in the world. One analysis of an authoritative body of statistics on Mount Everest summit attempts, looked at 20,041 individuals who intended to summit, spread across 2,756 non-commercial expeditions of 3 persons or more from 1950-2010. Of that group, 24 percent of the expeditions experienced at least one climber injury or death, and 4.7 percent of the mountaineers were injured or killed while climbing (Sherman and Chatman pp. 16-17). This does not include, for example, the 15 deaths of the disastrous 1996 commercial season chronicled by Jon Krakauer (Krakauer, 2011). Of those who attempted, only 26 per cent of the climbers successfully reached the summit, with an average of 18 per cent of the climbers in any given expedition doing so (Sherman and Chatman p. 17).

Although the definition of the importance of an Everest summit attempt differs from that of special operations forces mission, the attention paid to climbing teams and their summiting attempts does provide an external motivator for climbing teams on the major peaks. The use of Sherpas as porters and for other support functions, and the need to obtain permits from sometimes hostile governments can immerse all members of Himalayan climbing teams in foreign communities (Ortner, 2001). Teams are highly interdependent for safety and logistic reasons, although final summit pushes (the push for full mission success) are often taken by individuals. High-altitude mountaineering used to require isolation of team members from their families and home communities, but the advent of satellite and electronic communication has mitigated this separation somewhat. In short, high-altitude mountaineering requires superb physical conditioning, significant mental fortitude, and a high appetite for risk.

3.4 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

The FBI is an intelligence-driven and a threat-focused national security organisation with intelligence and law enforcement responsibilities. The

FBI organisations that appear to be most relevant to the special operations forces mixed-gender elite teams research are, the Counterterrorism Division, Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate, Critical Incident Response Groups, Human Resources Division, Training Division (The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) website at http://www.fbi.gov/).

Of those organisations, the Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG) incorporates tactical operations which include Hostage Rescue Teams (HRTs) and Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams. HRTs and SWAT teams seem to be the most relevant in terms of similarity of activities with the special operations forces teams. Another team that shares some kind of resemblance is the special reconnaissance and counterterrorism (Knarr *et al.,* 2014 p. 85). The conditions experienced by an HRT or a SWAT team are not as severe as those experienced by special operations forces teams. For example, the teams are not deployed for long periods of time in austere locations.

3.5   Smokejumpers

Smokejumpers are an elite group of wildland firefighters who parachute into remote areas to fight wildfires. In the US, these teams are overseen by the US Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management (US Department of Agriculture and Department of the Interior respectively). There are seven Forest Service and two Bureau of Land Management Smokejumper bases employing nearly 550 jumpers (Mason, 2011). Women make up approximately five per cent or less of the total Smokejumper population with the exact number always in flux.

The US Army has a historical connection to the Smokejumpers. The 555th Parachute Infantry Battalion was activated as a result of a recommendation made in December 1942 by the Advisory Committee on Negro Troop Policies, chaired by the Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy. In approving the committee's recommendation for a Black parachute battalion, Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall decided to start with a company, and on 25 February 1943 the 555th Parachute Infantry Company was constituted. The battalion did not serve overseas during World War II. However, in May 1945 it was sent to the west coast of the United States to combat forest fires ignited by Japanese balloons carrying incendiary bombs. Although this potentially serious threat did not materialise, the 555th Parachute Infantry Company fought numerous other forest fires. Stationed at Pendleton Field, Oregon, with a detachment in Chico, California, unit members courageously participated in dangerous firefighting missions throughout

the Pacific Northwest during the summer and fall of 1945, earning the nickname "Smoke Jumpers" (Knarr *et al.*, 2014 p. 87).

SELF -ASSESSMENT EXERCISE
Write short notes on (1) Smokejumpers and (2) Polar Expeditions and Antarctic overwintering team.

4.0   CONCLUSION

This unit set out to highlight and discuss other elite military and paramilitary teams that operate in environments as dangerous as the special operations forces teams and to compare them with the special operations forces teams. It found that such other elite teams include the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Smokejumpers, Polar Expeditions and Antarctic overwintering teams, as well as mountaineering and trekking.

5.0   SUMMARY

This unit shows that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Smokejumpers, polar expeditions and Antarctic overwintering teams, and mountaineering and trekking, are elite groups that operate on similar pedestals as the special operations forces teams. The works of these teams are regarded as dangerous and women were initially excluded from them until recently.

6.0   TUTOR- MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Discuss the differences and similarities between the special operations forces and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Smokejumpers, polar expeditions and Antarctic overwintering teams, and mountaineering and trekking in terms of their operations and mission ideology.

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UNIT 4   GENDER   INTEGRATION   IN   SPECIAL OPERATION FORCES

CONTENTS

1.0   **INTRODUCTION**

A state may want to accomplish a mission covertly or she may want to accomplish the mission without the full military getting involved in it. In such cases, she has the option of using special operations forces. These are a selection of capable hands. Such operations often take place in rough terrains, with clandestine planning as well as operation that involves high risk to the forces. The United States is an avid user of special operations forces. Think of the operation that resulted in the killing of Osama Bin Laden in May 2011, the killing of Abubakar Al'Bagdadi in December 2019 and the killing of the Iranian General Quassem Suleimani in Iraq in January 2020. Do you think these operations could have been possible if an entire battalion of the United States army was sent to accomplish it? No. Information about the operation would have leaked and the operation would have failed. It is in this regard that the use of special operations forces is important. They will secretly deploy and achieve the objective without being noticed. It is only when the news breaks that the world will know what the operation has been accomplished.

Traditionally, only male soldiers are selected to go for special operations. Indeed in 1994, there was a ban in the United States on the deployment of female soldiers as members of special operations forces, due to concerns about the lesser physical and mental strength of women to deploy to such tasking duty in faraway lands and in rough terrains, the need to meet the hygiene requirements of women operating in such

distant foreign land, the capacity of women to break away from their family for a long time in the course of such mission, the ability of women to maintain the necessary bonding and cohesion with men required for effective team work, the fear of sexual harassment, etc. However, in January 2013, the United States made a policy detour and began to allow the deployment of women for special operations mission.

2.0   OBJECTIVES
At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- display grounded knowledge of the use of special operations forces
- explain why women should or should not be part of the team deployed for special operations forces
- show whether the inclusion of women in special operations forces enhances or inhibits the success of special operations forces or whether it has a neutral effect on the mission

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Background

On 24 January 2013, the United States (US) Secretary of Defense (Sec Def) rescinded the 1994 Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule (DCAR) that excluded women from assignment to units and positions whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground (William Knar *et al*., 2014 p. v). In doing so, the Sec Def directed the opening of all occupational specialties (OS), positions and units to women; the validation of gender-neutral standards for those positions; and establishment of milestones for implementation. The Sec Def marked 1 January 2016 as the implementation date for women to be integrated into newly opened positions and units. The memorandum stipulated that "Recommendations to keep an OS or unit closed to women must be approved by the [Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff] CJCS and then the SecDef" and that those recommendations should be "narrowly tailored, and based on a rigorous analysis of factual data…." ("Elimination of the 1994 Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule." Secretary of Defense Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, 24 January, 2013.)

3.2   Variables of Interest

Although there are many variables that affect team dynamics, three of those variables are discussed in this unit because they surfaced most

frequently in the literature: 1) gender-sex distinctions, 2) cohesion, and 3) institutional/organisational pressures. The gender-sex distinction was selected as it is the social implementation and cultural valuation of sex categories (male and female) and associated behaviours that lay behind the original exclusion of women from combat, and it was change in those valuations which prompted the recent opening of combat positions/units to women. Cohesion is a relevant topic as it is reflected in the CJCS memorandum ("preserving unit readiness, cohesion, and morale") and has figured as a concern in historical attempts to integrate other groups (such as racial minorities) into the military. Finally, the selection of institutional and organisational pressures as an important variable recognises the force that collectivities such as Congress, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and the individual military services and units can exert on the behaviour of small teams and individuals.

3.3   Gender/Sex Distinction

Sex and gender need to be clearly differentiated. Sex (male/female) describes observable characteristics and defines biological categories, while gender (masculine/feminine) is 'performative' and defines social categories. Sex or sex category is what one is and does not change from situation to situation. Gender, on the other hand, is a set of behaviours that are culturally associated with sex categories and thereby a given value. For example, people in Africa, Western countries, including the US, generally associate bravery, repressed emotions, strength, and assertive behaviour with males. This is called masculine behaviour. These same populations generally associate nurturing, compassionate, weakness, and retiring behaviours with females, calling it feminine behaviour. These behaviours are what one does, not what one is. Gender thus is the social presentation and display of sex category (West and Zimmerman, 1987 pp. 125-151).

It is when sex is conflated with gender that social interaction becomes problematised (Ridgeway, 2009 pp. 146-160). When people engage with others on the basis of sex categories (engage with someone as a female) and assume the association of valued, gendered behaviours with that sex category (as a female, she should act in certain ways), expectations are created that may or may not be valid (Tajfel, 1982 pp. 1-39). Females can exhibit strong and assertive behaviour, just as males can be nurturing and compassionate. Although sex and gender are related, they are distinctly different and strategies for teams to cope with each are different.

Gendered occupations emerge when optimal performance in an occupation means exhibition of behaviours synonymous with a gender (Britton, 2000 pp. 418-434). The military is recognised as a highly gendered occupation – optimal performance in combat (the defining military behaviour) requires exhibition of behaviours that most people comfortably define as masculine. The discussion of sex and gender and sex- and gender-linked qualities then sets up a discussion on "diversity," i.e. teams composed of different genders. Do males and females on teams similar to special operations forces exhibit different, gender-defined behaviours? If so, do these gendered behaviours negatively impact team performance?

There is very little research directly addressing the effect of gender on team performance (Horwitz, 2005 pp. 219-245). Therefore, to address this question, one has to look at studies performed on mixed-gender teams operating in environments analogous to those in which special operations teams operate.

Very small numbers of females in the special operations forces selection pools can raise the possibility that those females, if considered members of a low status minority, will be viewed as tokens, symbols of a category (females) rather than as fully qualified individuals, and consequently be subjected to discriminatory, harassing and exclusionary behaviour (Kanter, 1977 pp. 178-192). De-gendering an occupation by establishing gender-neutral standards truly reflective of requirements for the success of missions is an important step towards removing incentives and opportunities for gender harassment. Establishment of mission-defined, gender-neutral standards for special operations forces will define what it means to be an operator, to be mission-capable, not what it means to be a man or woman.

Occupations can be organically de-gendered as the minority group acquires positions, prestige and power within the occupation through the collective activities of individuals over time through superior performance. Alternatively, society can begin the process by externally forcing the de-sexing (note: not de-gendering) or desegregation of an occupation through laws or requirements opening them to classes of individuals which historically have been excluded. The requirement for the opening of combat positions to women (unless there is a performance-required reason for exclusion) is such an effort. It is an attempt to move the military, a historically gendered occupation into what its leaders see as a position more in accordance with the social values and attitudes of the general society it serves. However, allowing females to serve does not necessarily de-gender a masculine occupation.

Whether the change is organic or imposed, the initial numbers of members of the minority population will be small and could be perceived as "tokens," or "treated as representatives of their category, as symbols rather than individuals" (Kanter, 1977 p. 208). Kanter's (1977, p. 208) study of women in a corporate environment concluded that when the minority population is small enough (around 15% or less), that minority population may experience performance pressures, social isolation and stereotyping if they are treated as tokens…. While Kanter used a specific threshold, this number should only be used as a guide. Tokenism (with its associate effects) can still occur if the minority is more than 15%, 20% or even more of the total group (Knarr, 2014 p. 30). Other studies, such as Ott's study of Dutch policewomen integrated into the force in the 1980's, compared teams where women made up as much as 25% of the team ("tilted" teams) with those where an average of 6% of the teams' members were women ("skewed" teams), with many of these skewed teams having only one female team member. Ott found that women on the skewed teams reported more severe performance pressures such as greater visibility, more social isolation, less peer acceptance and more sexual harassment than did women on the tilted teams (Ott, 1989 pp. 41-57).

Kanter's (1977) study argued that structural factors (the relative numbers of the minority to the dominant group) would be the primary cause for the less-than-optimal behaviour of the majority group. The study suggested that increasing the percentage of the minority, "gender balancing" to some level beyond the 15% threshold, would eliminate the perception of the minorities as tokens and alleviate the negative effects of such a perception. Though Kanter did not identify a specific numerical tipping point, proposed policy solutions often focus on reaching a "critical mass" of the minority which the literature puts between roughly 15-25% of the total. Morris argued for a similar structural solution to the integration of women into the military, positing that inclusion of women in the military in sufficient numbers would be necessary to degender the profession (Morris, 1995 p. 740).

Subsequent research suggested that increasing the proportion of a minority in a group may worsen the effects of tokenism, not alleviate them. Yoder suggests that the saleswomen in Kanter's original study encountered negative behaviours not because of their small numbers but their increasing numbers. The increase in numbers was viewed intrusive by the dominant group which felt under threat (Yoder, 1991 p. 185). This view is shared by Blalock who argued that discrimination increases with the relative size of the minority, because the minority becomes a greater competitive threat to the majority (Blalock, 1967 p. 366). Thus increasing the proportion of the minority may heighten not lessen

undesired behavioural effects (Rosen et al., 1996 p. 540). These divergent perspectives suggest that the effect of tokens (small numbers of an identified group seen as symbols, not as individuals) in a workplace is a complex phenomenon influenced by more than numbers (Archbold and Schulz, 2008 pp. 50-73). This structural solution is now seen as perhaps necessary but certainly not sufficient.

Further research has suggested that the negative experience of the minority group is a function not only of its numbers but of its status vis-à-vis or relationship to the dominant group (Zimmer, 1988 p. 64-77). Yoder found that perceived occupational inappropriateness (e.g. women should not fight), not relative numbers, may be the key factor allowing negative behaviour toward tokens to emerge, arguing that it only occurs for women in occupations that are considered gender-inappropriate. Not all numeric minorities have the same negative experiences in any given occupation, and the same minority may have different experiences in different occupations (Turco, 2010 pp. 894-913). In fact, minority males in female-gendered occupations such as nursing or social work may occupy positions of prestige and token-related behaviours may not emerge (Knarr, 2014 p. 30).

The presence of a low-status or felt-inappropriate minority or of a token population allows certain behaviours to emerge in the dominant group, leading to a common group of experiences on the part of the minority. These include heightened visibility for the minority partially but not only because of behaviour around the definitional category (sex or gender in the case of this study), exclusion from the dominant group through boundary heightening and other mechanisms which emphasise characteristics and behaviours related to the definitional category, and being cast in stereotypical roles by the dominant group (Knarr et al., 2014 p. 30). Research addressing the impacts of inter-sectionality, defined as the simultaneous consideration by Self and Other of multiple categories of identity and difference, supports the contention that it is the felt-inappropriateness or low status of the minority population rather than its numbers that stimulate the negative behaviour directed at tokens. Yoder and Berendsen's study of white and black female firefighters in the late 1990's found that Black females were the target of these negative behaviours for a longer period than White females, noting that "specific enactments of … exclusion often vary along racial/ethnic lines reflecting the subordinated racial status of being Black in contrast to the culturally privileged status of being White" (Yoder and Berendsen, 2001 p. 34). Another study of police officers also looked not only at the impact of gender (the study population had both male and female sworn officers) but at two different race/ethnicities, Blacks and Latinos (Stronshine and Brandl, 2011 pp. 344-365). The study found that Black

officers, whether they were male or female, experienced greater negative performance pressures associated with tokenism, even though their population percentages were higher than Latinos. This supported what the authors called "a wealth of research that establishes a racial hierarchy, with Latinos faring better than Blacks in the workplace" (Stronshine and Brandl, 2011 p. 360) and supports the argument that, in this case, it is the low status of the criterion defining the minority population (defined by race or ethnicity), not that members of the population are female, that stimulates the negative behaviours towards that population.

Negative performance pressures associated with tokens have been experienced by women in the military and other public service organisations, generally as a result of their perceived inappropriateness in a gendered occupation. A large scale survey by Adams and Yoder in 1965 of male and female officers commissioned through West Point and other sources found that "On ratings of assistance from peers, getting to know one's unit, congeniality of one's unit and acceptance by troops, men's ratings were significantly higher than women's, suggesting that the women officers were isolated" (Yoder, 1965 p. 187). Such experiences were consistent with those reported by female firefighters in Yoder and Berendsen's study of Black and White female firefighters in the late 1990's (Yoder and Berendsen 2001). Muir's study of Canadian women serving during the 1991 Gulf War described a "goldfish-bowl" syndrome, reporting that the women were "carefully observed by everyone—sailors, officers, the press and the public" (Muir, 1992 p. 312). Dutch female police officers in Ott's study conducted in the mid-1980's said that "you cannot make a mistake…they know everything about me" (Ott p. 48). In Yoder and Berendsen's study of female firefighters, the women noted "By the end of the first week of training everyone knew there were three women. They all knew our names, they knew how we were doing…and they could not tell you the names of any of the guys, but they certainly knew everything about us. We were just watched more closely" (Yoder and Berendsen, 2001 p. 31). As Yoder argues, women experience the negative behaviours associated with tokenism when they are both "numerically scarce, and working in an occupation normatively defined as men's work" (Yoder p. 188).

A token thus is a member of a low-status or felt-inappropriate minority who is perceived by the majority as representative of a category, not as an individual. The relative size of the minority vis-à-vis the dominant group and the threat felt by the dominant group to its definitional position in the occupation have the potential to lead to behaviours by the dominant group that could be damaging to overall group cohesiveness and have negative psychological impacts on the excluded individuals

(Knarr *et al*., 2014 p. 31). These behaviours also could preclude the full utilisation of the capabilities of the members of the minority group, precluding the divergent thinking and innovation associated with influence of minorities which are used as strong arguments in favour of diversity (De Dreu and West, 2001 pp. 1191-1201).

As Kanter's original research saw a structural problem (the negative behaviours of the dominants were the result of the small number of tokens or minorities), so was her solution a structural solution—increase the numbers. However, as later research discovered additional dimensions of the problem, the solution became more complex.

A very different approach suggests de-gendering the occupation—addressing the values that set up the initial conflict, and forcing the conversation back to one about performance. Rosen et al.'s work suggests professionalizing the occupation by developing visible standards and assessment processes against which all performers must measure up, de-conflating masculine qualities and the occupation. (It is worth noting that Rosen et al. did say that "Ungendered professionalism may be relatively easier to maintain among personnel in garrison, but may break down during deployments with the development of warrior environment" (Rosen, 1999 p. 346). To be a SEAL (abbreviation for Sea, Air and Land) it is not necessary to be "a tough guy." It *is* necessary to be able to accomplish the mission—and it has been demonstrated that if a candidate can do a certain number of pull-ups, swim a certain distance under a measured time, or retain judgment under physical stress (recognising that physical stress may look different for males and females), he or she could effectively perform the types of activities necessary to discharge the range of missions with which a SEAL team might be charged. That those kinds of performances mean that one is strong is not debated. What is up for challenge is the definition of the performance standards. If those standards are appropriately validated, then any candidate who measures up to the standards can do what needs to be done by a SEAL. Morris made this point writing about the military in general, although it certainly applies to special operations.

> There is no reason that the high valuation of those attributes (what she called the "masculinist" attributes of dominance, aggressiveness, and toughness) cannot be retained while simultaneously dissociating them from masculine gender; they may be valued instead as important attributes in a good soldier regardless of gender. Nor need the celebration of a certain steeliness exclude the approval also of compassion and understanding (as it does

in the hypermasculinity component of the masculinist construct) (Morris p. 751).

Finally, the job itself can be redefined, either institutionally or at the individual and interactional level. Skuratowicz (1996), found that the female firefighters broadened their interpretation of the physical requirements of their jobs from an exclusive focus on masculine-identified "brute strength" to a more encompassing conception combining strength, flexibility, endurance, and overall physical fitness without compromising their ability to put out fires. Ely and Meyerson's well-documented work on the shift from a masculine to a safety culture on offshore oil rigs illustrates how "collectivistic goals, the alignment of definitions of competence with *bona fide* task requirements rather than with idealised images of masculinity, and a learning orientation toward work" successfully engineered such a shift without challenging the self-hood or perceptions of masculine selves of the men working on the rigs" (Ely and Meyerson p. 27).

As very few women are likely to meet the physical requirements for selection into elite special operations forces units, it is likely they always will form a very small minority on those teams, well below any number posited for a structural solution. An awareness of the potential difficulties faced by tokens (as distinct from a minority population) may help begin a process to mitigate them through the de-gendering of combat-related occupations (Knarr *et al.*, 2014 p. 33).

Mixed gender teams have the potential to add to the richness of the toolkit special operations teams bring to the table, just as any other type of diversity does. However, in order for this diversity to be effectively accessed (i.e. to avoid females becoming simply additional team members with different plumbing), the occupation must be de-gendered by establishing standards truly reflective of requirements for the success of missions. For special operations, those professional standards will define what it means to be an operator, not the standards of masculinity. Furthermore, as women do join the cadre, there may be a redefinition of activities (not of missions) in ways more conducive to female capabilities.

It should be emphasised that just as males who are selected as special operators are "special" along many dimensions, so will be the females. In fact, since the selection criteria in several of the dimensions, most notably the physical, will pick only females who are far at the tail of a normal distribution, the female special operators will be highly exceptional. Given their exceptionalism and their potentially extremely small numbers, it will behoove leadership to treat each as a special case,

at least initially, assigning her to a team that can best take advantage of what she brings to the game just as is expected for the men.

3.4   Cohesion

By the 1990s, two forms of cohesion that were different in kind emerged independently from various studies (Dion, 2000 p. 7-26): social cohesion and task cohesion. The definitions of social and task cohesion, developed by MacCoun in 1993 have been widely used over the past twenty years and will be the reference point here (MacCoun & Hix, 2010 p. 140).

> Social cohesion refers to the nature and quality of the emotional bonds of friendship, liking, caring and closeness among group members. A group is socially cohesive to the extent that its members like each other, prefer to spend their social time together, enjoy each other's company, and feel emotionally close to one another.

> Task cohesion refers to the shared commitment among members to achieving a goal that requires the collective efforts of the group. A group with high task cohesion is composed of members who share a common goal and who are motivated to coordinate their efforts as a team to achieve their goal.

The first guiding principle in the policy opening combat positions to women was to "preserve" unit readiness, cohesion, and morale." This leads one to examine the concept of cohesion and its significance for team dynamics in military settings. Cohesion has been categorised as vertical and horizontal (Siebold, 1999 pp. 178-192). Vertical cohesion exists between a leader and followers. The connection a leader can establish with his subordinates and the relationship of the leader with his superiors and peers is an important mechanism for all participants to engage with the larger institution. Vertical cohesion influences horizontal cohesion and underscores the importance of leadership in creating cohesion within the unit (MacCoun and Hix, 2010 pp. 137-165). Horizontal cohesion can be characterised as social cohesion or task cohesion (Harrel & Miller, 1997). Social cohesion describes how well members of the group like each other, their emotional connection; task cohesion on the other hand describes the bonds that arise among individuals cooperating to achieve common goals (MacCoun, 1993).

The relationship between task cohesion, social cohesion and performance is complex. In general, task cohesion is believed to positively influence performance more than social cohesion. Social

cohesion is not reliably associated with improved performance and can, in fact, have a negative impact on performance (MacCoun & Hix, 2010 p. 143). High social cohesion can lead to groupthink or situations in which the group may adopt attitudes and values that differ from that of the organisation (Hogg & Hains, 1998 pp. 323-341). While some level of social cohesion appears necessary, too much may be problematic.

There are a number of methodological challenges for drawing conclusions relevant for special operation forces. First, although there has been a reasonable amount of research on cohesion in military units (Siebold, 1999), the research was not conducted on special operations forces – small, elite units operating in austere environments. So while there may be generalisations to special operations forces units that can be made from the research on cohesion in general and on the military in particular, a couple of the studies raise the possibility that there may be differences between general military units and special operations units that affect the development of cohesion (Vaitkus, 1994). Secondly, much of the research on cohesion, including some targeting the military, was conducted in the 1980s and 1990s, and may not be reflective of current social attitudes towards diversity (gender and other forms) within the military. Team dynamics are also influenced by, and influence, organisational culture and climate. Finally, as at 2014, there were no scientific studies of gender-integrated combat units. However, considerable research has been done on gender-integrated military groups in noncombat roles. In general, there is no finding of negative impact on cohesion (Johnson et al., 1978). That said, there is a recognition that it is possible (although not known how probable) that the role of gender in cohesion will play differently in actual combat units and situations (Rosen, Knudson and Fancher, 2003 pp. 325-351).

The conceptualisation of cohesion within relevant academic disciplines and applied fields has evolved substantially over the decades. A key development was the identification of types of cohesion discussed above: task and social cohesion, and vertical and horizontal cohesion. However, considerable debate remains over how to measure these different types of cohesion and their interrelationships, especially within a military setting (Siebold, 2000).

The relationship between cohesion and performance is one of the most often studied aspects of cohesion as all organisations are interested in creating and maintaining high performing groups. Scientific studies on cohesion and performance have examined a broad range of variables related to cohesion such as: stressful events, individual adjustment, support among group members, leadership, group integration, perceptions of individual and group performance, group structure and

size, and task orientation (Griffith & Vaitkus, 1999 p. 31). However determining the exact nature of the relationship between these variables and any causal effect on cohesion remains a challenge. This is particularly true within a military environment which adds the confounding stressor of combat (Siebold, 2000).

An interesting cautionary point is raised by Mullen and Copper (1995) in one of the earlier meta-studies on the relationship of cohesion to performance which included military units. Although Mullen and Copper did not differentiate between task and social cohesion (they define cohesion as "resulting from interpersonal attraction, liking for or commitment to the group task, and group status or pride" (p. 15), they note that of the 49 previous studies analysed for their article, of which ten were conducted by the military or under contract to the military, the relationship between cohesion and performance was strongest for sports teams. They speculate that "the increasing effect of cohesiveness on performance as it moves from artificial groups, to non-sport, non-military real groups, to military groups, to sports teams…may map on to increasing degrees of salience and legitimacy of standards of excellence" (pp. 36-37). They also suggest that the "increasing degrees of "group-ness" or "entitativity" (p. 37) across this chain may also be of importance in strengthening cohesion. This suggests that the elite-ness and tight intra-group relationships found on special operations forces teams may affect the ways in which cohesion play out.

Multiple studies indicate that high task cohesion is essential for performance, but that "social cohesion has no reliable correlation with good performance" (MacCoun & Belkin, 2006 p. 647). Similarly, Beal found that "there is no clear evidence that stronger bonds within the group leads to higher level of productivity" (Knarr *at al*., 2014 p. 43). This aligns with MacCoun's conclusion that "task cohesion has a modest but reliable influence on performance." He further notes that "social cohesion does not have an independent effect after controlling for task cohesion" (MacCoun, 1993 p. 330). This directly counters the romanticised view of the effect of social bonds on battlefield performance.

The integration experience of African Americans in the military suggests that task cohesion can help create cohesion in heterogeneous (diverse) work groups and, perhaps, facilitate change in values in the larger organisation. DeFleur, writing on the integration of women into the service academies points to the research by Stouffer, *et al* in 1949 where it was stated that: "In one of the first studies of Blacks in combat units during World War II, soldiers cooperated with each other in military activities and as a result attitudes towards the minority become

more favorable as contact between groups increased" (Stouffer *et al*., 1949 p. 23). Further research on the integration of African Americans found that "those who had more contact with minorities were more favorable if the contact involved equal status individuals engaged in cooperative and meaningful tasks" (Moskos, 1971 pp. 271-289). This recalls one of the conclusions on gender: to facilitate full integration, females integrated into special operations forces units must be given tasks commensurate with their abilities as a special operator, not perceived "gender-appropriate" tasks.

The nature of the work performed and the working environment, which is related to task, may also play a role in the level of cohesion. There is some evidence to suggest that arduous or stressful work conditions can increase cohesion within groups, especially if the outcome of the group's work is successful. Bartone's study of cohesion on Norwegian Naval cadets suggested that "the combined effects of being already familiar with one another and then experiencing as a group a stressful task or exercise that together seem to have more impact on cohesion than either factor alone" (Bartone, 1977 p. 16). This parallels earlier investigation of African American integration by Moskos, which found "the most favorable conditions for this have been actual combat with close living, clear-cut goals, and common dangers" (Bartone p. 16).

Combat is, of course, an extremely stressful experience—some would say the quintessentially stressful experience as it requires participants to violate very strongly inculcated moral codes (Grossman, 2002) and poses an existential threat to participants. Wong's 2003 monograph based on in-theater interviews with Iraqi prisoners of war, embedded journalists and US troops, argued that motivation to fight was based on "the strong emotional bonds" and "bonds of trust" between military personnel, (Wong, *et al*., 2003 pp. 23, 25), connections he describes as social cohesion (Wong, *et al*., pp. 11-14). However, as others have argued, Wong simply dismissed the established distinctions between social and task cohesion (Wong says, "attempting to dissect cohesion into social or task cohesion and then comparing correlations with performance is best left to the antiseptic experiments of academia" (p. 23), conflated the two, and labeled the phenomenon "social cohesion." MacCoun *et al.* argue that the conflation of social and task cohesion led Wong to mistakenly label task cohesion's contribution to performance as social cohesion.

The nature of the work performed may matter as well. MacCoun and Hix cite previous research in support of this point. "Chiocchio and Essiembre (2009), showed that the cohesion-performance association was stronger when group tasks required a high degree of coordination

among members" (quoted in MacCoun & Hix p. 141). The high inter-dependency of special operations team members thus may position them well for the development of high task cohesion.

It is important to note that increased contact among majority and minority members in a group does not always lead to increase in cohesion or more favorable attitudes towards each other. Factors such as the nature of the groups' activities and the larger organisational context also affect the outcome.

Time also is a factor in the development (positive or negative) of cohesion. As MacCoun & Hix stated, "several studies have shown that any negative effects of socio-demographic differences tend to dissipate over time" (p. 15). Full integration of a new demographic is a long-term process as it entails changing attitudes which can be strongly held. That said, most studies on cohesion are not longitudinal, and do not provide insight into attitudinal changes across the organisation. One existing longitudinal study of gender attitudes in the Army does support this point. Although a survey conducted in 1988 showed a "significant negative correlation between percentage of women in the workplace and horizontal cohesion among male junior enlisted soldiers," a more recent 1995 study demonstrated no significant relationship between the ratio of men and women in the work group and unit cohesion (Rosen, *et al.*, 1999 p. 2). The military record on racial integration also supports the claim that the negative effects of heterogeneity diffuse over time. "A look at the distribution of attitudes held by white soldiers reveals that opposition to integration dropped from 84 per cent in 1943 to less than half in 1951" (Moskos, 1966 pp. 138-139). Nearly twenty years after Executive Order 9981: Desegregation of the Armed Forces (1948), Moskos' research in 1966 reported results from the study of racial integration in the Korean War. "By this time integration of military units had become standard and again there was an increase in favorable attitudes towards minorities with very few tensions between black and white soldiers working together" (Moskos, 1966 p. 23). By the early 21st century, from 2009 - 2013, there were five or fewer race-based complaints per year filed under the military's No FEAR Act, (Knarr, *et al.*, 2014 p. 44) suggesting a high level acceptance of integration.

Although it appears there is no research directly associating social cohesion with high team performance, MacCoun & Hix identified several studies which demonstrated that "it is social cohesion rather than task cohesion (or together with low task cohesion) that is responsible for any negative effects" on team performance (p. 143). King observed that "interpersonal bonds can undermine combat performance just as well as encourage it" (p. 32) RAND's 1997 study determined that:

> Multiple research efforts have shown that high social cohesion, or bonding on a social level, can have deleterious effect on performance outcomes or task cohesion, because people start to prioritise friendship and social activities over performing their jobs and let their work suffer (Harrel and Miller p. 54).

An association of high social cohesion with groupthink, "a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action," (Janis, 1982 p. 388) is another potential negative effect. Groupthink encourages conformity and can lead to poor decision making, a significant risk in any combat environment but particularly in the highly fluid environments encountered by special operators. Research by Hogg and Hains found that "too much cohesiveness is probably risky in almost all group decision making contexts" (p. 338). Hogg & Hains identify cohesiveness as "the principle antecedent" of groupthink as it encourages group members to reach consensus and agreement. In this process there is a "stronger endorsement of majority decision making, greater deference to the group leader, more rationalisation of decisions made and a tendency for the group to comply with the leader" (p. 337)

In addition to inefficiency and lack of task focus, high social cohesion can also be considered negative "when a cohesive unit develops values, attitudes, beliefs and norms contrary to the organisation's" (Rielley, 2001 p. 67). This cohesiveness, or "loyalty to the team above all," can prevent soldiers from reporting inappropriate acts and, can create an atmosphere in which "cruelty and barbarism become a group norm" (Rielley, 2001 p. 70). The My Lai Massacre in Vietnam is often cited in psychology textbooks as an incident in which group pressure to conform resulted in individuals taking actions that did not align with their personal values or those of the organisation (Lilienfield, *et al*., 2008). At least an absence of peer-to-peer policing, combined with strong unit leadership may have been a factor in the 2010 murder of civilians in the Maywand District in Afghanistan by members of the 5th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division and the abuse of prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison in 2003-2004. In both cases, a group leader directed the behaviour of the group and the group members retaliated against whistleblowers who sought assistance outside the group (Barret, 2012).

The impact of high social cohesion need not be violent to negatively impact the organisation as a whole. In 1994 a widespread cheating scandal at the US Naval Academy led to the expulsion of 24

midshipmen. Many of those involved covered up for each other "contending that loyalty to one's buddies was higher than loyalty to the honor concept at Annapolis" (Toner, 1996 p. 100). Bartone's research on the Army Cohesion, Operational Readiness and Training (COHORT) programme of the 1980s, which focused on keeping companies and battalions intact, has implications for understanding the role of leadership in cohesion. He notes that the COHORT programme resulted in only modest increases in cohesion and argues that "familiarity alone is not enough, other aspects, training and influence of leaders play a role" (Bartone p. 17). This may be particularly important in a small group context where "leaders are perhaps in a unique position to shape how stressful experiences get understood by members of the group" (Bartone p. 16).

A very high level of social cohesion within all male groups can be associated with hypermasculinity. Hypermasculinity is demonstrated in the "expressions of extreme, exaggerated, or stereotypic masculine attributes and behaviours. While this can be positive, in some cases this may have negative social consequences resulting in violent and criminal behaviour" (Rosen, et al., 1999 p. 326) including rape. At the very least, a hypermasculine environment, by definition, excludes women. That said, research conducted by Rosen et al. on the relationship between hypermasculinity and cohesion in selected military units produced some rather interesting results:

> Group hypermasculinity was significantly positively associated at the group level with both vertical and horizontal cohesion in male-only units. However, the relationship between these variables in mixed gender units was negative. Thus, the presence of women in military units does not simply decrease the levels of group hypermasculinity, but changes the relationship of group hypermasculinity to cohesion. With women present in the unit, hypermasculinity is no longer related to positive outcomes, and may even be related to negative outcomes. (Rosen *et al*., p. 344)

The introduction of females not only reduced the hypermasculinity but reduced the positive valuation of hypermasculinity by the group. It also is worth noting that Rosen et al., found that not all members of a hypermasculine group felt equally positive about the value of the hypermasculinity—but went along because of peer pressure (Rosen, *et al.*, p. 344). Finally, Rosen et al.'s study found that group hypermasculinity was positively related to perceived combat readiness (that is, the greater the hypermasculinity of the group, the more prepared

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the group believed itself to be for combat) (p. 345) and that gender integration may break down during combat deployments (p. 346).

As at 2014 there are no scientific studies of gender-integrated US combat units. However, considerable research has been done on gender integrated groups in noncombat roles. Many of these studies have been conducted by military research institutes or under contract to the military (Knarr, *et al*., 2014 p. 47).

In the 1970s the US Army Research Institute for the Behavioural and Social Sciences conducted two studies that focused on the impact of women's integration on performance. The Women Content in Units Force Development Test study assessed the performance of 40 combat support and combat service support companies during the (Fall 1976-Spring 1977) standard Army Training and Evaluation Programme (ARTEP). This study showed that the units' ability to meet ARTEP standards was not affected by the gender ratio in the unit, with women constituting up to 35% of personnel (Knarr, *et al*., 2014 p. 47). Moreover, the eighteen month-long study found that officers perceived that "leadership, training, morale, and personnel turbulence affect unit performance much more than the proportion of women. Hence, omen were readily accepted, particularly when commanders accepted them and the participants felt ARTEPs measured essential job performance."

The second study, *Women Content in the Army REFORGER*, (Johnson *et al*.1978,) examined unit performance during field exercises in conjunction with the annual Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER) exercise. The study included combat support and combat service support units, specifically military police, signal, medical, maintenance, supply and transport units. Women made up approximately 10% of each unit. The study found that the presence of women had "negligible impact on unit performance."

As a third example, the 1992 Presidential Commission Report stated that, "Evidence does exist, however, regarding cohesion in non-combat aviation units with demanding missions that have become integrated. It shows that cohesion either remained at the same level as in the all-male unit or improved after entry into the unit". Shortly after the Presidential Commission issued its report, the General Accounting Office released its study of mixed gender units deployed in operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. In the Persian Gulf War women made up 7% of the nearly half-million US service members deployed. The study found that "Gender was not identified as an issue effecting cohesion." The report stated:

> The people we met with did not identify gender as a component or determinant of cohesion and generally considered bonding in mixed units to be as good as, and sometimes better, than in single-gender units (Report, 1991 p. 38)

In 1997 RAND conducted a study for the Secretary of Defense to assess the extent and effects of the integration of women into previously closed occupations that were opened in April 1993. Of particular interest was the impact on readiness and morale. The study found that:

> …gender differences alone did not appear to erode cohesion. Cohesion was reported high in units where people believed the command emphasised unity and the importance and necessity of all members and divisions [organisations] in accomplishing the mission. (Cited in Field, K. and Nagl J 2001) "Combat Roles for Women: A modest Proposal", *Parameters,* Summer 2001, 74-88).

The RAND study distinguished between task and social cohesion and discussed the relationship of each to performance, proving that:

> When people thought they performed well as a unit, they rated cohesion as high or medium. Medium raters did not necessarily see their situation as problematic. When social cohesion was low, but coupled with medium or high task cohesion, overall cohesion was rated medium. Only when both social and task cohesion were low did people rate overall cohesion as low. (Harrell & Miller pp. 58-59)

In the RAND study, in units without high cohesion, gender was reported as a secondary issue, though not as important as divisions based on work group or rank. The study determined that "When gender was perceived as having a negative effect, it was generally because gender is one way that people break into categories when conflict surfaces, because structure or organisational behaviour highlights gender differences, or because dating occurs within a unit." (Harrell & Miller pp. 58-59).

Finally, some RAND study participants cited the presence of women as raising the level of professional standards, with some participants admitting that "some now-abandoned types of social bonding between men were unprofessional and detracted from the work environment." (Harrell & Miller, 1994 p. 57).

In a meta-analysis of five studies, three of recent actions with US deployments, Rosen *et.al* reported a highly variable relationship between gender composition and group cohesion, ranging from nothing to rather strong. The five studies reviewed included combat service and combat support companies. All five studies measured horizontal cohesion, although they all used different methods, contributing to difficulties with comparisons (Rosen *et al.*, 1999 p. 37). Rosen et al. hypothesised that a range of factors could account for the differing results among the studies, including the size of the unit, the level of violence in theatre, leadership policies towards gender, and the individual soldier's support for the mission (Rosen, *et al.*, 1999 p. 37). The authors also concluded that "cohesion need not suffer if the culture of hypermasculinity is replaced with one of "ungendered professionalism" as the bond that holds unit members together" (Rosen, *at al.*, 1999 p. 332).

It appears that nothing has yet been published based on research conducted during the large scale US military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan that followed 9/11. Though women were still banned from assignment to many combat positions during this time, many were 'attached' and so still participated in action in combat (Knarr, *et al.*, 2014 p. 49). These cases may provide some valuable insights into the potential impact of cohesion on gender integration, although with the lack of systemic research on this subject such evidence from Afghanistan and Iraq remains anecdotal. However, the 'attachment' rather than the assignment of women to combat units still sent a clear message to all that the target occupation (military combat) was a gendered occupation, which would affect the relationship of attached women to the unit.

This assessment of the potential impact of gender integration on cohesion in SOF teams began with the recognition that cohesion is a complex phenomenon that is not yet well understood or fully studied. Consideration and study of the impact of gender integration on cohesion in SOF elite units must take into account both social and task cohesion. High levels of task cohesion appear to be the most highly correlated with performance and seem to enable higher levels of social cohesion.

The 2010 RAND study on cohesion provided a list of factors that are known to contribute to cohesion. These include "propinquity (spatial and temporal proximity…); shared group membership…; attitude similarity; success experiences…; shared threat…; leadership and training" (MacCoun & Hix, 1977 p. 155). Leadership is emphasised as particularly important, with leadership ranging from the institutional to the local level. This links the discussion back to vertical cohesion, a

dimension of cohesion addressed only briefly here. Leadership is responsible for the development of policies such as those found on recently integrated Navy ships, in which junior male sailors were instructed to "stay away from the women", as well as separate berthing which exacerbated divisions along gender lines. As "…both official and unofficial information use to be communicated in berthing areas, either verbally or by posting notices" female sailors often found themselves lacking key job-related information when information was not posted in their area or males were reluctant to enter their berthing area (Harrell and Miller p. 63). Such unintended consequences were reported with the Canadian forces as well, in which an interview respondent reported that:

> Women had a detrimental effect on combat effectiveness. However, this was not the fault of the women themselves, but were self-imposed by the military through administration problem and separate facilities for women (toilets and showers), which illustrated women's "differences" and ascribed a separate status to women. Since the initial difficulties, problems with mixed-sex units on field exercise have dissipated (Cnossen, quoted in Knarr *et al*., 2014 p. 50).

Attitudes towards integration by individual team members and within the overall organisation can impact cohesiveness. In groups, and especially in small groups, where high social cohesion among the majority members excludes members of a newly integrated demographic, overall group cohesion is likely to be lower, especially if exclusionary and boundary-heightening behaviours related to tokenism appear (Yoder & Berendsen p. 33).

Cohesion is a complex and poorly understood phenomenon, yet one that is posited to be at the core of a group's ability to perform as a high-performing team. There appears to be general agreement in the research community on the distinction between task cohesion and social cohesion, and the orthogonal dimension of vertical cohesion reflecting the importance of leadership. There also is agreement (although contested by some such as Wong) that task cohesion demonstrably contributes to high performance, and social cohesion does not. It is possible that high social cohesion can contribute to negative performance with the emergence of groupthink and the potentially dangerous behaviours that can emerge from hypermasculine and other hyper-cohesive environments. Although the military is a gendered occupation, the pervasiveness of hypermasculinity and its associated negative consequences in military units is still uncertain.

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3.5   Organisational Culture

It is true that gender/sex distinction and cohesion are variables to be considered in allowing women to serve in certain positions or units, but the critical change in special operations forces organisations will come when definitions of gender-appropriate behaviour change in organisational culture (Knarr *et al.,* 2014 p. ix). A group's culture is its frame of reference, its understanding of what in its environment is important to it, and how it should engage with those elements (Knarr, *et al.*, 2014 p. 66).

As already discussed, gender is a set of valued behaviours associated with sex or biologically defined categories. Thus, gender is a cultural category – part of an organisation's frame of reference, its understanding of what in its environment is important to it, and how it should engage with those elements. This is the organisation's culture, the shared understanding among members of that organisation of the work environment, including common assumptions and beliefs of its members. Although culture is expressed through behaviour and embodied in artifacts, its locus is in the members' values and attitudes which drive their behaviour and imbue the artifacts with meaning (Schein, 1990 pp. 109-119).

Social organisations are dynamic, complex, quasi-open systems, constantly evolving through exchanges of information, personnel and other elements with their environment (Schein, 1990 pp. 109-119). Organisational culture change is a term used for an integrated, deliberate organisational change programme usually focused around an externally stimulated, discontinuous change such as the issuance of the policy on mixed gender. Although the ultimate target of culture change efforts is a change in behaviour, the actual target is the values and attitudes of the members of the organisation. These values and attitudes are expressed through (i.e. guide and constrain) behaviour (Demers, 2007).

For successful organisational culture change, it is imperative that senior leadership establish a clear and strong vision of the "changed organisation," and empower members of the organisation to support the new vision through the provision of policies, procedures and other organisational mechanisms. Leadership down through the ranks and across the organisation must subscribe to and support the new values, appropriately rewarding inclusionary behaviours and punishing exclusionary behaviours such as sexual harassment and gender discrimination (Kotter & Heskett, 1992).

Development of the new policy on mixed gender special operation forces requires a clear and persuasive description of a force that is benefiting from and can provide benefit to the females on the teams. Leadership at all levels must commit to the potentially years-long effort to change the values and attitudes related to the gender identity of the special operator.

Strong proponents of the "organisational culture" camp see an organisation's culture as an emergent phenomenon, a product that emerges from the interaction among members of the organisation. The organisation's culture thus exists only as the participants engage; the environment for that engagement is created *by* the engagement. This is a recursive model of the phenomenon of culture – the culture is created by the engagement, and simultaneously forms the environment for that engagement. As anthropologist Clifford Geertz put it, cultural systems thus become both models of behaviour and models for behaviour (Geertz 1973 p. 93).

Proponents of an "organisational climate" perspective, embodied in the theory put forth by Kurt Lewin, argue for an analytical separation between the organisation and the participant (Lewin, 1951). The organisation exists separate from the participant, and provides an analytically describable and persistent environment for engagement. It is important to note that this does not require that the organisation—the environment-creator—have objective status, i.e. be something that could be touched or seen. The "organisation" for proponents of Lewin's theory can consist of power relationships or rules for social engagement, as well as the physical plant. For advocates of this approach, changes in the attitudes, values and behaviour of the participants are a function of changes in the environment—but those changes in the participants do not (necessarily) change the environment. And the environment—the organisation—has existential status (an existence) that continues as given individuals move in and out (Martin, 2003 pp. 1-49).

Most definitions of organisational culture take neither the radical post-modern position of complete emergence as described by the "culture" part of the culture/climate debate, nor the organisation-as-separate-from-participant position required by other theory, but rather find a more moderate spot between the two. This is true of Schein's definition that:

> An organisation's culture can be thought of as: 1) A pattern of basic assumptions, 2) invented, discovered, or developed by a given group, 3) as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, 4) that has worked well enough to be considered valid and,

therefore 5) is to be taught to new members as the 6) correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems. The strength and degree of integration of a culture is, therefore, a function of the stability of the group, the length of time the group has existed, the intensity of the group's experiences of learning, the mechanisms by which the learning has taken place, i.e. positive reinforcement or avoidance conditioning, and the strength and clarity of the assumptions held by the founders and leaders of the group (Schein p. 7).

Schein's definition of organisational culture embodies concepts from both the organisational culture and organisational climate camps. His definition has participants within the organisation engaging partially within an environment provided for them ("taught to new members") and partially created by them ("invented, discovered, or developed by a given group"). Schein's approach thus allows the engagement among participants to create values (including the exclusionary ones that are called prejudices, leading to discriminatory behaviour, as well as inclusionary ones leading to integration) as well as allowing those same participants to adopt values that are provided to them through policies and procedures, and by other participants.

Schein's definition is predicated on the assumption that a social organisation is a complex, quasi-open system (Schein, 116). To characterise a social organisation as a quasi-open system is to recognise that there always is some exchange with the environment (people move in and out of the organisation, information is constantly being exchanged with other organisations) although there are some aspects of the organisation that may be characterised as remaining relatively constant. The military has a structure, for example, that endures over time, and a set of attitudes and beliefs held by its participants that may give it a recognizable character. However, as the military interacts with civilian society and with more formal institutions such as parliament, it either changes organically or is forced to change through Executive Order or law. Levels of approval of women in combat differs significantly between the civilian public and (parts of) the military. The recent opening of combat and special operations forces space is a requirement for the military to fully align its values in this area with those of the general public.

Schein also saw organisations as complex systems. To characterise a social organisation as complex is to recognise that it operates simultaneously on multiple timescales and different geographic scales, with interlocking relationships of authority – and all the

interdependencies these scales and relationships require. For example, strategy in the military is formulated on much longer time horizons than tactical actions and the relationships of the theater special operations commands (TSOCs) with their relevant geographic combatant command. Complex systems also are dynamic systems. They never reach equilibrium (what does "organisational stability" really mean?). The military is always changing. Policies in force today are abandoned tomorrow, and new ones (such as the inclusion of women in special operations forces) emerge. The complexity of the organisational system also means that it is nonlinear—small changes in initial conditions may yield large changes in the nature of the system. It is quite possible that a change in policy, such as that which requires certain positions to be open to women when they were not previously, can have significant unintended consequences as it reverberates through the organisation. Although there are steps that can be taken to guide the organisational change, the complex nature of social organisations means that any change is highly unlikely to occur at the pace and in the manner in which leadership wish.

The attitudes and values or the frames of reference which comprise an organisation's cultural complex are produced through interaction amongst the individuals in a group and its external environment and expressed through policy and procedure documents, training, and in other ways, but cannot be observed. As Schein said, "the essence of a culture lies in the pattern of basic underlying assumptions, and after you understand those, you can easily understand the other, more surface levels and deal appropriately with them" (Schein, 2010 p. 32). Indeed, the subconscious assumptions may be "the most elusive yet powerful layer of culture…" (Bunch, 2007 p. 149). Not only are these underlying assumptions difficult to consciously identify, they are the most difficult aspects of culture to change. These often are assumptions related to power, to definitions of community, to time, to personhood and the like. Most participants cannot articulate these underlying concepts – yet they act in accordance with them and can exhibit reactions including anger, fear and hostility if the assumptions are violated. Definitions of gender, for example, are highly tied up with personal identity. Gendered occupations speak to personal identity, so efforts to de-gender an occupation can feel very threatening to those in the occupation's defining gender.

The final conclusion contains two cautions. First, given the distributed nature of gender-related behaviours, it is likely that there are male special operators that already bring "feminine-associated" skills to the team and these behaviours are ones that already contribute to some mission success. Second, even the distributional nature of these

behaviours, not all women will exhibit them, and some of the women may exhibit strongly masculine behaviours. It would be highly counterproductive both for team morale and for team performance to designate certain types of missions as "women's missions." As with all activities, special operations teams must find the best team member for the particular task. That said, it is possible that mixed-sex teams will add new depth to certain gender-associated behaviours that could contribute effectively to all SOF missions.

The empowerment of members of the organisation to support the new vision through the provision of policies, procedures and other organisational mechanisms is important. Leadership down through the ranks must be willing to support the incorporation of females but discourage the development of the "female special operator" in favour of a cadre of "special operators." Leadership must appropriately reward inclusionary behaviours and punish exclusionary behaviours such as sexual harassment and gender discrimination. Note that gender discrimination could be negative – females assigned to "feminine" jobs such as negotiation or advising, and away from masculine activities such as direct action—or positive—females given special attention simply because they are female and not because of performance.

3.6   Analogous Units

This sub-unit reviewed research and lessons from non-military and other military organisations on how they have integrated, tried to integrate, or are integrating women into their combat, combat-like, or analogous elite team formations. As such, it seeks answer to the question: What research has been conducted and what lessons can we learn from others (and apply to special operations forces) who have tried to form, formed, or are forming, mixed-gender elite teams?

Knarr *et al* (2014 p. x) looked at occupations whose mission or performance space haveaspects analogous to those found on special operations forces missions. All the research on mixed-gender teams in environments analogous to those in which special operations forces will operate must be heavily caveated. The team's internal dynamics are only one element in a very complex system including variables ranging from the natural (the environment) to the human (adversaries, allies, institutions, and the like) that will influence the team's ability to perform its mission. The small number of analogous teams presents problems for the extensibility of the findings to special operations forces. Furthermore, the number of women who qualified for those teams and who will be able to pass selection for special operations forces teams is

going to be extremely small, further compromising the extensibility of research findings.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) performed extensive research over the years on team composition, looking for the optimal conformation for long-duration space flight (for trips to Mars, for example). NASA participates in research conducted at a research station on Devon Island in northern Canada where the Mars Society, a private non-profit organisation, has created a simulated habitat and where researchers can conduct fairly controlled experiments (Bishop *et al.*, 2010 pp. 1353-1367). NASA's researchers also studied polar expeditions and parties overwintering in Antarctic research stations (Leon, 2005 pp. B84-B88). In addition to using NASA's studies, this sub-unit looked at other material on polar expeditions (both Arctic and Antarctic) and overwintering parties (Kahn & Leon, 1994 pp. 669-697).

There is some research on gender and performance available on high-altitude mountaineering teams and Himalayan trekking teams. All-female and mixed-sex teams are relatively new in Himalayan mountaineering, and have received some special attention (Kramer and Drinkwater, 1980 pp. 93-99). There is a small body of literature on the performance of females on offshore oil rigs which treats the rigs as a strongly masculine (gendered) occupation and explores women's performance in these environments (Ely & Meyerson, 2010 pp. 3-34).

Women's achievements in these gendered occupations demonstrate that there are women –albeit much fewer than the number of men – who are physically able to manage the tasks, have the mental fortitude required, and will take the personal and family risks necessary to succeed at what had historically been considered male-only activities. How they accomplish the tasks and whether those methods are different from those of their male counterparts remain to be determined. Knarr *et al* (2014 p. x) showed, although caveated by sample size and the difficulties of isolating gender as an independent variable, that males and females exhibit somewhat different strategies for coping with stress, and that males tend to be more competitive than females.

However, the mix of genders on teams did not appear to be a defining variable in team performance in any of the cases examined in the literature. It became obvious that very few militaries and law enforcement agencies have integrated women into mixed-gender elite teams, and for those that have, very little information is available to the public; hence, Knarr *et al* (2014) used interviews to obtain that information. Interviews were performed with members of existing Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams in the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI), Canadian Special Operations Forces (CANSOF), and the Smokejumpers, an elite group of forest fire fighters. Two of the organisations (FBI SWAT and Smokejumpers) have had mixed-gender teams for decades. CANSOF has recently integrated. In no case did respondents report that performance was compromised because of females on the teams. All emphasised the importance of gender-neutral selection standards, and the absence of quotas. Some respondents mentioned incidents of sexual harassment, although in all cases, the women involved dealt with them quickly. Finally, although there were reports of early female recruits to the FBI and Smokejumpers feeling effects of tokenism (such as increased scrutiny), these effects have generally proved transient and today the teams are functional and appear comfortable with mixed-gender composition.

SELF- ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

1.   How and why does tokenism emerge in mixed gender operations teams? How can tokenism be eradicated in such teams?
2.   As the Nigerian Chief of Defence Staff, will you recommend the integration of women in special operation missions embarked on by Nigerian soldiers? Why?

4.0   CONCLUSION

There are a number of factors that affect team dynamics such as gender/sex conflation, leadership, working conditions, attitudes of team members towards gender integration, and organisational/culture pressures. However, existing literature does not support the contention that special operations forces mixed-gender elite teams cannot effectively accomplish special operations forces mission objectives.

In the long term, the inclusion of females on special operations forces elite teams is about building mission-capable teams. The review of analogous teams showed mixed-gender teams performing effectively in high-stress, austere environments similar in dimensions to those special operations forces will face. Again the number of mixed-gender teams available for review was very, very small, and there are difficulties isolating gender as an independent variable. Although research showed the desired future is possible, there are areas to which special operations forces leadership will need to attend as gender integration goes forward.

Recognising the differences between sex and gender is critical to successful integration. For integration to be successful, all operators must be engaged on the basis of actual, not expected capability. Females must not be assigned to particular jobs or kept away from others on the

basis of their femaleness, only on the basis of capability. Also, quotas which require accommodation of females who may be of lesser capability than males will create tokens. In this case, the females will likely experience ostracism, role typing and hostility by way of tokenism. As much as possible, enhanced scrutiny of females and their units should be avoided.

Team cohesion is as much about the dynamics of men working with and for women (and the associated changes in conceptions of gender identity that entails) as it is about women working with and for men. Assessment and selection criteria may need to consider the willingness and aptitude of candidates working in a mixed-gender environment. This will help minimise the potential sex- and gender-harassment. Maturity of the force and a focus on professionalism are key to mitigating adverse team dynamics, including sexual assault.

Changing conceptions of gender identity and any values or attitudes that preclude females from being perceived as full players must start with a strong vision of a force enhanced and improved through integration. Leadership at all levels is critical to changing organisational values. Leadership must recognise that it has indirect or no control over many of the individuals who hold the values it seeks to change, and must work through others to influence them. Finally, leadership must realise that the complex, dynamic nature of social organisations means that there will be unintended negative consequences of many actions taken for all the right reasons. Organisational culture change can take decades and can be a very difficult process.

Sustaining a professional force through the promulgation and support of mission-validated, gender-neutral standards will be critical to the integration of the special operations forces elite teams. If this professionalisation is supported by a clear and compelling vision of a gender-integrated force constructed around improved professional capability, special operations forces missions will begin the journey towards gender-integrated, fully effective elite teams.

5.0   SUMMARY

Special operations forces mixed-gender elite teams should be constructed and managed within an environment that will allow them to function professionally and accomplish the wide variety of missions encountered by these teams. To increase the likelihood of this happening the organisation should develop and promulgate a clear vision of a force improved through the inclusion of females on special operations forces mixed-gender elite teams. The organisation should separate successful

mission performance from the presentation of gendered behaviours or attributes. Do not allow gender-defined behaviours to dominate team dynamics. Focus on validated performance standards and mission requirements. Take advantage of the skill-sets women are more likely than men to bring to the table; but exploit those attributes when found in any special operations forces personnel. Recognise that sexual harassment and gender discrimination may happen: work to actively prevent it through de-gendering activities and inculcation of respect for full-performing professionals. Shape and mature the future force through training, education, and policy development. Prepare for the long term; the effort may take as long as a decade or more; there may be initial transitory negative responses—be prepared to manage them.

The maturity of the force as expressed through their professionalism and respect for qualified operators regardless of gender will be key to mitigating adverse gender-related team dynamics. The special operations community needs to evolve to a culture where there are no female special operators—where all qualified team members are known as special operators, a gender-free term referring to a member of an elite team. All special operations forces leadership must be involved in this change, recognizing that full acceptance of females on any and all teams may be as far away as ten years in the future. Leadership must be prepared for problems in the short term—but there is no reason to believe that the force cannot look forward to long-term institutional success.

6.0   TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

You are the Nigerian Chief of Defence Staff. The President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces has asked you to do a memorandum to him on how you will organise a special operations forces team to go to Sambisa Forest, identify and eliminate Abubakar Shekau, the leader of the Boko Haram terrorist group. Explain in the memo the composition of the team and why and how you selected them. Will you include female members in your team? Why? What strategy will you adopt to ensure a successful mission?

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MODULE 6

Unit 1   Meaning, Theorists and Strategic Models of Guerrilla Warfare
Unit 2   Tactics and Organisation of Guerrilla Warfare
Unit 3   Other Aspects of Guerrilla Warfare
Unit 4   Counter-Guerrilla Warfare

UNIT 1   MEANING, THEORISTS AND STRATEGIC MODELS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE

CONTENTS

1.0   Introduction
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1.0   INTRODUCTION

Groups now, as before, make use of guerrilla models in warfare, and these models are of interest to military intelligence. Guerrilla warfare is a form of unconventional warfare compared with contemporary warfare. It comprises mostly small group of fighters that aim to achieve more of political goal than winning the more equipped army of its enemy. However, even conventional armies do apply guerrilla war tactics as the situation demands. The strategic models, tactics and organisation of guerrilla warfare differ from those of conventional wars. There are other aspects of guerrilla warfare, which we shall see in this unit that are not part of conventional warfare. There are developed counter-guerrilla warfare that an enemy faced with guerrillas can apply to fight in order to defeat guerrillas.

2.0   OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
- explain strategic models of guerrilla warfare, namely: the classic three-phase Maoist model and the more fragmented contemporary pattern
- explain the tactics and tactical operations and organisation of guerrilla warfare
- describe the guerrillas' use of surprise and intelligence, their relationship with the civilian population, their use of terror and penchant to withdraw from battle in the face of superior fire power
- explain how guerrillas organise their logistics, how they source foreign support and resort to sanctuaries
- explain guerrilla initiative and combat intensity.

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3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Meaning of Guerrilla Warfare

The main strategy and tactics of guerrilla warfare tend to involve the use of a small attacking, mobile force against a large, unwieldy force. The guerrilla force is largely or entirely organised in small units that are dependent on the support of the local population. Tactically, the guerrilla army makes the repetitive attacks far from the opponent's center of gravity with a view to keeping its own casualties to a minimum and imposing a constant debilitating strain on the enemy. This may provoke the enemy into a brutal, excessively destructive response which will both anger their own supporters and increase support for the guerrillas, ultimately compelling the enemy to withdraw. The Boko Haram insurgents and the Fulani Herdsmen fighters in Nigeria apply guerrilla warfare strategy as they do not boldly face the Nigerian Armed Forces but do pin-prick attacks that frustrate the army and prolong the victory of the army.

An insurgency, or what Mao Zedong referred to as a war of revolutionary nature, guerrilla warfare can be conceived of as part of a continuum (Mao Zedong, 1937). On the low end are small-scale raids, ambushes and attacks. In ancient times these actions were often associated with smaller tribal bands fighting a larger empire, as in the struggle of Rome against the Spanish tribes for over a century. In the modern era they continue with the operations of insurgent, revolutionary and terrorist groups. The upper end is composed of a fully integrated

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political-military strategy, comprising both large and small units, engaging in constantly shifting mobile warfare, both on the low-end "guerrilla" scale, and that of large, mobile formations with modern arms.

The latter phase came to its fullest expression in the operations of Mao Zedong in China and Võ Nguyên Giáp in Vietnam. In between are a large variety of situations – from the wars waged against Israel by Palestinian irregulars in the contemporary era, to Spanish and Portuguese irregulars operating with the conventional units of British General Wellington, during the Peninsular War against Napoleon (*Encyclopaedia Britannica*).

Modern insurgencies and other types of warfare may include guerrilla warfare as part of an integrated process, complete with sophisticated doctrine, organisation, specialist skills and propaganda capabilities. Guerrillas can operate as small, scattered bands of raiders, but they can also work side by side with regular forces, or combine for far ranging mobile operations in squad, platoon or battalion sizes, or even form conventional units. Based on their level of sophistication and organisation, they can shift between all these modes as the situation demands. Successful guerrilla warfare is flexible, not static.

3.2   Theorists of Guerrilla Warfare

Mao Zedong, during the Chinese Civil War, summarised the People's Liberation Army's principles of Revolutionary Warfare in the following points for his troops: The enemy advances, we retreat. The enemy camps, we harass. The enemy tires, we attack. The enemy retreats, we pursue. A common slogan of the time went thus: "Draw back your fist before you strike." This referred to the tactic of baiting the enemy, "drawing back the fist", before "striking" at the critical moment where they are overstretched and vulnerable. Mao made a distinction between mobile warfare (yundong zhan) and guerrilla warfare (youji zhan), but they were part of an integrated continuum aiming towards a final objective. Mao's (1937) seminal work, "On Guerrilla Warfare" has been widely distributed and applied, successfully in Vietnam, under military leader and theorist Võ Nguyên Giáp. Giap's "Peoples War, People's Army" closely follows the Maoist three-stage approach.

T. E. Lawrence, best known as "Lawrence of Arabia", introduced a theory of guerrilla warfare tactics in an article he wrote for the *Encyclopædia Britannica* published in 1938. In that article, he compared guerrilla fighters to a gas. The fighters disperse in the area of operations more or less randomly. They or their cells occupy a very small intrinsic space in that area, just as gas molecules occupy a very small intrinsic

space in a container. The fighters may coalesce into groups for tactical purposes, but their general state is dispersed. Such fighters cannot be "rounded up." They cannot be contained. They are extremely difficult to "defeat" because they cannot be brought to battle in significant numbers. The cost in soldiers and material to destroy a significant number of them becomes prohibitive, in all senses that is physically, economically, and morally. Lawrence describes a non-native occupying force as the enemy (such as the Turks).

Lawrence wrote down some of his theories while ill and unable to fight the Turks in his book *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom*. There, he reviews Carl von Clausewitz and other theorists of war, and finds their writings inapplicable to his situation. The Arabs could not defeat the Turks in pitched battle since they were individualistic warriors not disciplined soldiers used to fight in large formations.

So, instead Lawrence proposed if possible never meeting the enemy, thus giving their soldiers nothing to shoot at, unable to control anything except what ground their rifles could point to. Meanwhile, Lawrence and the Arabs could ride camels into and out of the desert, attacking railroad lines and isolated outposts with impunity, avoiding the heavily garrisoned positions and cities.

One of the main guerrilla strategists was the Berber leader Abd el-Krim who fought both Spanish and French armies in the Rif Mountains in North Africa during the beginning of the 20th century. His guerrilla tactics are known to have inspired Ho Chi Minh, Mao Zedong, and Che Guevara. Guevara, an Argentinean revolutionary, wrote extensively on guerrilla warfare and stressed the revolutionary potential of the guerrillas in the following words:

The guerrilla band is an armed nucleus, the fighting vanguard of the people. It draws its great force from the mass of the people themselves. The guerrilla band is not to be considered inferior to the army against which it fights simply because it is inferior in fire power. Guerrilla warfare is used by the side which is supported by a majority but which possesses a much smaller number of arms for use in defense against oppression (Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, 1960).

The fullest expression of the Indonesian army's founding doctrines is found in Abdul Haris Nasution's 1953, *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare*. The work is a mix of reproduced strategic directives from 1947-8, Nasution's theories of guerrilla warfare, his reflections on the period just past (post-Japanese occupation) and the likely crises to come, and outlines of his legal frameworks for military justice and "guerrilla

government". The work contains similar principles to those espoused or practised by other theorists and practitioners from Michael Collins in Ireland, T. E. Lawrence in the Middle East and Mao in China in the early Twentieth Century, to contemporary insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq. Nasution willingly shows his influences, frequently referring to some guerrilla activities as "Wingate" actions, quoting Lawrence and drawing lessons from the recent and further past to develop and illustrate his well-thought out arguments. Where the work substantially differs from other theorist/practitioners is that General Nasution was one of the few men to have led both a guerrilla and a counter-guerrilla war. This dual perspective on the realities of "people's war" leaves the work refreshingly free of the dogmatic hyperbole and ideological contortions of similar revolutionary works from the period and manages to be both brutally direct in the methods it espouses and jarringly honest about the terrible price revolutionary guerrilla war exacts on everyone involved or affected, the civilian population most of all.

Guerrilla tactics were summarised into the Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla in 1969 by Carlos Marighella. The text has been banned in many countries, but remains in print and on bookshelves in several others, including the United States. According to Lenny Frank junior, Marighella's booklet was considered the bible of the Baader-Meinhof Gang, among many other left-wing terror groups. Unfortunately for them, and as Lenny Frank points out, much of the book was fatally flawed. Basic assumptions about how the public would react to Marighella's tactics, and how some of these tactics would work in an urban environment, proved to be exactly wrong. Junior proto-terrorists interested in starting their own revolutionary groups based on the Marighella's tactics would be wise to steer clear: it did not work in the early seventies and it is less likely to work now.

John Keats wrote about an American guerrilla leader in World War II: Colonel Wendell Fertig, who in 1942 organised a large guerrilla force which harassed the Japanese occupation forces on the Philippine Island of Mindanao all the way up to the liberation of the Philippines in 1945. His abilities were later utilised by the United States Army, when Fertig helped found the United States Army Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

3.3   Strategic Models of Guerrilla Warfare

3.3.1   The Classic Three-Phase Maoist Model

In China, the Maoist Theory of People's War divides warfare into three phases. In Phase One, the guerrillas earn the population's support by

distributing propaganda and attacking the organs of government. In Phase Two, escalating attacks are launched against the government's military forces and vital institutions. In Phase Three, conventional warfare and fighting are used to seize cities, overthrow the government, and assume control of the country. Mao's doctrine anticipated that circumstances may require shifting between phases in either directions and that the phases may not be uniform and evenly paced throughout the countryside. Some authors have stressed this interchangeability of phases inherent in this model and guerrilla warfare more generally, especially as applied by the North Vietnamese guerrilla (Jakopovich, 2008).

SELF- ASSESSMENT EXERCISE
Describe in your own words the classic three-phase Maoist model of guerrilla warfare.

3.3.2   The More Fragmented Contemporary Pattern

The classical Maoist model requires a strong, unified guerrilla group and a clear objective. However, some contemporary guerrilla warfare may not follow this template at all, and might encompass vicious ethnic strife, religious fervor, and numerous small, "freelance" groups operating independently with little overarching structure. These patterns do not fit easily into neat phase-driven categories, or formal three-echelon structures (Main Force regulars, Regional fighters, part-time Guerrillas) as in the People's Wars of Asia.

Some jihadist guerrilla attacks for example, may be driven by a generalised desire to restore a reputed golden age of earlier times, with little attempt to establish a specific alternative political regime in a specific place. The Boko Haram terrorists in Nigeria, for instance, are driven by the desire for the populace to eschew western education. They have no facility to take over the government of Nigeria, but concentrate their activities only in the northeastern part of Nigeria. Ethnic attacks likewise may remain at the level of bombings, assassinations, or genocidal raids as a matter of avenging some perceived slight or insult, rather than a final shift to conventional warfare as in the Maoist formulation (Kilcullen, 2006).

Environmental conditions such as increasing urbanisation, and the easy access to information and media attention also complicate the contemporary scene. Guerrillas need not conform to the classic rural fighter helped by cross-border sanctuaries in a confined nation or region, (as in Vietnam) but now include vast networks of peoples bound by religion and ethnicity stretched across the globe (Hoffman, 2007).

Today, Boko Haram uses Western technology to make videos of its activities and post in a website designed with Western technology. They fight simultaneously in Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon without using any of these states as sanctuaries in the primitive cocoon. Before the US and allied forces defeated the Islamic State of Iran and Syria (ISIS), the terrorist group was able to recruit followers from countries far away from its base in Iraq and was able to conduct operations in places as far as France, the US etc.

4.0   CONCLUSION

In this unit we studied the intricacies of the strategies of Guerrilla Warfare, namely the classic three-phase Maoist model and the more fragmented contemporary model. We saw the early theorist, how their thought influenced the development of guerrilla warfare for a long time, and how latter thinkers were able to vary and modernise the older theories.

5.0   SUMMARY

Here, we saw the meaning and concept of guerrilla warfare, the development of guerrilla warfare theories, the shifting modalities of guerrilla warfare and the strategic models of guerrilla warfare. Of interest were the classic three-phase Maoist model and the more fragmented contemporary pattern. In particular, we learnt that guerrillas can use conventional war strategies just like conventional armies do use guerrilla warfare strategy when it suits them.

6.0   TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1.   Do you think that the Boko Haram and the Fulani Herdsmen fighters in Nigeria follow the classic three-phase Maoist Model of guerrilla warfare?
2.   What are the more fragmented contemporary patterns of guerrilla warfare and how are they different or derivable from the classic three-phase Maoist model of guerrilla warfare.

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**UNIT 2   TACTICS AND ORGANISATION OF GUERRILLA
WARFARE**

CONTENTS

1.0   INTRODUCTION

This unit is concerned with the tactics and organisation of guerrilla
warfare. It considers the type of tactical operations adopted by guerrillas
and their organisational formats. On organisational format, the unit
examines issues of surprise and intelligence, guerrillas' relationship with
the civil population, the guerrillas' use of terror and withdrawal. It also
clarifies issues such as withdrawal, logistics, terrain, foreign support and
sanctuaries and guerrilla initiative and combat intensity.

2.0   OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
- describe tactics, including the type of tactical operation and
  organisational models employed by guerrillas in warfare
- explain how guerrillas use surprise and intelligence to rattle the
  conventional armies facing them
- describe how guerrillas cash in on the sentiment and support of
  the local, civil population to enhance their warfare and how the
  guerrillas can lose this support if they make tactical maneuvers
  that irk the civil population
- describe how the guerrillas achieve their aim by adopting
  surrender tactics, by way of withdrawing from battle in the face
  of superior fire power, and later re-grouping, re-planning and re-
  launching attacks
- explain how logistics, terrain and foreign support and sanctuaries
  aid the success of guerrillas and generally the guerrilla initiative
  and combat intensity.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Tactics

Guerrilla warfare is distinguished from the small unit tactics used in screening or reconnaissance operations typical of conventional forces. It is also different from the activities of pirates or robbers. Such criminal groups may use guerrilla-like tactics, but their primary purpose is immediate material gain, and not a political objective.

Guerrilla tactics are based on intelligence, ambush, deception, sabotage, and espionage, undermining an authority through long, low-intensity confrontation. It can be quite successful against an unpopular foreign or local regime, as demonstrated by the Cuban Revolution, Afghanistan War and Vietnam War. A guerrilla army may increase the cost of maintaining an occupation or a colonial presence above what the foreign power may wish to bear. Against a local regime, the guerrilla fighters may make governance impossible with terror strikes and sabotage, and even combination of forces to depose their local enemies in conventional battle. These tactics are useful in demoralising an enemy, while raising the morale of the guerrillas. In many cases, guerrilla tactics allow a small force to hold off a much larger and better equipped enemy for a long time, as in Russia's Second Chechen War and the Second Seminole War fought in the swamps of Florida (United States of America). Guerrilla tactics and strategy are summarised below and are discussed extensively in standard reference works such as Mao's *On Guerrilla Warfare*.

Guerrilla operations typically include a variety of strong surprise attacks on transportation routes, individual groups of police or military, installations and structures, economic enterprises, and targeted civilians. Attacking in small groups, using camouflage and often captured weapons of that enemy, the guerrilla force can constantly keep pressure on its foes and diminish its numbers, while still allowing escape with relatively few casualties. The intention of such attacks is not only military but political, aiming to demoralise target populations or governments, or goading an overreaction that forces the population to take sides for or against the guerrillas. Examples range from the chopping off of limbs in various internal African rebellions, to the

suicide attacks in Israel and Sri Lanka, to sophisticated maneuvers by Viet Cong forces against military bases and formations.

Whatever the particular tactic used, the guerrilla primarily lives to fight another day, and to expand or preserve his forces and political support, not capture or holding specific blocks of territory as a conventional force would. Ambushes on key transportation routes are a hallmark of guerrilla operations, causing both economic and political disruption. Careful planning is required for operations, indicated here by Viet Cong preparation of the withdrawal route. In this case the Viet Cong assault was broken up by American aircraft and firepower. However, the Viet Cong did destroy several vehicles and the bulk of the main Viet Cong force escaped. As in most of the Vietnam War, American forces would eventually leave the area, but the insurgents would regroup and return afterwards. This time dimension is also integral to guerrilla tactics (Cash *et al*., 1985). This is similar to the tactics of the Boko Haram insurgency operations in Nigeria. The insurgents hardly face the Nigerian forces in battle. Rather, the insurgents will retreat in the face of battle, regroup and attach army camp when the soldiers are lax. The insurgents will attach transport route and vulnerable villages. Each time the government announces that the insurgency have been defeated, the insurgents will regroup and bomb one target or the other.

3.2   Organisation

Guerrilla warfare resembles rebellion, yet it is a different concept. Guerrilla organisation ranges from small, local rebel groups of a few dozen guerrillas, to thousands of fighters, deploying from cells to regiments. In most cases, the leaders have clear political aims for the warfare they wage. Typically, the organisation has political and military wings, to allow the political leaders "plausible denial" for military attacks. The most fully elaborated guerrilla warfare structure is by the Chinese and Vietnamese communists during the revolutionary wars of East and Southeast Asia (Lanning & Cragg, 2014 p. 59). A simplified example of this more sophisticated organisational type was used by revolutionary forces during the Vietnam War. Below are vital elements in the organisation of guerrilla warfare.

Surprise and Intelligence

For successful operations, surprise must be achieved by the guerrillas. If the operation has been betrayed or compromised it is usually called off immediately. Intelligence is also extremely important, and detailed knowledge of the target's dispositions, weaponry and morale is gathered before any attack. Intelligence can be harvested in several ways.

Collaborators and sympathisers will usually provide a steady flow of useful information. If working clandestinely, the guerrilla operative may disguise his membership in the insurgent operation, and use deception to ferret out needed data. Employment or enrollment as a student may be undertaken near the target zone, community organisations may be infiltrated, and even romantic relationships struck up as part of intelligence gathering (Lanning & Cragg, 2014 p. 59). Public sources of information are also invaluable to the guerrilla, from the flight schedules of targeted airlines, to public announcements of visiting foreign dignitaries, to Army Field Manuals. Modern computer access via the World Wide Web makes harvesting and collation of such data relatively easy. The use of on the spot reconnaissance is integral to operational planning. Operatives will "case" or analyse a location or potential target in depth- cataloguing routes of entry and exit, building structures, the location of phones and communication lines, presence of security personnel and a myriad of other factors. Finally, intelligence is concerned with political factors- such as the occurrence of an election or the impact of the potential operation on civilian and enemy morale.

Relationship with the Civil Population

Although a hostile civil population may contribute to the failure of guerrilla operation, guerrillas often find sympathy in the midst of the civil population, who, driven by favourable emotion, show support for the cause of the guerrilla fighters.

> Why does the guerrilla fighter fight? We must come to the inevitable conclusion that the guerrilla fighter is a social reformer, that he takes up arms responding to the angry protest of the people against their oppressors, and that he fights in order to change the social system that keeps all his unarmed brothers in ignominy and misery (Che Guevara).

Relationships with civilian populations are influenced by whether the guerrillas operate among a hostile or friendly population. A friendly population is of immense importance to guerrilla fighters, providing shelter, supplies, financing, intelligence and recruits. The "base of the people" is thus the key lifeline of the guerrilla movement. In the early stages of the Vietnam War, American officials "discovered that several thousand supposedly government-controlled "fortified hamlets" were in fact controlled by Viet Cong guerrillas, who "often used them for supply and rest haven" (*Encyclopedia Britannica*). Popular mass support in a confined local area or state however is not always strictly necessary. Guerrillas and revolutionary groups can still operate using the protection

of a friendly regime, drawing supplies, weapons, intelligence, local security and diplomatic cover.

An apathetic or hostile population makes life difficult for guerrillas and strenuous attempts are usually made to gain their support. These may involve not only persuasion, but a calculated policy of intimidation. Guerrilla forces may characterise a variety of operations as a liberation struggle, but this may or may not result in sufficient support from affected civilians. Other factors, including ethnic and religious hatreds, can make a simple national liberation claim untenable. Whatever the exact mix of persuasion or coercion used by guerrillas, relationship with civil populations is one of the most important factors in their success or failure.

Use of Terror

In some cases, the use of terrorism can be an aspect of guerrilla warfare. Terrorism is used to focus international attention on the guerrilla cause, kill opposition leaders, extort money from targets, intimidate the general population, create economic losses, and keep followers and potential defectors in line. As well, the use of terrorism can provoke the greater power to launch a disproportionate response, thus alienating a civilian population which might be sympathetic to the terrorists' cause. Such tactics may backfire and cause the civil population to withdraw its support, or to back countervailing forces against the guerrillas. Such situations occurred in Israel, where suicide bombings encouraged most Israeli opinion to take a harsh stand against Palestinian attackers, including general approval of "targeted killings" to kill enemy cells and leaders (David, 2002). In the Philippines and Malaysia, communist terror strikes helped turn civilian opinion against the insurgents. In Peru and some other countries, civilian opinion at times backed the harsh countermeasures used by governments against revolutionary or insurgent movements.

Withdrawal

The surrender tactics of warfare is often employed by guerrillas. Guerrillas must plan carefully for withdrawal once an operation has been completed, or if it is going badly. The withdrawal phase is sometimes regarded as the most important part of a planned action, and to get entangled in a lengthy struggle with superior forces is usually fatal to insurgent, terrorist or revolutionary operatives. Withdrawal is usually accomplished using a variety of different routes and methods and may include quickly scouring the area for loose weapons, evidence cleanup, and disguise as peaceful civilians (Mao Zedong, 1937).

Logistics

Guerrillas typically operate with a smaller logistical footprint compared to conventional formations; nevertheless, their logistical activities can be elaborately organised. A primary consideration is to avoid dependence on fixed bases and depots which are comparatively easy for conventional units to locate and destroy. Mobility and speed are the keys and wherever possible, the guerrilla must live off the land, or draw support from the civil population in which it is embedded. In this sense, "the people" become the guerrilla's supply base (Mao Zedong, 1937). Financing of both terrorist and guerrilla activities ranges from direct individual contributions (voluntary or non-voluntary), and actual operation of business enterprises by insurgent operatives, to bank robberies, kidnappings, cattle rustling as in the case of the Boko Haram insurgents in Nigeria and complex financial networks based on kin, ethnic and religious affiliation (such as that used by modern Jihadist/Jihad organisations).

Permanent and semi-permanent bases form part of the guerrilla logistical structure, usually located in remote areas or in cross-border sanctuaries sheltered by friendly regimes. These can be quite elaborate, as in the tough Viet Cong fortified base camps and tunnel complexes encountered by US forces during the Vietnam War. Their importance can be seen by the hard fighting sometimes engaged in by communist forces to protect these sites. However, when it became clear that defence was untenable, communist units typically withdrew without sentiment.

Terrain

Guerrilla warfare is often associated with a rural setting, and this is indeed the case with the definitive operations of Mao and Giap, the mujahadeen of Afghanistan, the Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres (EGP) of Guatemala, the Contras of Nicaragua, and the FMLN of El Salvador. Guerrillas however have successfully operated in urban settings as demonstrated in places like Argentina and Northern Ireland. In those cases, the guerrillas relied on a friendly population to provide supplies and intelligence. Rural guerrillas prefer to operate in regions providing plenty of cover and concealment, especially heavily forested and mountainous areas. Urban guerrillas, rather than melting into the mountains and forests, blend into the population and are also dependent on a support base among the people. Urban guerrillas may operate without uniform to avoid detection. Removing and destroying guerrillas out of both types of areas can be difficult.

Foreign Support and Sanctuaries

Foreign support in the form of soldiers, weapons, sanctuary, or statements of sympathy for the guerrillas is not strictly necessary, but it can greatly increase the chances of an insurgent victory (Lanning and Cragg). Foreign diplomatic support may bring the guerrilla cause to international attention, putting pressure on local opponents to make concessions, or garnering sympathetic support and material assistance. Foreign sanctuaries can add heavily to guerrilla chances, furnishing weapons, supplies, materials and training bases. Such shelter can benefit from international law, particularly if the sponsoring government is successful in concealing its support and in claiming "plausible denial" for attacks by operatives based in its territory.

The Viet Cong made extensive use of such international sanctuaries during their conflict, and the complex of trails, way-stations and bases sneaking through Laos and Cambodia, the famous Ho Chi Minh Trail, was the logistical lifeline that sustained their forces in the South. Also, the United States funded a revolution in Colombia in order to take the territory they needed to build the Panama Canal. Another case in point is the Mukti Bahini guerrilleros who fought alongside the Indian Army in the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971 against Pakistan that resulted in the creation of the state of Bangladesh. In the post-Vietnam era, the Al Qaeda organisation also made effective use of remote territories, such as Afghanistan under the Taliban regime, to plan and execute its operations.

Guerrilla Initiative and Combat Intensity

Able to choose the time and place to strike, guerrilla fighters will usually possess the tactical initiative and the element of surprise. Planning for an operation may take weeks, months or even years, with a constant series of cancellations and restarts as the situation changes (Lanning and Cragg). Careful rehearsals and "dry runs" are usually conducted to work out problems and details. Many guerrilla strikes are not undertaken unless clear numerical superiority can be achieved in the target area, a pattern typical of Viet Cong and other "Peoples War" operations. Individual suicide bomb attacks offer another pattern, typically involving only the individual bomber and his support team, but these too are spread or metered out based on prevailing capabilities and political winds.

Whatever approach is used, the guerrilla holds the initiative and can prolong his survival though varying the intensity of combat. This means that attacks are spread out over quite a range of time, from weeks to

years. During the interim periods, the guerrilla can rebuild, resupply and plan. In the Vietnam War, most communist units spent only a limited number of days a year fighting. While they might be forced into an unwanted battle by an enemy sweep, most of the time was spent in training, intelligence gathering, political and civic infiltration, propaganda, indoctrination, construction of fortifications, or stocking supply caches. The large numbers of such groups striking at different times however, gave the war its "around the clock" quality.

SELF- ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

In your own words and in your understanding, explain the difference in the organisation of a terrorist group and a guerrilla band.

4.0   CONCLUSION

In this unit, we studied the tactics and organisation of guerrilla warfare. We saw that the guerrilla warfare depends much on a hit and run tactic and carefully avoids face-to-face battles with conventional unit that are more in number and bear more sophisticated weapons. Again, we saw that guerrilla bands make use of surprises and intelligence and they rely on good relationship with civil population to thrive, just as adverse relationship with the civil population can hamper the success of guerrilla warfare. We saw how, through use of terror, withdrawal and effective logistics, guerrilla can pull a fast one on conventional unit and get away with a successful operation. Lastly, we saw that favourable terrain, foreign support and logistics, initiative and combat intensity help guerrillas gain victory in war.

5.0   SUMMARY

Here, we looked at the tactics and organisational models of guerrilla band and compared them with those of terrorist groups. We also saw that guerrillas can use conventional tactics, just as conventional teams can make use of guerrilla warfare—all as the situations permit.

6.0   TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Now that you have learnt that the Boko Haram insurgents and Fulani Herdsmen operating in Nigeria make use of guerrilla tactic and organisational models, do a memo to the National Security Adviser on ways to counter the insurgents and terrorists and win the war against them.

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UNIT 3   OTHER ASPECTS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE

CONTENTS

1.0   INTRODUCTION

In this unit we will study the aspects of guerrilla warfare that do not
pertain specifically to strategic models, tactics and organisation of
guerrilla warfare. The study in this unit rather deals with other aspects of
guerrilla warfare such as foreign and native regimes, ethical dimensions
and the laws of war.

2.0   OBJECTIVES
At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
- explain the other aspects of guerrilla warfare, such as foreign and
  native regimes, ethical dimensions and the laws of war.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Foreign and Native Regimes

Examples of successful guerrilla warfare against a native regime include
the Cuban Revolution and the Chinese Civil War, as well as the
Sandinista Revolution which overthrew a military dictatorship in
Nicaragua. The many coups and rebellions of Africa often reflect
guerrilla warfare, with various groups having clear political objectives
and using guerrilla tactics. Examples include the overthrow of regimes
in Uganda, Liberia and other places. In Asia, native or local regimes
have been overthrown by guerrilla warfare, most notably in Vietnam,
China and Cambodia. Foreign forces intervened in all these countries,
but the power struggles were eventually resolved locally. The ongoing
Boko Haram insurgency is also a form of guerrilla warfare against a

native regime, although the insurgency seems not to have the prospect and capacity to oust the government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

There are many unsuccessful examples of guerrilla warfare against local or native regimes. These include Portuguese Africa (Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau), Malaysia (then Malaya) during the Malayan Emergency, Bolivia, Argentina, and the Philippines. It was even able to use these tactics effectively against the Indian Peace Keeping Force sent by India in the mid-1980s, which were later withdrawn for varied reasons, primarily political. The Tigers are fighting to create a separate homeland for Sri Lankan Tamils, many of whom complain of marginalisation by successive governments led by the Sinhalese majority since independence from Britain in 1948.

3.2   Ethical Dimensions

Civilians may be attacked or killed as punishment for alleged collaboration, or as a policy of intimidation and coercion. Such attacks are usually sanctioned by the guerrilla leadership with an eye toward the political objectives to be achieved. Attacks may be aimed to weaken civilian morale so that support for the guerrilla's opponents decreases. Civil wars may also involve deliberate attacks against civilians, with both guerrilla groups and organised armies committing atrocities. Ethnic and religious feuds may involve widespread massacres and genocide as competing factions inflict massive violence on targeted civilian population.

Guerrillas in wars against foreign powers may direct their attacks at civilians, particularly if foreign forces are too strong to be confronted directly on a long term basis. In Vietnam, bombings and terror attacks against civilians were fairly common, and were often effective in demoralising local opinion that supported the ruling regime and its American backers. While attacking an American base might involve lengthy planning and casualties, smaller scale terror strikes in the civilian sphere were easier to execute. Such attacks also had an effect on the international scale, demoralising American opinion, and hastening a withdrawal.

In Iraq, most of the deaths since the 2003 US invasion have not been suffered by US troops but by civilians, as warring factions plunged the state into civil war based on ethnic and religious hostilities. Arguments vary on whether such turmoil will succeed in turning American opinion against the US troop deployment. However, the use of attacks against civilians to create an atmosphere of chaos (and thus political advantage where the atmosphere causes foreign occupiers to withdraw or offer

concessions), is well established in guerrilla and national liberation struggles. Claims and counterclaims of the morality of such attacks are bound to come up any day and they make up the ethical dimension of guerrilla warfare. Even government forces engaged in counter-guerrilla warfare do often attack civilian population either deliberately or by mistake. Government forces in Nigeria fighting the Boko Haram insurgents bombed an internally displaced people's (IDP) camp in 2017 with heavy casualty and claimed that it was as a result of human error in targeting the place, adding that the air force responsible for the attack mistakenly believed the IDP camp was a terrorist camp. In January 2020, Iran shot a missile at and brought down a Ukrainian civilian plane near Tehran. Iran later accepted responsibility and claimed that it was as a result of human error as the force believed the target was a terrorist plane.

3.3   Laws of War

Guerrillas are in danger of not being recognised as lawful combatants because they may not wear a uniform, (to mingle with the local population), or their uniform and distinctive emblems may not be recognised as such by their opponents. This occurred in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71.

Article 44, sections 3 and 4 of the 1977 First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, "relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts", does recognise combatants who, because of the nature of the conflict, do not wear uniforms as long as they carry their weapons openly during military operations. This gives non-uniformed guerrillas lawful combatant status against countries that have ratified this convention. However, the same protocol states in Article 37(1)(c) that "the feigning of civilian, non-combatant status" shall constitute perfidy and is prohibited by the Geneva Conventions. So is the wearing of enemy uniform, as happened in the Boer War.

SELF- ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

Explain the ethical and legal dimensions of a Boko Haram insurgent not wearing uniform in combat, not bearing his arms openly and attacking a civilian population.

4.0   CONCLUSION

We have seen the other aspects of guerrilla warfare, namely: foreign and native regimes, ethical dimensions and the law of war pertaining to the use of uniform by guerrillas engaged in war.

5.0   SUMMARY

In this unit we found that it is always easier for guerrillas to fight local regimes and depose them than to fight a foreign regime. Often when a foreign force joins a local regime in fighting a native guerrilla, it is still the local regime and the native guerrillas that will resolve their issues. Ethics is a worrisome dimension in guerrilla warfare as guerrillas have a penchant to attack unarmed civilian population against the law of war which makes it a war crime for a combatant to attack a civilian population. It is desirable that guerrillas engaged in combat wear uniform for easy identification and bear their arms openly to enable civilians stay clear of dangerous persons and environments.

6.0   TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Discuss foreign and native regimes, ethical dimensions and law of war as aspects of guerrilla warfare.

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UNIT 4   COUNTER-GUERRILLA WARFARE

CONTENTS

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1.0   INTRODUCTION

When guerrillas attack an enemy, what does the enemy do in response? The enemy will respond by returning the attack by way of countering the guerrilla's attack. The response of an enemy to a guerrilla attack or the way and manner or the measures adopted by the enemy to handle and eradicate the guerrilla attack is what is called counter-guerrilla warfare. This is the focus of this unit.

2.0   OBJECTIVES
At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
- give a detailed account of the way and manner an enemy responds to guerrilla attack
- specify the classic guidelines and their variants thereof which the enemy uses to counter the attack of a guerrilla.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Classic Guidelines

The guerrilla can be difficult to beat, but certain principles of counter-insurgency warfare have been well known since the 1950s and 1960s and have been successfully applied. The underlying assumption of the classic guidelines is that of a country minimally committed to the rule of law and better governance. Some governments, however, give such considerations short shrift, and their counter-insurgency operations have involved mass murder, genocide, starvation and the massive spread of terror, torture and execution. In the Soviet–Afghan War for example, the Soviets countered the Mujahideen with a policy of wastage and depopulation, driving over one third of the Afghan population into exile

(over five million people), and carrying out widespread destruction of villages, granaries, crops, herds and irrigation systems, including the deadly and widespread mining of fields and pastures (Thompson, 1966). The elements of Thompson's moderate approach is adopted here (Thompson, 1966):

The people are the key base to be secured and defended rather than territory won or enemy bodies counted. Contrary to the focus of conventional warfare, territory gained, or casualty counts are not of overriding importance in counter-guerrilla warfare. The support of the population is the key variable. Since many insurgents rely on the population for recruits, food, shelter, financing, and other materials, the counter-insurgent force must focus its efforts on providing physical and economic security for that population and defending it against insurgent attacks and propaganda.

There must be a clear political counter-vision that can overshadow, match or neutralise the guerrilla vision. This can range from granting political autonomy, to economic development measures in the affected region. The vision must be an integrated approach, involving political, social and economic and media influence measures. A nationalist narrative for example, might be used in one situation, an ethnic autonomy approach in another. An aggressive media campaign must also be mounted in support of the competing vision or the counter-insurgent regime will appear weak or incompetent.

Practical action must be taken at the lower levels to match the competitive political vision. It may be tempting for the counter-insurgent side to simply declare guerrillas "terrorists" and pursue a harsh liquidation strategy as was the case in Afghanistan. Brute force however, may not be successful in the long run. Action does not mean capitulation, but sincere steps such as removing corrupt or arbitrary officials, cleaning up fraud, building more infrastructure, collecting taxes honestly, or addressing other legitimate grievances can do much to undermine the guerrillas' appeal.

Use of economy of force. The counter-insurgent regime must not overreact to guerrilla provocations, since this may indeed be what they seek to create a crisis in civilian morale. Indiscriminate use of firepower may only serve to alienate the key focus of counterinsurgency- the base of the people. Police level actions should guide the effort and take place in a clear framework of legality, even if under a state of emergency. Civil liberties and other customs of peacetime may have to be suspended, but again, the counter-insurgent regime must exercise restraint, and cleave to orderly procedures. In the counter-insurgency

context, "boots on the ground" are even more important than technological prowess and massive firepower, although anti-guerrilla forces should take full advantage of modern air, artillery and electronic warfare assets (Metz, 2006).

Big unit action may sometimes be necessary. If police action is not sufficient to stop the guerrilla fighters, military sweeps may be necessary. Such "big battalion" operations may be needed to break up significant guerrilla concentrations and split them into small groups where combined civic-police action can control them.

Aggressive mobility is useful. Mobility and aggressive small unit action is extremely important for the counter-insurgent regime. Heavy formations must be lightened to aggressively locate, pursue and fix insurgent units. Huddling in static strong-points simply concedes the field to the insurgents. They must be kept on the run constantly with aggressive patrols, raids, ambushes, sweeps, cordons, roadblocks, prisoner snatches, etc.

Ground level embedding and integration is vital. In tandem with mobility is the embedding of hardcore counter-insurgent units or troops with local security forces and civilian elements. The US Marines in Vietnam also saw some success with this method, under its CAP (Combined Action Programme) where Marines were teamed as both trainers and "stiffeners" of local elements on the ground. US Special Forces in Vietnam like the Green Berets also caused significant local problems for their opponents by their leadership and integration with mobile tribal and irregular forces. The CIA's Special Activities Division created successful guerrilla forces from the Hmong tribe during the war in Vietnam in the 1960s, from the Northern Alliance against the Taliban during the war in Afghanistan in 2001 (Simmon & Schuster, 2002), and from the Kurdish Peshmerga against Ansar al-Islam and the forces of Saddam Hussein during the war in Iraq in 2003 (Tucker & Faddis, 2008; Woodward, Simon &Schuster, 2004). In Iraq, the 2007 US "surge" strategy saw the embedding of regular and special forces troops among Iraqi army units. These hardcore groups were also incorporated into local neighborhood outposts in a bid to facilitate intelligence gathering, and to strengthen ground level support among the masses (Metz, 2006).

Cultural sensitivity is inevitable. Counter-insurgent forces require familiarity with the local culture, mores and language or they will experience numerous difficulties. Americans experienced this in Vietnam and during the US Iraqi Freedom invasion and occupation, where shortages of Arabic speaking interpreters and translators hindered both civil and military operations (Metz, 2006).

Systematic intelligence effort is of top priority. Every effort must be made to gather and organise useful intelligence. A systematic process must be set up to do so, from casual questioning of civilians to structured interrogations of prisoners. Creative measures must also be used, including the use of double agents, or even bogus "liberation" or sympathizer groups that help reveal insurgent personnel or operations.

Methodical clear and hold should be put in place. An "ink spot" clear and hold strategy must be used by the counter-insurgent regime, dividing the conflict area into sectors, and assigning priorities between them. Control must expand outward like an ink spot on paper, systematically neutralising and eliminating the insurgents in one sector of the grid, before proceeding to the next. It may be necessary to pursue holding or defensive actions elsewhere, while priority areas are cleared and held.

Careful deployment of mass popular forces and special units is a vital aspect of counter-insurgency. Mass forces include village self-defence groups and citizen militias organised for community defence and can be useful in providing civic mobilisation and local security. Specialist units can be used profitably, including commando squads, long range reconnaissance and "hunter-killer" patrols, defectors who can track or persuade their former colleagues like the Kit Carson units in Vietnam, and paramilitary style groups. Strict control must be kept over specialist units to prevent the emergence of violent vigilante style reprisal squads that undermine the government's programme.

The limits of foreign assistance must be clearly defined and carefully used. Such aid should be limited either by time, or as to material and technical, and personnel support, or both. While outside aid or even troops can be helpful, lack of clear limits, in terms of either a realistic plan for victory or exit strategy, may find the foreign helper "taking over" the local war, and being sucked into a lengthy commitment, thus providing the guerrillas with valuable propaganda opportunities as the toll of dead foreigners mounts. Such a scenario occurred with the US in Vietnam, with the American effort creating dependence in South Vietnam, and war-weariness and protests back home. Heavy-handed foreign interference may also fail to operate effectively within the local cultural context, setting up conditions for failure.

Time is of the essence. A key factor in guerrilla strategy is a drawn-out, protracted conflict that wears down the will of the opposing counter-insurgent forces. Democracies are especially vulnerable to the factor of time. The counter-insurgent force must allow enough time to get the job

done. Impatient demands for victory centered around short-term electoral cycles play into the hands of the guerrillas, though it is equally important to recognise when a cause is lost and the guerrillas have won.

3.2   Variants

Some writers on counter-insurgency warfare emphasise the more turbulent nature of today's guerrilla warfare environment, where the clear political goals, parties and structures of such places as Vietnam, Malaysia, or El Salvador are not as prevalent. These writers point to numerous guerrilla conflicts that center around religious, ethnic or even criminal enterprise themes and that do not lend themselves to the classic "national liberation" template.

The wide availability of the Internet has also caused changes in the tempo and mode of guerrilla operations in such areas as coordination of strikes, leveraging of financing, recruitment, and media manipulation. While the classic guidelines still apply, today's anti-guerrilla forces need to accept a more disruptive, disorderly and ambiguous mode of operation.

Insurgents may not be seeking to overthrow the state, may have no coherent strategy or may pursue a faith-based approach difficult to counter with traditional methods. There may be numerous competing insurgencies in one theater, meaning that the counterinsurgent must control the overall environment rather than defeat a specific enemy. The actions of individuals and the propaganda effect of a subjective "single narrative" may far outweigh practical progress, rendering counterinsurgency even more non-linear and unpredictable than before. The counterinsurgent, not the insurgent, may initiate the conflict and represent the forces of revolutionary change. The economic relationship between insurgent and population may be diametrically opposed to classical theory. Insurgent tactics, based on exploiting the propaganda effects of urban bombing, may invalidate some classical tactics and render others, like patrolling, counterproductive under some circumstances. Thus, field evidence suggests, classical theory is necessary but not sufficient for success against contemporary insurgencies.

SELF- ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

You have been appointed the National Security Adviser for Nigeria and requested to do a blue print to the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on guidelines to embark on counter-guerrilla operations against

the Boko Haram insurgents and the Fulani Herdsmen. Develop your blue print.

4.0   CONCLUSION

In this unit we learnt the various classic guidelines for counter-guerrilla warfare. We saw that numerous guerrilla conflicts like Boko Haram centre around religious, ethnic or even criminal enterprise themes and therefore, do not lend themselves to the classic "national liberation" template, hence, the need for some variants of guidelines for counter-guerrilla warfare.

5.0   SUMMARY

For effective response to a guerrilla attack, the counter-insurgents need to use some classic guidelines as part of measures to contain and eventually defeat the guerrillas. However, the wide availability of the Internet and other current amenities have caused changes in the tempo and mode of guerrilla operations in such areas as coordination of strikes, leveraging of financing, recruitment, and media manipulation. While the classic guidelines still apply, today's anti-guerrilla forces need to accept a more disruptive, disorderly and ambiguous mode of operation.

6.0   TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

List and discuss the guidelines you will like the government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to adopt in the counter-insurgency warfare against the Boko Haram insurgents and the Fulani herdsmen currently terrorising the country.

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